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PREFACE
In the concluding paragraph of his
Metaphysics
. Borden Parker Bowne remarks
that
,
"According to an Oriental proverb,
God knows it better.” No doubt that will
always be true of the solution to the
problem of this dissertation; but many
times in the course of these years I have
felt that doubtless (so far as I was con-
cerned, at least) God was the only one
who would ever know anything worth say-
ing about the complexities of body-mind
relations! Over these many rough places
assistance has been rendered by several
members of the Faculties of Philosophy
and Psychology of Boston, Yale and Brown
Universities.
Foremost among the few who should be
named specifically is Dr. Edgar S.
Brightman, without whose constant
encouragement and numerous counsels this
would never have been written. Dr.
Edmund B. Delabarre, of Brown University,
has given invaluable help, particularly
in achieving orientation in the problem
in general. Professors F. S. C.
Northrop, of Yale University, and Arthur
E. Murphy, of Brown University, have
rendered much assistance, especially in
dealing with the problems of organism and
freedom.
Grateful acknowledgement is made
here of the courteous and willing service
rendered by the staff of the Library of
each of the above-named schools, also.
The conclusion of the citation from
Bowne applies to this dissertation, too;
“Yet so it seems to me; and I have set it
down in the hope that so it may seem to
others also.” J. S. P.
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THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM
IN JAMES WARD'S PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE
THE PROBLEM, AIMS AND SOURCES OF THE DISSERTATION
A. The Problem
This dissertation is concerned with the problem of
describing and explaining the relationship which exists
between body and mind, in the life of the human individual.
In particular, it is limited for the most part to an exposi-
tion, analysis and critical evaluation of the contributions
made in the writings of James Ward, toward a solution of that
very difficult problem.
James ?/ard was an English personalistic psychologist and
philosopher. He was born January 27, 1843, at Hull, England,
and died at Cambridge, March 4, 1925, in his eighty-third
year. Forty years of his life were spent in academic pur-
suits, chiefly in connection with Cambridge University, first
as Fellow and Tutor in Trinity College, and later as Professor
of Mental Philosophy. His long life and unusual character
held a curious mixture of poverty and riches, illness and
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health, suffering and honors, loneliness and social achieve-
ment. Sensitive, painfully conscientious and self-critica].,
he yet reveals a depth of insight, and a felicity of style
that have assured him an enduring place in the world of
thought. V/ard was thoroughly scientific: a first-rate
biologist, and one of England’s greatest psychologists. At
the same time, he was a true philosopher. His restless and
adventurous spirit could not stay content among the facts
and laws and disconnected hypotheses of science. He must be
ever pushing out into the deeps of metaphysics and
epistemology, exploring implications, meanings and explana-
tions, seeking connections, and the wider view of a coherent
philosophy, a true We 1 tans chauung . Hence his greet
importance to those interested in a problem like that of
body-mind relations, which clearly spans the fields both of
science and philosophy.
B. The Aims
The relation of body and mind is, without doubt, one
of the most persistent and difficult problems in the whole
compass of philosophy. Furthermore, it is also one of the
most fertile, leading the investigator and student out into
all manner of secondary problems and questions. James Vi/ard
v;as fully alive to the importance of these secondary and
supporting considerations, and he was peculiarly well-fitted
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to deal with them: particularly with such as had
psychological implications.
It shall be my aim, therefore, first of all to understand
and set forth Ward*s solution of the age-long riddle of body-
mind relationship. In the second place, I shall seek to make
clear what seem to me to be the meaning and value of his
thought concerning some of the most important secondary
problems that arise. And, finally, it shall be ray aim
throughout to see Ward’s thought in its true perspective, so
far as I am able, and rightly to evaluate his conclusions.
C. The Primary Sources
1. The Writings of James Ward
Naturally, the principal source for this dissertation
is the writings of James W'ard. I shall endeavor to examine
every available published word that Ward v/rote, in order to
glean everything which may have any bearing on our problem.
But most important for our purpose are the following:
Naturalism and Agnosticism
,
1899
The Realm of Ends
,
1911
Psychological Principles
,
1918
and the posthumously published collection of essays and
articles.
Essays in Philosophy
,
1927
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Special mention should he made, also, of the article,
"Psychology," written originally in the 1880's, and appearing
in 1885, in the Encyclopedia Brittanica . It was republished,
with additions and omissions, in succeeding editions down to
1911. Although, for the most part, it is embodied in
Psychological Principles
,
there are some portions of it -
particularly the section on Body and Mind - which are of
importance, and are not included in his great text-book?'
2. Dr. J. S. Marshall *s Dissertation
Another important source for this study is the disser-
tation offered to Boston University in 1926, by Dr. John
Sedberry Marshall, entitled. The Continuum in James Ward * s
Psychology . As a study of the continuum itself. Dr.
Marshall »s work will surely stand unchallenged as a monumental
piece of research. This has been of some value in helping
toward a grasp of Ward’s teachings. But we shall be inter-
ested, also, in considering and criticizing Marshall’s
interpretation of the metaphysical meaning and bearing of
the continuum. This is of vital significance in relation to
the solution of the body-mind problem. As I understand the
situation, if Marshall is right in his interpretation, then
1. See Ward, PP, the Preface, pages v to vii.
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logically we ought to regard Ward as hut one of that group
of thinkers who attempt a monistic solution. This, it seems
to me, is a very questionable position, and must be con-
sidered carefully. Hence the importance of Dr. Marshall’s
dissertation as source material.
3. The V/ritings of Other Psychologists
and Philosophers
And naturally, also, the published work of a number of
other thinkers, from Aristotle on dovm to the present day,
will be used as source material. V/hile Ward was quite
thorough in his exposition of the historical background,
nevertheless, it is necessary to go to the authors themselves,
that we may acquire and preserve right perspective. These
shall be noted in the proper places of reference, as we have
occasion.
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CHAPTER T'WO
THE LOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Nature of the Body-Mincl Problem
1. Its Psychological Basis
In order to approach intelligently a problem as compli-
cated as that of body-mind relations, a preliminary survey
of the nature and logical relations of the problem is
indispensable. By means of such a survey (which is
attempted in this chapter and the one following) we may hope
to "get our bearings," and to avoid certain confusions and
misunderstandings, which might otherwise be inevitable.
Let us begin with the statement and application of a
general principle: Every investigation in science or
philosophy should start by asking, lhat are the facts as
critically determined? This means that any study of the
body-mind problem must begin in the field of psychology.
Obvious though this seems, it is important to set it dovm
clearly, here at the very beginning of our discussion of
Vi/ard’s thought. For, as we shall see, it was his conviction
that the psychology (and most of the philosophy) of his day
was infected by the taint of Descartes' rationalistic and
dualistic analysis. Therefore, he did not consider the
psychological, factual basis as finally and correctly
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determined. Rather, this was his first, and in some respects
his most important point of attack. Little or no sound
progress can be hoped for in the speculative aspects of the
problem, until the factual basis is scientifically ascertained
and logically interpreted.
2. The Limits of Scientific Investigation
Important as it is, however, in any discussion of body-
mind relationship, to make sure of the scientific basis in so
far as we can, we may not stop there. In the first place,
a great deal of the factual background of this problem is
beyond direct observation, either objective or introspective.
Although psychologists and physiologists have learned hov/ to
Investigate part of this obscure background by studying
indirectly many of the muscular, nervous and cerebral
processes and events, and their correlation with mental
processes, yet many other critically important facts still
defy investigation. It may well be that many of these latter
will always continue to lie beyond scientific observation
and systematization.
By way of example, consider the vital question as to
temporal sequence of brain-event and sensational or
volitional experience. Conceivably - but quite improbably -
it might become possible to locate cerebrally the particular
brain-events with exactness, and even to time them with great
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accuracy. For other objective physical events can be located
and measured, and timed, to the millionth of an inch and the
quadrillionth of a second, by indirect methods. Of what use
would this be, however, in view of the crudeness of our
time- sense with respect to experiences? V/e knov/, experimen-
tally, e.g., that sounds and colors experienced at the rate
of fifteen per second cannot be distinguished, but merge into
one continuous tone or shade. It is difficult, therefore,
to see hov/ it will ever be possible to locate temporally
with any accuracy, sensations (or volitions, either), within
more than the tenth of a second. It would seem, therefore,
that the question of temporal sequence must remain
scientifically unsettled; and the important considerations
within the scope of the body-mind problem which hinge upon
it must be determined, if at all, extra-scientifically
.
3. The Necessity of Metaphysics
But deeper still, the very distinction between body and
mind must, itself, be examined and criticized. Psychology,
in the beginning (and continuously for practical purposes)
quite naturally accepts that distinction, on the basis of
common sense realism. Upon that realistic basis, as an
unconscious philosophical presupposition, all science
proceeds. V/hen, however, science finds itself in a deadlock,
or when plainly contradictory theses seem both to be
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scientifically correct, then it is necessary to reexamine
the presuppositions of science. It is thus that we are
driven, often, to deal v/ith questions of metaphysics. James
Ward is of the opinion that this is the situation in
psychology, particularly v/ith respect to the problem of body
and mind. In his Britannica article (embodied later in PP)
he proceeds to that reanalysis of experience (referred to
above^) which is, in effect, a reanalysis of the psychological
^
factual basis of the body-mind problem. But such a
reanalysis, even though it be regarded as thoroughly
scientific and sound, can be completely understood and
coherently justified only on the basis of a different meta-
physics than that underlying the Associationisra of his
2predecessors. It is to the working out of this metaphysics,
after a refutation of the systems of naturalism and
agnosticism in the earlier lectures, that Ward devoted
himself in the later Gifford Lectures, The Realm of Ends.
4. Relation to Other Philosophical Problems
Thus, we see, the body-mind problem is of such a nature
as to demand the resources of both science and metaphysics
1. Supra, pages 1, 2.
2. See, on this point, e.g.. Ward, PP, 412, n.l; 428.
Of. below, Chapter Three.
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for its treatment. Yet even this is not the whole story, for
the body-mind problem is, further, the meeting-point of a
host of other problems. This has been well stated by
Professor C. A. Strong:
Thus a whole series of scientific and philosophical
conceptions of the first order - the principle of the
conservation of energy, the mechanical theory of life,
the biological doctrine of evolution, the fundamental
postulates of brain- physiology and mental pathology,
the philosophical conceptions of mechanism, efficiency
and free-will - all converge and come to a focus in the
problem of the relation of mind and body.^
In particular, it is important to note that there is a
peculiarly close relationship between the body-mind problem
and the problems of freedom and determinism, and of mechanism
and teleology. So close, in fact, are these problems seen
to be to one another, as we study James Ward’s treatment,
that it is practically impossible to deal v;ith one without
dealing with the others, and the solution of one is seen to
involve, almost inevitably, the solution of the others.
B. The Logic of the Problem
1. The Tentative Nature of Any Solution
It remains, now, before turning to the question of the
relations of science and metaphysics, to draw certain
1 . WMB
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logical inferences from the nature of the body-mind problem.
In the first place, it is clearly evident that so far as the
details of the problem are concerned, any solution must be
purely tentative at many points. It must be always open to
revision in the light of new scientific facts or reasonable
interpretation thereof, or in the light of new and more
coherent philosophical insights. We have a good illustration
of this tentativeness , for example, in Ward’s own thought,
where he discusses at length occasionalism and "parapsychlc"
realism,land decides in favor of the latter, while freely
admitting that neither can be empirically proved, and that
occasionalism is defensible from his ov/n point of view of
theistic personalism.
2. The Determinative Relation of
Metaphysical Standpoint
But there is a deeper sense in which any discussion of
the body-mind problem must remain tentative, or at least,
remain always conditioned: After all, Important as it is,
body-mind relation is but one of a number of very important
and very difficult problems in metaphysics and epistemology.
One’s total philosophy or V/eltanschauung
,
and one’s mbtaphy-
sical credenda must rest upon and must deal coherently with
all of these problems and their solutions. Metaphysical
standpoint, therefore, is very apt to be determined by other
1. ROE, 248-269. Note Ward's spelling: "pampsychic . ”
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considerations than body-mind relationship, and is very
likely to be strongly determinative in dealing with the
body-mind problem. If, for example, one is convinced on
other grounds of the truth of naturalistic, or certain types
of idealistic metaphysics, he will find little light, indeed,
in Vmrd's treatment of the body-mind problem, per se, and
his ov/n solution of that problem will almost certainly be
predetermined on other lines than those of Ward.
Or, to look at those considerations from a less general
point of view: It is a matter of fact that the interactionist
is almost always an Indeterminis t; that the parallelist is
just as often a determinist; and that the automatist in body-
mind theory is certain to be a determinist. This does not
happen by accident. Metaphysical conviction as to determin-
ism or indeterminism, and as to the so-called efficiency or
lack of efficiency of mind forms a standpoint from which the
body-mind problem is almost certain to be viewed in one way
or the other. Theoretically, it would seem that one*s
conclusion regarding body-mind relations should be just as
determinative in the other direction. But in reality this
problem is so difficult, and so deep in the underbrush of
preliminary problems, that it is practically impossible to
solve it independently and then use its solution as a
standpoint. At most, it seems increasingly clear that its
solution must go hand in hand with that of freedom and
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dater-minism: that the two problems cannot be satisfactorily
solved or dealt with independently.
In criticizing any solution of the body-mind problem,
then, it is important to keep in mind the metaphysical stand-
point from which the solution was attempted, and, also, the
standpoint from which it is to be criticized. A difference
of standpoint will invalidate almost any criticism.
3. The Possible Relations of Body and Mind
One more group of inferences we must note: the various
relations between body and mind which are logically possible,
considering the nature of body, mind, and the world in which
they are related. These relations may be considered under
three heads: a. As to substantial reality; b. As to temporal
sequence; c. As to causal efficiency.
a. As to Substantial Reality
The temporal and causal relations of body and mind
depend to a considerable extent upon the ontological nature
of the two factors (body and mind) . It is well, therefore,
to ask, first of all, Vi/hat are the possible conceptions of
these elements in our problem, which common sense take to be
independently real, and capable of interaction, one with the
other, but which many philosophers, and even some scientists
interpret quite otherwise?
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(1) In the first place, both body and mind may be held
to have independent, ontological reality, and really to
interact. In this case their relation would be that of
distinct and disparate substances. Philosophically, this
would demand an explanation or interpretation of the assumed
causal interrelations.
(2) Body (i.e., as composed of matter) may be considered
to be the only real substance. In such case, mind becomes
epiphenomenal, or else it must be granted some other status
in reality: e.g., as having a purely functional relation
and meaning. On such a hypothesis it is difficult to see
hov; the relation of mind to body can be other than that of
dependence
.
(3) Neither body nor mind, per se may be regarded as
independently real. In this case their relation to each
other will depend upon the type of metaphysical conception
which is posited. In particular, if a monistic metaphysics
is assumed, both will be regarded as aspects of some under-
lying reality. If a neo-realis tic conception is adopted,
both will be regarded as composed of neutral entities in
certain complicated arrangements. The distinction between
them vanishes, and the problem becomes one of explaining the
complicated arrangements and their changes.
(4) Or, finally, it is conceivable that mind alone may
possess independent reality, in each particular case of
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body-mind relationship. The body may be regarded, from this
point of view, as purely illusory, or as having only a
phenomenal, not an independent, existential reality. This
type of theory is not to be confused with those systems of
idealism and realism which do not deny the independent
reality of body, but which conceive it as psychic in nature.
If pluralistic, such systems belong under (1), above. If
monistic, under (3).
b. As to Temporal Sequence
Coming nov/ to the possibilities of temporal relation of
body and mind, we may note first of all that there are
several logically possible relations which have seldom or
never been seriously entertained, at least by systematic
thinkers. For instance, it is logically possible that there
is no law of temporal relationship. Also, it is logically
possible that the mental event always precedes the brain-
event. Some such notion as this latter seems to be at the
basis of Christian Science, but is certainly not entertained
hy any scientific investigator or systematic philosopher, so
far as I can find. The logical possibilities commonly
adopted would seem to be limited to these three:
(1) The mental event may sometimes precede the brain-
event (e.g., in so-called volition) and may sometimes follow
(e.g., in so-called sensational experience).
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(2) The mental event may he regarded as always following
the physical event.
(3) They may he regarded as always talcing place simul-
taneously.
c. As to Causal Efficiency
The third and last group of possible hody-mind relations
has to do with the conception of causality. Vi/e may note in
passing that scientists and philosophers are not agreed as
to the meaning of causality. Vi/hat is meant hy scientific
causality, strictly speaking, is uniform temporal succession.
The factor known as the cause always precedes the effect, and
is presumably always followed hy the effect. There is
assumed to be no cause without an effect, and no effect with-
out a cause. Furthermore, according to the ideal of modern
science, causes and effects form unbroken chains. There are
no scientifically demonstrable "first causes," or "final
effects." This conception of causal continuity is closely
allied to the law of the conservation of energy, according
to which no physical energy is ever lost or created within
the system of the universe. Over against the scientific
conception of cause, are the popular and what is sometimes
called the philosophical conceptions of causality. According
to these, the cause is a real agent, and not merely the
uniform predecessor of the effect.
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However, we are not here concerned with the conceptions
of causality, except to note the disagreement, and that the
conception of causality entertained may influence the choice
of the theory of causal relationship, in individual cases.
^
We should also note that the question of temporal sequence
is closely bound up with the problem of causal relations.
We may distinguish three possible types of theory which
have been commonly held, and one logical possibility seldom
if ever embraced:
(1) Mind and body may causally interact on one another.
This is the conception of interactionist theories.
(2) The physical side may be the cause of the mental,
but not vice versa. This is what Ward calls psychical
epiphenomenalism - a better term than automatism, for the
latter may be conceived parallelistically
.
(3) Physical and mental events may occur concomitantly,
without there being any causal relation between them. This
is known as parallelism.
(4) And it is possible to conceive of the mental factor
as the only causal one: a sort of physical epiphenomenalism.
A completely idealistic panpsychism, in which the apparent,
scientific parallelism breaks down philosophically because
the body side is held to be really only phenomenal, would
1. On causal conceptions see Ward, ROE, 273-277, and
the references there cited.
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illustrate this type. This is probably the position of Prof.
Strong, in his earlier work, V/hy the Mind has a Body .
Before closing this brief survey of causal relations,
we should give attention, also, to the possibility that some
montal events, at least, may exist without a physical
correlate. 1/Vhile not frequently held, at least in modern
science and philosophy, it is true that at least one first-
rate thinker in recent times has embraced this possibility:
Henri Bergson, in Matter and Memory .
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Relations of Science and Metaphysics Involved:
1. By the Nature of the Body-Mind Problem
The problem of the relation of body and mind involves
both metaphysics and science, as we have noted in the
preceding Chapter, It is true, of course, that one can
consider the problem from the point of view of science alone.
The attempt to do so has been made more than once, and,
doubtless, will be made again. Yet even superficial examina-
tion should convince one of the futility of such a one-sided
attack. As we have pointed out, the scientific facts are
patently insufficient for a full and satisfactory solution.
The mechanics of the brain is but slightly understood, and
many of the factors involved in the body-mind relation are
such as to def^j- empirical observation, probably for all time
to come. Furthermore, such facts as are indisputably avail-
able do not thus far admit of a purely scientific hypothesis,
without resort to metaphysical presuppositions. So far as
we may judge, this must continue indefinitely to be the
situation.
We must hold, therefore, in spite of Huxley and the more
-'C' i -JI AOX*.'- i. '\‘}':*iy: c:-:
< r T
•
• ^
•
: , Pa
- Vn A 2 !" "'A *' S' l; ' *' ' ^ } ' •> - »
'
'.i;/Xcfo*i'^ i^'n * * . ‘'iXc' *^lc '-*C''f ' ^7'i
~
•’’I.'jv
-;. ''-r-' X “io r-.'. i:/ 5 Een: : i;.-^ ':o r-^Jiro'- '
6ii:i nt ^ ‘ . ;. '‘v^ 07 :
,
iOR f'."' i F. '^’ CS /d'-.;:*-':,.'*; rfdoo'
.rs^ir 'c 'tc
.
ej:f'T 7 a ; :II ./t'< :'-f* ' ' ; 7;T.b;eO'- -rq
.
= '3 eorr*-' Inr '10 Vf-lv lo r.j-'.’, 7* P.uX - <'’R,CdoTq t ;'X 1: bl AJICO
,
-p ^-o~: a •A ':'’7 TO'' '' b T. T T 9 1, <1 ^ os cb orf erfT
-
'. 1 Irl:/ ^'tT ': if.i /: 0V e ct- eY , t t t^ '• : 9d [jX V 4c3#>XctdYob
lo ‘^onl '•'’00 bIrod
8
P* * ''! •_''. 1 ' L 'T; O' 7 v' ..• A' aA .'[oRo l s
.
.
.-;
f ;.'Xoe 770 :+ d n1a ^ *. R r ' '. •:': In^’oXMlx
f^rj: .^'O'j^S’T 'X'.'TA' 7>' .'f f'^' X r. 7;,'’ ^ ;'".it*:!'.f otrl '.’’c 5? :>i/!: 'Xo£‘^; f'-nX.'
*
’ ^ j r •!' >ii
' *•
'.'T; i’X
-.• X • •::/l I'T. iCic j * 7 ' : : a-'
'
••
’'i tfr^a <>u r. :: '{!^:jr,
-
.
’.
•
'
'••CT’^ lf.7 !.* 8 M SwOPI '; 0 .' •
,
i:-"
.t;r’0 ‘:' 'jj
. : c
..
'. .
y-;
'
./.'.••J •; lo Xi:-Xv i*.'i eff-l .'• .’ o.v o^' C^n
”• V' ^ Inolt
,
Xf. .’ t : ,
''''' Cf-' ' '’j j /
t
•
^ V ^. } :.;•! 7 . 7:1 >>0 v.irf-J ,.”7: *' •.; : .•
-
!
^
*'
^
i
:
'! “ C
7'id'xe; T ‘V / e.'
20 .
recent behaviorists
,
that the investigation of body-mind
relations is not a strictly scientific problem. For even a
tentative or hypothetical solution, metaphysics must be
brought to bear. Its attempted exorcism, through the use of
the label "scientific,” is all too familiar, and completely
unsuccessful; as indeed it must be, in the nature of the
case. Consequently, it is of much importance to set forth
clearly, in the introduction, that conception of the relations
of science to metaphysics which is to govern our procedure
and judgments throughout this study. Confusion or uncertainty
at this point is sure to result in distortion and mis judgment.
2. By Criticisms of Marshall’s Dissertation
But more specifically, the relations of science to
metaphysics are important in view of our criticisms of Dr.
Marshall’s dissertation. These criticisms, as we shall see
later, turn largely about his apparent failure to distinguish
the tv/o standpoints in the work of James Vvard; whereas, on
the other hand, so far as I am able to judge, V/ard himself
was never oblivious to the distinction, nor to its fundamental
importance
.
3. Bj’- the Discussion of Secondary Problems
Furthermore, as we take up for critical discussion and
evaluation certain problems which crop out as we examine
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Ward’s body-mind theory, it is essential that we keep in mind
I
!
the clear distinction between the scientific and metaphysical
standpoints. If we do not, we shall be in constant danger of
misjudging their speculative or practical significance.
B. Scientific Contributions to Ketaphysics
1. The Empirical Basis of Metaphysics
To those of us who live in the modern world - let us say,
since the time of Hegel and the English naturalist s - it
seems perfectly obvious that an empirical knowledge of reality
must always precede and underlie metaphysics. The day when
men may spin their philosophy out of their own inner conscious-
ness seems gone forever: if, in truth, there ever was such a
day! In this sense, then, all modern philosophy is inductive,
not purely deductive; and the first fact to recognize, in
considering the relation of science to metaphysics, in modern
thought, is that a scientific understanding of the world must
be the basis for metaphysical systematizing. This is not to
deny, of course, that such ”a scientific understanding of the
world” will, itself, involve metaphysical viewpoint and
presuppositions, which must, in their turn, be critically
considered.^ But the important distinction (for our problem)
1. See below, Sections B, 3, p. 23, and C, 2, p. 24 f.

is that science is strictly limited by the empirical facts,
and, in general, must proceed purely inductively. Metaphysics,
however, while it must start inductively, from the scientifi-
cally ascertained facts, is not so limited, but may build the
wider generalizations of its rational systems inductively or
deductively, so long as it does not contradict the facts.
2. The Necessity of Complete Accord
But we may go further than we have in the last paragraph.
At the basis of all huinan thinking is the principle of con-
sistency: Hegelians would say, of coherence, or systematic
consistency. Consistency, at least, we may regard as a neces-
sary presupposition of reason. If, therefore, we find any
contradiction between our science and our metaphysics, we may
depend upon it that either our science is faulty or our reason-
ing is illogical, 1 The second fact upon which we must insist,
then, in seeking to understand the relations of science and
metaphysics, is that they .must, of necessity, be in complete
accord. If they disagree, it may be either one or the other
that is in error, but, granted that v/e have a valid reading of
experience in our science, then our metaphysics must adjust
itself to those fexts of experience. This is the important
point. As James Ward has well said: "Philosophy is not
directly concerned with matters-of-fact : it cannot, of course,
contradict exper ience
1. Of. Brightman, IP, II, 12: p. 58 f.
2. Muirhead, GBP, II, 47. See also Ward's essay "The
Progress of Philosophy," EIP, 112-140.
K.
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3. The Difficulty of Determining Limits
Taken abstractly, it is easy enough to differentiate
science from metaphysics. Practically, however, it is a very
difficult matter to draw a sharp line between their respec-
tive fields. It is of importance, also, to recognize that a
nui'iiber of practical and vital problems extend into both fields,
inevitably. Their solution can be attempted with some hope
of success only as this dual nature is kept constantly in
mind. The body-mind problem is unquestionably one of those
which demand both science and metaphysics in their treatment,
as we have pointed out above. ^ Of course, in any case, both
will be involved. It is the clear and conscious recognition
and distinction of the respective parts which science and
metaphysics play in the attempted solution, which is demanded.
Confusion in this matter, as we shall see, leads in Marshall's
case, at least, to the transmutation of a scientific hypoth-
esis of limited application, into a metaphysical conclusion
involving a general principle, of wide implica.tion, with
serious consequences for our problem.
C. Metaphysical presuppositions of Science
1. The Common Failure to Recognize Them
In the sections immediately preceding we have been
1. Supra
.
pages 6-8, 21. Cf. 24-25, 134, below.
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looking at the problem of the relations of science and meta-
physics largely from the ordinary and practical point of view.
It is well further to orient ourselves by recognizing that
science itself rests back upon certain philosophical presuppo-
sitions, having to do with the reality and nature of the physi-
cal world, with the knowledge process, with relationships,
logic, et cetera. Many, perhaps most, workers in the fields
of science are comfortably unconscious of these presuppositionti
some go so far, even, as to deny their very existence! The
usual point of view of the scientist is that of a refined com-
mon sense realism; and so long as he stays strictly within his
own field, there is little or no need for him to raise ques-
tions about its philosophical substratum. It is only when he
attempts to erect his science into an explanation of the uni-
verse, and so becomes, in the words of James Ward, "a man of
science off his beat, like Haeckel for example,”^ that the
ignoring or denial of his presuppositions is apt to lead the
scientist into grave difficulties.
2, Such Presuppositions Often Inescapable
A worker like James Ward in the field of psychology, how-
ever, could not rest content with ignoring these more funda-
mental questions. For he saw clearly that if he did so, there
must always remain large and embarrassing gaps in his thinking.
And Ward, first-rate scientist though he was, was also too much
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of a philosopher, and too deeply influenced by Hegelian ways of
thinking, permanently to endure such gaps. It is to be put down
to his credit, not only that he saw this situation, but that he
also very carefully refrained from cluttering up his psychology
with metaphysical discussions; and that, further, he did fear-
lessly and consistently follow out their meaning and bearing in
his Crifford Lectures, working out there a coherent philosophy.
Now we noted above that certain problems, like that of the
relation of body and mind, cannot be solved by science alone,
for they inevitably involve metaphysical considerations. One
may borrow, so to speak, from metaphysics, in order to comple-
ment or supplement the contributions which science makes toward
their solution. Such, in brief, is the attempt at solution
made by many students of the body-mind relationship. James Ward
does not believe that it is sufficient. He attempts to do more
than complement the work of empirical science. His efforts to
solve the body-mind problem amount to a critique of all previ-
ous and contemporaneous attacks on the problem, and an approach
based on a different fundamental metaphysics. This critique and
new approach go hand in hand with a strikingly similar critique
and new approach to the psychological interpretation of exper-
ience. The one seems logically impossible without the other -
at least if one is to have a coherent view of human nature and
experience. Furthermore-, both tie in with Yifard's total philos-
ophy, his Weltanschau^onp; and hie Naturphilosophie .
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D. The Body-Mind Problem and These Relationships
1. Metaphysical Presuppositions of Most Dualisms
The significance of all this discussion of the relations
of science and metaphysics may be brought out still more
specifically, perhaps, by reference, in a general way, to
previous and current attempts to solve the body-mind problem.
Almost without exception they fall into one of two classes:
(i) those which adopt a dualist ic metaphysics, and (ii) those
which veer toward metaphysical monism of the singularistic type.
Concerning the dualistic solutions, it is to be noted that
in a broad and general way, they depend upon consciously or
unconsciously assumed presuppositions. All too often these are
|
adopted or assumed uncritically. James Ward is most thoro'ogh
and merciless in exposing the short-comings and inadequacies
I
of this type of solution. Here he is indeed at his best. I
i
2. Monism Seems to Ignore Scientific Data
On the other hand, those solutions based upon an under-
lying singularistic monism seem (speaking again in a broad
and general way) to ignore the genuine reality of the plain
facts of human experience and the reasonable hypotheses
derived from those data. Although, in some respects, more
closely related to such attempts. Ward is just as thoroughly
critical of these theories, and on just as solid ground in
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his criticisms of them.
3. The Necessity for Clear Distinctions
The conclusion of this introductory discussion of the
scientific and metaphysical background of the body-mind
problem would seem to be this: It is of supreme importance,
as we proceed to study the body-mind problem in the thought
of James Ward, to "sterilize our verbal instruments by
careful definition before we begin; for much confusion and
futilit3’' seems to have resulted, historically, from failure
to distinguish carefully and to handle properly the scienti-
fic and metaphysical factors involved.** In particular, we
cannot hope to understand the meaning and the bearing of
Ward’s work, if we fail to see it against the background of
this historic confusion and futility.
1. Bowne, MET, 102.
2. Cf. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 47.
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PART ONE
THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM
CHAPTER FOUR
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OP THE PROBLEM
I
I
A* Body and Soul in the Thought of Aristotle
1. Aristotle's Psychological Viewpoint
In this chapter, it is hardly necessary to say, no at-
tempt is being made to present, even in outline, a complete
or comprehensive history of the hundreds of treatments of the
body-mind problem by scientists and philosophers from earliest i
times down to the present. All that we can hope to do is to
select a few of the more important and distinctive treat-
ments, particularly those directly influencing Ward's, by way
of illustration of the scope of his historical background.
We can do no better than to begin where most investigations
of Western thought are apt to start; with the work of Aris-
totle, the great master of ancient scientific philosophy.
Aristotle's point of view in his study of the individual.
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De Anlma
,
which is -usually regarded as the first scientific
treatise on psychology, was primarily objective. He ap-
proached the study of mind from the side of the body, and
divided bodies into those with and those without life.^ As
might be expected, his psychology is closely related to biolo
gy. But it is not biology in the modern sense of the word:
Aristotle did not abstract from the aspects of purpose and
end, and so the teleological coloring is strong in his work.
2. How Soul and Body are Related
Consequent upon this point of view, we find body and
soul as inseparable correlatives. There is no clear recogni-
tion of consciousness as the central psychological factor.
To understand the meaning of soul we must keep in mind the
teleological factor just referred to. Reality, for him, was
a teleological process in which potentiality, or matter, is
united with determinate form to produce the natural world of
animate and inanimate things and persons as we know them.
"Nature, like reason," he says, "acts with purpose, and this
purpose is its end."^ Consequently, his conception of soul
is somewhat similar to the modern notion of psychological
function, yet it includes, also, the metaphysical functions
1. Ward, PP, 2. Ward has an excellent summary of "Aris
totle’s Psychology of the Living Organism," PP, 1-6.
2. De Anima, 415b-6.
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of form and determination. He tells us that "it is the form
(or entelechy) of a natural body endov/ed with the capacity of
life."^ That it is "an entity which realizes an idea,”^ or,
as Hicks translates the same phrase, "Substance as notion or
form." Again, "It is the essential notion which we ascribe
to a body of a given kind" - i. e.,jr^the "being what it was"
or "quidity” (Hicks
)
of a body. (Greek: 'T'o t
c
e.cVa^u
,
a
timeless aorist.)^ ("Quidity" is a scholastic terra.)
As to the inseparable relation of this formal soul to
body, he leaves us in no doubt;
Inasmuch as it is the composite which is the ani-
mate creature, body cannot be regarded as the complete
realization of the soul, but the soul is the realiza-
tion of a given body...The soul is not itself
but it is a certain aspect [literally, "something^ of
body, and is consequently found in a body, and further-
more in a body of such and such a kind... The soul is
a kind of realization and expressed idea of a determi-
nate potentiality.^
3. Causal Relationships Involved
We must not, however, suppose that Aristotle’s soul is
anything purely passive or inefficient. Rather it is to be
regarded as an immanent influence, or, to use his own ex-
pression, as "the causal principle of the aforesaid (life-)
phenomena and is defined in terms of them, I mean, in terms
1. ^ Anima , 412a-4, 6.
2. De Anima , 412b-8.
3. Ibid.
4 . De Anima
,
414a-15-17.
(Tr.; Hararaond,APS)
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of nutrition, sensation, reason, motion.'*^ From the point of
viev; of his famous doctrine of the four types of causation,
we note that '‘soul” covers three of them:
The soul is the cause and principle of a living
"body. These terms are used in several senses. Cor-
responding to these differences, the soul is referred
to as cause in three distinct meanings; for it is
cause in the sense of the source of movement (effi-
cient cause}, of final cause, and as the real sub-
stance of animate bodies [formal cause.3) 2
4. Aristotle on the Intellect
Thus, for Aristotle, there was no separate or disparate
”mind” over against body. Mind, as conscious, was apparently
one of the factors or elements, in terms of which soul was to
be defined. In discussing vov^ or intellect, he recognized
no organ of intellect, as such. Curiously enough, he looked
upon the brain as primarily an organ of refrigeration! 3 He
distinguished two kinds of reason, active or creative,© irour^-
and receptive or passive^© vovs, but it
is questionable as to just what he meant by the distinction.
Only in one short chapter^ is this distinction brought out,
and only once does he depart from the use of the simple term,
VOVS • He, himself, nowhere uses the term "the active in-
tellect." So Hicks concludes that it appears "as if he ac-
1. ^ Anlma , 413b-8. 3. Somno , Chap. III.
2. ^ Anima , 415b-5. 4. ^ Anima , Book III,
Chap . V
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cepted the essential unity of intellect.”^ And Ward holds
that his doctrine of the active intellect is theological
rather than psychological.^ It is important to note that, as
I
psychological, intellect is, for Aristotle, continuous with
the lower processes, sensation, imagination and memory^ which
depend directly on the organism.
^
B. The Cartesian Dualism
1. Complete Separation of Mind and Matter
The direct antithesis, in many respects, of Aristotle’s
objective psychology is that of Rene Descartes (1596-1650 A.D.),
His method may be described as rationalistic and analytic. In
i
Ward’s figure, Descartes was ’’unmistakably Inside the circle
I
which Aristotle regarded mainly from without, and the central
unity which we missed in his (Aristotle’s) exposition ,is now
clearly indicated.'"^ That unity centers in conscious mind.
CogKito , ergo sum was the cornerstone of Cartesian thought.
The notion of conscious mind precedes that of things, and is
I
more certain. It is entirely distinct and separate from the
|
j
notion of corporeal things; and it, ”as such, could only be
ADA, 498.
PP, 4.
See, e.g,, ^ Anlma , Book II, Chap. Ill, Cf Ward,
PP, 5.
PP, 7. Ward has an excellent summary of Descartes’s
psychology, PP, 6-12.
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occupied v/ith eternal truths or ‘innate ideas’ and with what-
thus immune from all empirical Infection. It was pure res
coe:itan3 .
Over against this res cogitans stands an even more impos-
sible analytic concept: that of res extensa . Material sub-
stance was conceived as having only the nature of extension.
All sensible qualities were held as not pertaining to matter,
per se . Dynamical concepts had to be ’’smuggled without clear
definition or derivation into a physics that professed to be
•nothing but geometry’.”^ Animals were mere machines without
souls, and the human body itself, per se , was nothing but a
machlne.3 Thus Descartes's new definitions of matter and mind
bifurcated the v/orld of experience, and foisted upon modern
philosophy the dualism which was to make the problems of body-
mind and external perception so impossible of solution through
the three centuries that followed.
Yet we must be fair to Descartes, His new definitions
gave renewed life to both mental and physical sciences. They
cleared the intellectual atmosphere. They freed the concept
of consciousness from the hazy materialism, and the concept
ever other ideas it might itself frame from these, It was
1. Ward, PP, 8.
2. Ward, PP, 9.
3. Ibid, where references are given.
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of matter from the animism of occult qualities, which had
held sway during the middle ages. Furthermore, Descartes,
himself, was not blind to the difficulties of his dualism, nor
to the unity within experience.
2. Body and Soul a Substantial Unity
But reason, he frankly admitted - even his own method of
philosophizing - could not make the duality and unity compa-
tible.
To me it seems impossible that the human mind
should, distinctly and at the same time, conceive the
distinctness of body and soul and likewise their union;
for so to do, it must conceive them as a single thing
while yet conceiving them as two, which is self-repug-
nant . ^
Could any one state more clearly the complete impasse of
dualism? Yet at the same time he contends that soul and body
do become a substantial unity - unum quid cum illo compo -
nam ” - and, further, he argues that v/e should have no doubt
about the truth of the presentations of other bodies sur-
rounding our own.^
3. The Resolution of the Contradictions
Descartes, then, is in the curious position of clearly
recognizing that his reasoning is in flat contradiction to
1. Letter to the Princess Elizabeth, June, 1643.
Quoted by Ward, PP, 10.
2. See Ward, PP, 10 for quotations and references.
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plain fact, yet still contending that his reasoning is both
right and necessary to the true understanding of facts. In
such a pass, there was only one recourse, and, naturally -
since it was available to him, if not to later generations -
he took it. He appealed to the divine omnipotence and vera-
city, to bring about, in human nature, the unity of complete
duality that lay beyond hioman reason to grasp, and to ’’guaran-
tee the reality of the material world in human experience,"^
On the basis of this suggestion of Descartes, his disciples,
particularly Geulincx and Malebranche, worked out the doctrine
of Occasionalism,^ According to this doctrine, on the oc-
casion of the mental act God produces the physical effect by
a direct act of intervention. Thus interaction is accounted
for.
C, Dualism after Descartes
1, Locke’s Sensation and Reflection
The substantial dualism of Descartes and his disciples
was soon metaphysically disowned. Within the next two genera-
tions Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646-1716) set the whole course of ontological reasoning in
1, Ward, PP, 12,
2, Gf, the parallelism of Spinoza, et al,, pages
45-48, below.
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different channels. But in spite of that, Descartes's in-
fluence persisted, particularly upon the epistemological and
psychological aspects of philosophy, aided and abetted by the
rapid rise of scientific realism. We must now attempt to
trace, very briefly, something of this post-Cartesian develop-
ment of dualism, guided, still, by the suggestions of James
Ward, himself.^
John Locke (1632-1704), the father of British empirical
philosophy and psychology, distinguishes two sources of the
ideas which, for him, constitute experience. These he called
sensation and reflection. By the former he meant the deliver-
ances of the senses, which, he says, ”do convey into the mind
several distinct perceptions of things, according to those
various ways wherein those [particular sensibl^ objects do
affect them.*'^ The latter, “reflection,” he defines as '"the
perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as
it is employed about the ideas it has got.“^ He says, further
that though reflection is not sense, “as having nothing to
do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might
properly enough be called internal sense.
Note that, although Locke is not concerned primarily
1. PP, 12-21.
2. Locke, Ml -Essay Concerning Human Understanding ,
Bk. II, Chap. 1, Sec. 3
3. Op. cit., II, 1, 4.
4. Op. cit., II, 1, 4.
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with metaphysics, and disavows any clear and distinct meaning
for the word "substance” as generally used,^ yet he did not
mean at all to deny dualism. He insists that
We have as clear a notion of the substance of
spirit as we have of body,..Qt is^ the substratum to
those operations which we experiment in ourselves
within, . ,we can no more conclude its nonexistence than
we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of
body,
^
2, Kant’s External and Internal Senses
The suggestion concerning internal sense which Locke
made, but never followed up, was taken over unequivocally by
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Kant recognized an Internal sense
as well as an external sense, ^ throughout most of his
writings. According to this doctrine, the subject or Ego
knows itself as it knows other objects, phenomenally, that is
to say. At the ssime time, Kant holds to the noumenal reality
of the self. But the noumena are always, for him, unknowable.
Here, indeed, is a most interesting and difficult problem:
how "to hold fast to the reality of the self without at the
same time repudiating the doctrine of transcendental Idealism,
i. e, that the self is only ’given’ by an inner sense and so
1. Op. cit., 1, 4, 19.
2. Op, cit., II, 23, 5.
3. KrV, A-38, B-68, 69, 152-160, etc. See Ward, SOK,
139-174^ for a careful study, fully documented, of the Inner
Sense and Subject in Kant,
svaroi; r;....—, ;1 l-'i';:
0j4Cf0wL f j-C' .1. ti,
•' J '70 ny :? c . :;5:;
I
-)t:» rr.:: /:o
;
.r-i-',, } jruiA .<~:-L'n''auiJl
Lr\ ';0 ctiiC'-. .ttrc'vU; .'(C!:? ’,:^£icc Iaii'' o:‘xv rd sa Tyv.- ?.a
: '-xcvoh "I', .
jj ofiLae o.;:j :^A
^.r • ' : : ; T'• ~ . C:
•'
.'•'O i .7 / .':
•I<^ .....
arid' ri3 :^c/ort
"
’
.
.:nsj r /; Jne Ufi-v- v
J
‘ •’
-. a.'ij .a " *M^.::rv
O':. ^ .'i/i Cf'OE -I .'•r r:i .tjc ' ’ rev^o’ v,J.;iO oi 'll : ;- t^-.
'.in' . i->c
ritrh,
& 1.0 -rrf :i :: Si ol*- . ori
r r N
< •
1 ,- 0. . *
.
..'
• J .. V V w.
&ri.‘ Ic ,
,c:i€) .0
J'.rTi , ovc
• >
v\l
.aiaA al c c-£ '. i-i-J-c
38
is phenomenal . In a lengthy passage In Paragraphs 24 and
25 of the Second Edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft ^
Kant attempts vainly to solve this riddle.
The whole problem is one of exceeding difficulty, and
largely outside of the scope of the body-mind problem, in
relation to the latter we should note these two facts: first,
that Kant was still, for the most part, on the level of dual-
ism and his epistemological difficulties root back in that,
to a large extent. Secondly, however, he did attain to the
recognition of the universal subject-object duality of expe-
rience, which, for Ward,^ becomes the key to the whole prob-
lem.
3. Dualism of Phenomena, as in Hamilton
This "dualism of phenomena*^ represented in Kant's ex-
ternal and inner sense doctrine, had its counterpart in the
thought of the Scottish philosophers of common sense. Less
cautious here than Kant, they did not hesitate to draw the
logical metaphysical conclusions. This Scottish school
strongly influenced British thought of the last century, and
it was, in part, in contradiction to their dualistic strain
1. Ward, SOK, 163.
2. KrV, B-152-160, Meiklejohn's translation, pages
88-91.
3. See SOK, 151-152, 156. Cf. PP, 14-16.
4. Ward, PP, 14.
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that Ward developed his pluralistic monism. The inherent
dualism is clear, e. g,
,
in the following passage from the
Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856),
Mind and matter, as known and knowable, are only
two different series of phenomena or qualities; mind
and matter as unknown and unknowable, are the two
substances in which these two different series of
qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of
an unknown substance is only an inference we are com-
pelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena;
and the distinction of two substances is only in-
ferred from the seeming incompatability of the two
series of phenomena to ccinhere in one.^
In passing we should note also that this common sense
philosophy lay back of much of the British naturalism which
Ward is attempting to controvert in the first volume of his
Naturalism and Agnosticism .
4. Dualism in Experience, as in Bain
One of the leading psychologists of the generation pre-
ceding that of James Ward was Alexander Bain (1818-1903), who
for many years was Brofessor of Logic and English at the
University of Aberdeen. Although associated, therefore, with
the Scottish philosophers, he represents a long step away
from common sense realism. His dualism is no longer that of
substances, nor even of phenomena as implying substances.
"The arguments for the two substances,'* he contends, "have...
now entirely lost their validity. He continues,
1* Hamilton, LOM, I, 138. Quoted by V/ard, PP, 14, n. S.
2. Bain, MAB, last paragraph.
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The one substance, with two sets of properties,
two sides, the physical and the mental - a double-
faced unity - would appear to comply with all the
exigencies of the case... and the momentary glimpse
of Aristotle is at last converted into a clear and
steady vision.^
instead of the metaphysical monism we might expect from
this statement, however, Bain’s "one substance" turns out to
be conscious existence, states of mind, experience in the
cognitive sense. There is both the phenomenalism and the
positivism of Hume in his thought:
There is no possible knowledge of the world ex-
cept in reference to our minds, knowledge means a
state of mind; the notion of material things is a
mental thing. We are Incapable of discussing the
existence of an independent material world; the very
act is a contradiction.^
Yet, nevertheless, he finds within this total mental life
a definite and inescapable division into "a something
knowing and a something known," or "the subject consciousness"
and "the object consciousness.* Both are "modes of self* in
the largest sense of that term, but the object consciousness
"is our external world, our non-ego , " the subject conscious-
ness "is our ego , or mind proper.”^ Although completely dis-
parate - "between the world and mind there is no comparison,
the things are not homogeneous""^ - they are yet, for him.
1. Loo’. .cit.
2. Bain, BAI, 378.
3. Bain, SAI, 378, 379, 381, 385.
4. Op. cit., 383.
I
I
I
1
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nothing but different states of consciousness: llThe only
adequate expression," he tells us, "is a CHANGE OF STATE: a
change from the state of the extended cognition to a state of
unextended cognition.*^ The distinction is clear, for ex-
ample, if we contrast the experience of a hot stove with that
of pain. This distinction, this dualism within experience,
is the final word and can never be transcended. As might be
expected, presentationism of this Humian sort necessarily
results in a flat denial of any metaphysical self or subject
of experience; the objective-subjective dualism is entirely
p
within experience, ultimate though Bain regards that dualism,
D. Naturalism and Agnostic Monism
1,
Vlfard*s Analysis of Naturalism
In the associationism, or ias Ward calls it^; the pre-
sentationism of Alexander Bain, we have one of the contempo-
rary elements in the historical background of Ward's thought.
Another contemporary factor in that background we may call
naturalistic agnostic monism, it was represented by such
philosophers as Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) and Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903). The long battle between these thinkers
1. Bain, MAB, 137. llOE^
2. See Bain, EAW, 492. Of. Ward, 289-291.
3. PP, 70; ROE, 290; etc.
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and their idealistic opponents forms an interesting chapter
in the history of hiiman thought. Not the least on the side
of idealism were the personalists, Borden P. Bowne and James
Ward. Again, however, to deal with this struggle adequately
would take us far afield. Suffice it here to note, first.
Ward’s analysis of naturalism as he found it, and, secondly,
the relation of this scientific and philosophical creed to
the body-mind problem.
Ward finds that the naturalism of the 19th Century, ex-
pressed in the writings of Huxley, Spencer, and the scien-
tists of that day, rests back upon three fundamental theories,
the combined constituent principles of which were supposed to
account fully for the unity, completeness and reality of
nature as revealed by science.^ Let us glance at each of
these in turn:
(i) The theory of the mechanical explanation of all
reality holds that the universe is, in the last analysis, a
vast mechanism, and that all reality could be accounted for
on the basis of masses in motion and natural laws, if only we
knew enough. The science of abstract dynamics is at the basis
of this theory.
(ii) The theory of evolution, on the basis of the law of
the survival of the fittest and natural selection, is held
1. NAA, I, p. ix, 40, etc
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to be sufficient to account for all the phenomena of living
organisms
.
(iii) The theory of psychical epiphenomena is held to
account for the phenomena called mental. According to this
theory mental events are the non-effective correlatives of
certain physical events.
2. Naturalism and Monism
The earlier naturalists, in so far as they were more than
scientists, were dualistic in their philosophy. But as the
difficulties and inconsistencies of this naturalistic counter-
part of the old Cartesian dualism became apparent, natural-
ism was driven, eventually, to embrace a neutral, agnostic
monism. Without abandoning the mechanistic conceptions in-
volved, the old materialism is sloughed off, and the natural
world, physical and mental, is regarded as the expression of
an unknown and unknowable substance. This is the position of
Huxley, Spencer and many of the scientists and lesser philo-
sophers of the latter half of the last century.
3. The Status of Mind
The important point to note concerning this naturalistic
monism, in relation to the body-mind problem, is its concep-
tion of mind. In the words of Huxley,
...Our mental conditions are simply the symbols
in consciousness of the changes which take place auto-
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matically in the organism. . .To take an extreme il-
lustration, the feeling we call volition is not the
cause of the voluntary act, hut the symbol of the
state of the brain which is the immediate cause of
that act.
Thus, while theoretically both body and mind should be re-
garded as concomitant aspects of one underlying reality, as
a matter of fact the logical urge is to make one side or the
other predominant. With naturalistic writers like Huxley and
Du Bois-Reymond, "the lapse is always to the side of subor-
dinating the psychical to the physical."^ Thus it is that
the parallelistic theories of body-mind relation worked out
by these writers are called '"conscious automaton" and "psy-
chical eplphenomanon" theories. Ward has well summed up the
status of mind in such theories,
Dven if conscious, the automata as part of the
continuous mechanism are .. .powerless to withstand or
to control it: consciousness is only comparable to
a shadow that incidentally in some mysterious way ac-
companies their working.^
j!i. Singularistic Monism
1.
Varying Forms
Turning from Cartesian dualism and its derivatives, we
must take brief account of singularistic monism in relation
1. Conclusion of article on "conscious Automatism."
Quoted by Ward, NAA, I, 179.
2. NAA, II, 30, and passim .
3. ROE, 7,
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to the body-mind problem. Monism of this kind takes various
forms in the thought of different philosophers, according to
the interpretation of the One and its relation to the Many.
For none of these singularists absolutely deny the Many of
experience; and in the thought of some of them the One is
scarcely more than an underlying principle of unity or of ul-
timate explanation. Thus, at one extreme, is Baruch Spinoza
(1632-1677), for whom all existents, mental or physical, con-
sisted only of modifications of the attributes of the one
Substance, God.^ At the other extreme is the German philoso-
pher who was so influential in the thinking of Y/ard, Rudolph
Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). Lotze starts from the point of
vievv of the Many, and is driven to the singularistic explana-
tion only by what he conceives to be the impossibility of
casual interaction on any other basis. ^ Betv/een the extremes
is Georg ¥/. F. Hegel (1770-1831), for whom the One is abso-
lute Idee and absolute process, "the final goal of things
only because it is also their creative principle."^ Hegel
unites the One and the Many in his "concrete universal," "the
divine Idee
,
or ' all- enfolding ' nature of things, the true
genus within which all individual facts fall,""^ and of which.
1. Spinoza, Ethics, Part I.
2. Ward, ROE, 215-224.
3. V/eber, HOP, 512.
4. Royce SMP, 224. Lecture VII, "Hegel," 190-227. Of.
Hegel, ENG, pars. 213-215, 235-237.
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we may add, they are the manifestation or actuality at the
level of our hiiman understanding.
But whatever form singularistic monism assumes, in the
last analysis its solution of body-mind relations is the
same. Ontologically, there are not two realities, but one.
For, as Hegel says,
Denn in der Tat, wenn beide als absolut Selb-
standige gegeneinander vorausgesetzt werden, sind sie
einander ebenso undurchdringlich, als jede Materie
gegen eine andere undurchdringlich und nur in ihrem
gegenseitigen Nichtsein, ihren Poren, befindlich
angenommen wird...*^
So on the level of empirical fact, he contends, ”dass
sie ein unbegreifliches Gehelmnis sel , " and no answer save
that "of all the philosophers" - he mentions, specifically
Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz - can be given.
These, he says.
und zvirar in dem Sinne, dass die Endlichkeit der Seele
und die Materie nur ideelle Bestimriiungen gegeneinander
sind und keine Wahrheit haben, so dass Gott bei jenen
Philosophen, nlcht bloss, wle oft der Fall 1st, ein
anderes Wort fiir jene Unbegreifllchkelt 1st, sondern
vielmehr als die allein wahrhafte Identit&t derselben
gefasst wird.2
Similar passages might be quoted from any or all of the
1. ENG., Par. 389, which see for Hegel's ovm summary
treatment of the body-mind relation.
2. Loc. cit. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Props. 3L
-r -r . T ^ J n T-r-tm tt _ 1 -r -r -m _ ^ -r ^ ^ ^ ^
2. Body-Mind Solution
Haben sHmtlich Gott als dlese Beziehung angegeben.
•\r-PT* - 'T-ri i - ' *rM 'i ' / I'l- -.'i. n t-v
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singularistic monists, but few have set forth the essential
points more concisely than Hegel in the passage of the Philo
although it may well be questioned whether all the philoso-
phers, even all of those he mentions, would subscribe to his
interpretation of those essential points#
As to the causal interrelations of body and mind, singu-
larism v/ould seem to be strictly limited to unbroken parallel-
ism, since body and mind are but different aspects of one
reality. With regard to the freedom or efficiency of the
unified self or individual, however, we find a wide range of
opinion, from the absolute determinism of Spinoza to the
"fragmentary” freedom of Royce,^ depending on the conception
of the nature of the One and the significance of the Many.
F. Pluralistic Idealism
Still another element, and a most Important one, in the
historical background of our problem, is the pluralistic
monism of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). The
universe, for Leibniz, consisted of a vast collection of
activistic, psychic beings or monads, each of which, with
varying degrees of perfection, mirrored the rest of the uni-
1. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics
428-434; and below. Chap. Five
Props. XXIX, XXXII; Royce, SMP,
,
Secs. C, D.
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verse, but had no really effective relations with other' monads
.
"The Monads have no windows through which anything may come
in or go out."^ The individual, plant, animal or human, con-
sisted of a group of monads forming the body, and a dominating
' ?
j entelechy, which is the soul in animals and men. ' But the
i
I
"domination" is, for Leibniz, purely phenomenal - a "mirroring"
i
i
!
process. Soul and body act each in accordance with the laws
I
I
I
of its ov/n realm or nature: the soul "in accordance with the
I
!
laws of final causes through (its) desires, ends and means;"
j
!
i
I
j
the body follows "the lav/s of efficient causes or of motion."
i
J
I
And each is adjusted to the other "in virtue of the preestab-
I
lished harmony between all substances, since they are all
j
representations of one and the same universe." Leibniz suras
up the matter as follows,
I According to this system bodies act as if (to sup-
I
pose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and
souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both
j
body and soul act as if the one v/ere influencing the
other.
;
A century after Leibniz (whose Nouveaux Essais sur L*En-
fcendem.ent Hiimain
,
v/ritten in 1704, v/as not published until
1765) Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) applied the idea of
1
I
,
activism in psychology. The soul, for him, was a real quantl-
j
ty of energy which is being continuously expended in main- i
taining the unity of the soul against impressions. Herbart !
1. Leibniz
.
Nionadology
,
Sec. 7. 3. Op. Cit., Secs. T.-TO.
2. Op. cit.. Secs. 70-72. 4. Op. Cit., Sec. 81.
"V
>
and his disciples, especially V/. P. Volkmann, were influential
in the general psychological thought of Ward. Another
pluralistic idealist, of the generation just preceding that
of Ward, was the disciple of Kant, Charles Renouvier (1818-
1903). Although a pluralist and a personalist, Renouvier 's
influence on Ward was not as great as that of Lotze or the
Herbartians. This is doubtless due, in part, to Renouvier 's
thorough- going phenomenalism, which was contradictory to the
realistic bias of Ward's metaphysical thought. Body and mind
j
are, for Renouvier, phenomenally real. Phenomena are reality.
Although Ward is insistent upon recognizing phenomena as
real in the sense that they cannot be dismissed as merely sub-
jective, yet their reality is for him always the result in
consciousness of the psychic activity which is the ultimate
ontological reality.^
1. Cf. below. Chap. Seven, Sec. B, 3
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CHAPTER FIVE
WARD'S CRITICISM OF BODY-MIND THEORIES
A. Qualitative Dualism
1. It Involves a Questionable Analysis
Moving on toward a consideration of the contribution
to the solution of the body-mind problem which James Ward
offers, it is necessary, first of all, to note briefly
his attitude toward dualistic and singularistic solutions
of the ontological problem. As we have seen in Chapter
Four, modern philosophy (and modern science, also) had its
rise in the qualitative dualism of Descartes. Ward was
strongly of the opinion that this dualism was directly or
indirectly responsible for many of the errors and difficul-
ties of modern philosophy. In particular, he wrote:
These two problems - the relation of body and mind
and the reality of external perception - have continued
to vex philosophic thinkers from Descartes' day to our
own, nor will they cease to trouble us till dualism is
laid to rest."^
We may summarize Ward's criticism of the dualism of
matter and mind in three points. The first of these is
that such dualism involves and rests back upon a faulty
and unwarranted analysis of the facts. Descartes, to whom
this analysis is traced, was incurably rationalistic. The
purely analytic and rational concepts which he arrived at,
1. PP, 12.
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as he dissected his own cognitions, he erected into two
distinct and disparate substances, res co,c:itans and res
extensa
.
as we have seen.^ Even though his successors more
or less rejected or ignored the metaphysical assumptions and
implications involved, still they were handicapped "by the
defective analysis of the facts of mental life, which they
took over from Descartes;"^ an analysis which found a substan'
tial matter-mind dualism within the psychological data.
In addition to this direct criticism of dualism as based
on "the reification of abstract ions" ^ abstractly arrived at,
’<Yard is at great pains to account for the rise and plausibility
of dualistic thought. The second and third points of his
criticism of qualitative dualism, as commonly held, are to be
found in these two explanations which he -^ets forth; (a) the
fallacy of naive realism in its development of "the notion
of the transsub jective. " The common man, recognizing that
the sun,e.g.
,
is independent of individuals, severally,
concludes that "it is and remains an object independently of
them all collectively.""^ This is one step toward dualism.
The second step is (b) what Richard Avenarius termed "intro-
jection:" the rea,ding into the experience of others, then
back into one's own experience, of what we may call a
1. PP
,
S-11. Supra
,
Chap. Four, Sec. B.l.
2. PP, 13. Ward does not except Locke and Kant from this
indictment
.
3. KAA,11, 170.
4. NAA, II, 170-171.
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subjective copying^of the external environment - a copying
which is not evident in our own experience. Thus, quite
naturally,
...We are induced to construe our own experience
on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption
as to others* experience, which actually contradicts
our own... With this contradiction and the fallacy of
naive realism just now referred to, dualism is essential-ly
complete.^
2. It is Metaphysically Unstable
However strongly and deeply dualism may seem to be
intrenched in common sense, as a metaphysical theory it has
proven inadequate and unstable. From the point of view of
experience, as Ward says,
Lake two mutually exclusive halves out of the
one concrete world: in the one you will find only
your own so-called subjective states and have to
become a solipsist; in the other the organisms you
would find there you could call only automata at the
best .2
Carry such a bifurcation of nature to its rigorous metaphys-
ical conclusions, and, according to Ward, it leads, inevita-
bly, to mutually inconsistent conceptions, which point the way
to monism. To set forth this process is one of the chief
aims of his Naturalism and Agnosticism. In these lectures
he not only exposes the instability of dualism, but also
traces out other weaknesses and inadequacies of naturalistic
1. Ward does not use this term.
2. NAA, II, 172-173. Note the whole Lecture XVI, "The
Rise of Dualism."
3. ROE, 7.
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dualism and its logical descendant: agnostic monism.
From the point of view of our discussion we should note
particularly that, for ’.Vard, there is no crossing of the
"ugly broad ditch"! between the body (regarded as matter)
and mind, on the level of dualism. It is this, especially,
which drives us toward monism, and is therefore at the basis
of the logical instability of metaphysical dualism. For
Vk’ard is convinced that sensation, conation, and volition are
p
not merely subjective and that interaction is a fact that
must be accounted for.
3. It has Epistemological Difficulties
And of course, therefore, \^ard is clearly cognizant of the
epistemological difficulties of any real dualism. Sensation
is a fact, and it means (for Ward at least, as we have just
said) that there is in this process a real crossing of the ap-
parent "ditch," and not merely "subjective modifications."*^
How this can be: how there can be any knowledge of the one
realm by the other (aside from some miraculous occasionalism
such as that of the Ca.rtesians) on an ontologically
dualistic level. Ward cannot see. He does not deny that
there is a "ditch" to cross (he holds to epistemological
1. This phrase is cited by Ward, NAA,II,101. Source not
given
.
2. See, e.g., his discussion of subjectivity and objectiv-
ity, ROE, 122-124.
3. See ROE, 260; PP
,
104-105.

dualism), but he contends that if the “ditch” is ontologi-
cal, as well as epistemological, then it never could be
crossed without miracle. This then is the meaning of his
statement that “'these two problems - the relation of body
and mind and the reality of external perception - “ will not
“cease to trouble us till dualism is laid to rest.“^
1
B. The Theory of Psychical Epiphenomenalism
1.
Definition and Status
Closely related to the doctrine of metaphysical
dualism, which Ward criticized so devastatingly in the ways
we have Just indicated, is the theory of psychical
p
epiphenomenalism. As we have already noted,** this is one
of the fundamental principles “on which the supposed unity
and completeness of the 'full-orbed reality that modern
science sets before us* depends."^ In substance it is the
theory that mind is nothing but an ineffective collateral
product of certain physical series of events. Although
theoretically and historically it was associated with the
agnostic, naturalistic monism of such thinkers as Huxley
and Spencer, its roots are in the old Cartesian dualism, as
1. PP, 12.
2. Supra, Chap. Four, Sec. D,l.
3. NAA, I, ix.
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Ward points out;^ for its speculative basis is the complete
disparateness of mind and matter. It is “but the scientif-
ic counterpart of that occasionalism to which the followers
I of Descartes were driven" to account for body-mind I
i 2
j
relations.
i
i
In the thought of Huxley, this doctrine took the form
I
'
I
of the “conscious automaton theory." In the words of !
I
I
,
Huxley, as we saw, 3 according to this theory, “Our mental
conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the
changes which take place automatically in the organism."
Huxley has taken Descartes's theory of animal nature and 1
i
moved it up one step, to explain the nature of mind, and the ^
relation of mind to body. The mental series is only an
impotent shadow which always accompanies the physical
series, but without there being any causal connection between
them.^
2. Epistemological Criticisms i
In addition to the general criticisms Ward leveled I
against dualism, and which apply to this theory of body-mind,
ve may note several particular epistemological criticisms.
In the Britannica article Ward states “two fatal objections
1. NAA, II
,
6, 3. Supra
.
Chap. Four, Sec. D,3.
2. Ibid. 4. NAA, II, 36-38.
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j
to the conscious automaton theory.” One of them is that
I "the assumption is epistemologically \insound." For, Ward
contends, "The order implied in the distinction of physical
phenomena and psychical epi
p
henomena is contrary to all
experience and indefensible."!
Further, Ward insists that "a complete refutation" of
the naturalistic premises of the theory is to be attained
by asking how, from the standpoint of the kind of conscious-
ness involved in the theory, any knowledge of the independent
mechanical system is to be accounted for? How, from the
naturalistic standpoint, again, can it be known that
consciousness is concomitant with certain mechanical
motions?^
3, Psychological Criticisms
Again, from a psychological standpoint. Ward levels
I several criticisms at this theory. In the Britannica
section just referred to, his other "fatal objection" is
that the theory "is methodologically unsound: its
psychology is physiology in the bad sense." Psychological
facts, Ward insists, cannot be presented in physical terms.
There is no place in this theory for volition, or activity.^
And activity "is prima facie an ultimate and constitu-
1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. xxll, 602,
2. ROE, 6-7.
3. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 602.
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tive fact of oux daily experience and of its historical
development." If illusory, how did that illusion arise?
I
I
This activity, Ward contends, it is impossible to account
I
for on the basis of "mass that is inert and motions that are
I
I
reversible.
I
I
I
C. Singularistic Monism
I
I
1.
It Necessitates Rigid Determinism
The method of James Ward, both as a scientist and as a
!
philosopher, was to begin with experience exactly as he
j
found it. Now in experience, he contends, "we find not
i
indeed a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena ,
but a duality of object presented and subject affected, of
subject striving and object attained. "2 Furthermore, as he
proceeds to interpret this deliverance of experience it is
I
clear that, for him, subject and object must be regarded as
j
grounded in the metaphysically real; and neither they nor
the interaction implied are to be dismissed as mere
phenomena. The affection of subject by object and the
striving and attainment by the subject must be interpreted in
terms of immediate causal efficiency and positive freedom.^
1. ROE, 7-8. NAA, II, 41-64.
2. ROE, 10. Underlining is mine.
3. See below, Chap. Six, Secs. C,l,b,c; C,3.
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Contradictory to such a view of the world must be every
singularistio monism: for such a monism, in the last
analysis, must reduce individual mind and body to modifica-
tions, or phenomena. The logical terminus of such a doctrine
must be a rigid determinism, as Spinoza rightly saw, and
in so far as real freedom and individual mental efficiency
are posited, singularism is superseded,!
2. It Rules Out Interaction
But, further, singularistio monism rules out, not
merely real freedom, but also any real causal interaction -
"transeunt action,” as Lotze called it. Unquestionably, in
experience, we do “know” such determination of one body by
another,^ and common sense extends that concept to bodies
other than oiir own. Lotze, however, found this common
concept so unthinkable, that he was driven to singularism,
in which there is no real transeunt action, interaction
being but an appearance of modes of the One.
3
3. The Facts and Significance of
Activity and Conation
The significance of these two logical facts about
i
singularism (that it makes freedom impossible and rules out
1. Supra
. 48,n.l.
2. ROE, 288.
3.
See ROE, 215-216
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transeunt action) becomes clearer when we see that for Ward
i
I
the fundamental notion of metaphysics is activity . He says,
i “Leibniz, for good and all, as I believe, started philosophy
I
on a better track by making activity, not substantiality or
I
reality, the fundamental idea.“l again, “ Quod non agit
i
non existit
, said Leibniz, too."^ Add to this the facts that
conative activity, not cognition, is for Ward the central
feature of experience; and that the world, for him, is
primarily a "realm of ends,"^ and Nature "a pl\xrality of
I
conative individuals;"^ and it is clear that his whole
j
system stands or falls with the reality of free individual
activity and genuine plural interaction. These singularism
must logically deny.
!
D. The Double Aspect Theory
1.
Its Speculative Background
And now let us see how Ward dealt with the theory of
body-mind relations which most naturally follows from singu-
laristic speculation. This is the doctrine known as the
double aspect theory. In substance it is the belief that
body and mind and their intimate parallelism are to be
explained on the basis that body and mind are but two sides
1. EIP, 297.
2. Ibid.
3. ROE, 13.
4. ROE, 21.
.' xiydi^ x'-'X-elc S‘3r; • 0~
BX HDX3Yr^<i f'-X c--f’< "to noi
9V3*XsJ I nx’.
,
:ia brirt
J»0 3-I.T T^Xt' ‘- no
'sbiin't orij' , vt xl ua'.:
bX r,
,
.
TXt.-i . ''i j B 'i/ i j
-•.f *! v2 to. -:• V «_ ‘ ' • 4 t ^ ^
,
:o C;cn J ad'HO-ii-Oixal:
r;^ ,.n^ I
6;j:-j jCii , ivXto.^ 'j}ni ::'’’
f» .
.
ti\6 irOj^ Xj^f-'z.’' . :*r.;.3-;5/.. j::.-
rj.jOJ::! ;?rlc "irit ObA
lis- tir o b'ra’" Tc/i cx
?jj: xo'i , :il’xov; 9it^ cf -.rtj bin- ;ion?xxoqxo Ir eiLt^'-^r
lo oixrj fiil fort-c '-' *\ > --ns lo .it.I/c-':!':" yI^x
olon'.v f:i::: 'ic^Io ai rl :5no oni ov2 + ::ifToo
I /-'jbivx j£:i 39i'l :c ric^x^ sll-Vi xo. ::L'a *3?c rjsXsX'’
.T;' ,n-''i..toex9tni iBxixIq vj-lviu-'i :
. X- - * -‘- -o X I * Xim
•/xr.sriT tc^qx.-. otax/ol I'-nV .
.brrjL/c-x;3Jo3 3 ovi nj'I .
’
Ic vxoeiiicl' sbo ri:iv.' bi;/’-,' wcii -:j9;; bl Isl xca ciiji
LOTI 8’^oIXbl v.Lj i>'T:io'/:.x .' -.jf: Loi...-f nrujiy i--.i ox:.! .'.-Ytr, j
3r?j n«on3 ^xiixtc' Aj -in!' ,.'roi:;*Bxv.'3t-.rs oxoclx. [
^jiTod enJ- bx Ji aorri^t *udx;8 ,\;ioe:i:r eldx/ob
9 d ot 9 'X - sniaq 3 j SfiiXtii X Clin jjiucr. bnx; \'dod
R9 i;i 3 • or;X ^xid ‘.'j'Xri bnirn bxtc tBri-* oi?.x‘>d usit no
I." ,>0>d .
.
N y**
,
ixA .X
Jh V.
.•« •
60
or two aspects of the same single reality. As is clear, if
that one reality is really physical, this theory becomes
epiphenomenalism. Historically, also, agnostic monism, as
we have seen, veered toward epiphenomenalism. But the
double aspect theory, historically, is most often associated
with idealistic monism, from Spinoza *s day on down to the
present. In the case of the more definitely singularistic
monists, the one reality is conceived in terms of the
metaphysical substance posited. More realistic and plural-
istic monists lean toward doctrines of "mind-stuff."
Spinoza, Schopenhauer and Bradley might be cited as
illustrations of the former; W. K. Clifford and Morton Prince
are recalled as prominent advocates of "mind-stuff" doc-
trines, Ward's criticisms, for the most part, are valid
against either type. We may note, in passing, that Ward
recognized this theory, at least in its more usual Spinoz-
istic form, as "altogether less absurd" than epiphenomenal
theories.
2, The Meaning of "Aspect"?
In addition to the general speculative criticisms
directed at singularistic monism. Ward attacked the double
aspect theory from two directions, chiefly. First he raises
the question of the meaning of "aspect". What is "difference
1. For second direction of attack, see next Section,
p.62, below.
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of aspect” due to? To difference of standpoint, or difference
in the reality itself? The theory, he claims, ”playe fast
and loose” at this point. ^ If the answer be given that the
underlying reality is unknown and unknowable, then the theory
lays itself open to criticism as being an unwarranted
I
assumption, made ”simply because. .
.
the impossibility of
causal connexion being taken as established . . .no other
alternative remains. if the attempt be made to posit a
"mind-stuff” as in Clifford *s thoxight
,
then Ward contends that
"mind-stuff” inevitably becomes "matter-stuff over again” and
one is back in conscious automatism. ^ For Clifford asserts
that "reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a
complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational,
not intelligent, not conscious."'^ To which "maze of
psychological barbarism” Ward replies that,
The assertion that new properties arise from any
mere complication or conjunction of elements is never
justifiable, least of all in such a case as this... (For)
even things-in-themselves, if they are 'not rational, not
intelligent, not conscious,' can neither have the motive
nor the power nor the skill to group themselves and take
each other's pictures.^
1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 601. Cf. NAA
,
II, 18.
3.
EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 601. Cf. NAA
,
II, 18.
3. NAA, II, 13-17. W. K. Clifford, "On the Nature of
Things-in-themselves," LAE, 274-286. Cf. Prince, NMH. Cf., also
Royce, SMP, 300-304.
4. Op. cit.
,
286.
5. NAA. II, 15, 17.
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.
3. The Assumption of Parallelism
Let us note, next, Vl’ard's second line of attack on
double aspect parallelism. This is concerned with the
assumption that the impossibility of causal connection between
body and mind is thoroughly established; i.e., the theory of
complete parallelism. Interaction, Ward holds, is not or ima
facie contradictory nor absurd. Further, he contends, "such
a universal negative" as that embraced by complete parallelism
cannot be sustained by empirical evidence. The meaning of
"parallelism" is far from clear, for, though the physical
series can be rather definitely defined, the psychical series
is in a different case. And granted that the two series can
be definitely defined and the meaning of parallelism made
clear, how are such problems as sensation, volition, apparent
interaction, to be solved on the basis of two absolutely
disparate series?^ Epistemologically, it seems that the double
aspect theory "short-circuits" but does not solve these
problems.
E. The Status of the Body-ilind
Problem
1. Alternatives in Ward's Day
And, now, before examining Ward's own system and its
1. EB, nth Ed., vol. XXII, 601. KAA, II, Chaps. XI, XII.
Of. Pratt, MAS, 167, and passim ; and Laird, OIviB.
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solution, we must pause a moment to look at the status of the
body-mind problem as Ward took up his work. We should
remind ourselves, first of all, that in Ward* a day modern
psychology, as we know it, was just at the birth. Ward
himself, in the theoretical field, was one of the pioneers.
Experimental psychology was in its very beginnings.
Associationism of the older sort was in its heyday, and the
keen observations and analyses of behaviorism were yet to
come. If all this is kept in mind, we shall approach Ward*s
reanalysis of experience with a deeper appreciation and a
lively respect for hie keenness and accuracy. On the
scientific side there were no alternatives, practically
speaking. It was a question of working out a new conception
of experience, or of leaving the body-mind problem as he
found it.
On the philosophical side, as we have seen, there
seemed to be two alternatives, both of which Ward found
unsatisfactory; attenuated Cartesian d\ialism and Spinozistic
monism (singularism) of one form or the other. Modern
pluralism, pragmatic and realistic, was just about to come
into being, along with the various forms of personalistic
pluralism. Again, Ward was one of the earliest pioneers.
It will be worthwhile to set down here, also, the
possibilities with respect to parallelism and causal
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relationship, as Ward sums them up, in the Brittanica i
article,! for such a summary will enable us to see the
problem somewhat as Ward saw it, half a cent\iry ago, before
the days of modern psychology and the new realism, with their
closely-reasoned and exhaustive analyses.
^ j
2. parallelism. As Ward Saw It
!
I
Ward carefully distinguished three types of body-mind !
parallelism, which are often confused. There is first of all i
i
what he called "psychoneural parallelism,” and which he
maintained was ”a well established fact. ”3 This is the
general fact that ”in development and efficiency, in the
intensity and complexity of their processes, mind and brain
keep invariably and exactly in line together.” Ward regarded
this kind of parallelism as simply one of the empirically
given factors in the problem, to be accounted for. He did
not believe that this implied or necessitated the assumption
of a point for point (one to one) correspondence of the
mental and physical series.
Secondly, he recognized a methodological or physiologi-
cal-psychological parallelism, which he held to be entirely
1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 600-601.
2. Of., for example. Broad's analysis in MPN, with Ward's
summary in EB(on which these next two sections are based),
3. Unless otherwise indicated, refer to EB, 11th Ed.
vol. XXII, 600-601, for quotations and points in this and the
next section.
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I
valid within the field of science. According to this,
psychology and physiology set up a working agreement, and
each stayed on its own side of the fence, studying its own
type of facts. It is only when this sort of parallelism is
extended beyond being a methodological rule or agreement that
trouble arises.
And thirdly. Ward recognized, and consistently opposed,
psychophysical parallelism proper. This doctrine involves
the point for point parallelism of mental and physical facts,
plus the assumption of absolute separation or lack of causal
relations between the series. It is this latter type of
parallelism which is embodied in the conscious automaton and
double aspect theories,
3. Causal Relation, as Ward Saw It
As James Ward looked over the various body-mind theories
of his day, he found four theories of causal relation between |
body and mind expressed in them. First, there was interaction
!
as posited by common sense and the cruder types of natu- I
I
ralism. Secondly, there was occasionalism, as held by I
I
Cartesian dualism and its derivatives, by which interaction
|
was accepted and explained on the basis of divine activity
exercised on the occasion of the mental event incident to the
effecting or affected physical event. Thirdly, there was the
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"pre-established harmony" of Leibniz, which Ward regarded as
of a kind with occasionalism, the difference being that for
Leibniz God created the monads without windows and then took
on himself the function of supplying their place all at once,
rather than continuously.^ And finally, of course, Ward
recognized what he called "Spinozistic monism," by which he
meant absolute lack of any real causal relation between the
body and the mind.
1. ROE, 260
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CHAPTER SIX
WARD'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
A. Ward's Reanalysis of Experience
1. The Primacy of Experience
Finding, then, that the dualism of his day was inadequate
to the facts, and that singularistic monism, the only alter-
native which seemed open to him, ends in the "blind alley" of
determinism. Ward set about the re-examination of the facts,
and the building of a metaphysics which would support them.
This v/as the task of a life-time, and, naturally, covered a
far wider scope than that of the problem of this dissertation.
However, we cannot hope to grasp his solution of the body-
mind problem unless we have some idea of the general nature
of his work and thought. This latter falls naturally into
two divisions: the psychological reanalysis of experience,
and the metaphysical hypotheses which resulted in his monad-
ism.
At the risk of monotony we must reiterate, here at the
beginning of our summary examination of his reanalysis, the
primacy of experience, for Ward, Few philosophers have been
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more insistently empirical than he. It is not surprising,
therefore, that he writes, concerning psychological method:
If it be a sound maxim to proceed from the known
to the unknown, then Analytic Psychology, starting
from human experience should precede any attempt to
treat of the genesis of experience as a whole, or to
correlate psychology with physiology.^
And again.
But in truth there is no question of a choice
of methods: in every case physiological and compara-
tive psychology must fall back on the facts and ana-
logies of our own experience.^
He is not very anxious to offer a definition of psy-
chology, for he contends it cannot be defined by reference
to a subject matter, as can concrete sciences like botany
or mineralogy.^ Nevertheless, when, finally, he makes the
venture he writes:
Psychology then we define as the science of in-
dividual experience - understanding by experience not
merely, not primarily, cognition, but also, and above
all, conative activity or behavior.'^
With experience thus primary in his psychology, it is
not unnatural that his metaphysics, too, should be through
and through experiential and activistlc. Note the term
^individual experience.” Ward never made the mistake of
substituting a capital E for the notion of individual owner-
ship. When he does use "Experience, ” it is but to indicate
1. PP, 25-26
2. PP, 26.
3
4
PP, 26
PP, 28
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experience common to and. owned by a niimber of individuals:
experience has no meaning, for him, apart from the experience
of individuals.
Furthermore Ward never made the mistake, which he felt
many philosophers have made, of imagining that they could
literally "begin at the beginning,”^ That is out of the ques-
tion, he holds; "but we must start where alone reflexion on
experience can arise, at the level of self-consciousness • "2
2.
The One and the Many in Experience
And what does he find in experience, at that level?
Most certainly he does not find the One, either as Absolute
Subject or as Absolute Object. The standpoint of our human
experience is always pluralistic. The world does not imme-
diately confront us "as one Mind, nor even as the manifesta-
tion of one Mind."^
Yet, on the other hand, within each individual experi-
ence there is an organic unity, and within that unity an
ever-present duality of self and not-self, of subject and ob-
ject. Upon this "duality in unity" he insists, over and over
again. It is not too much to say that it is the crux of his
reanalysis
.
1. See article "*In the Beginning*," EIP, 277-302.
2. ROE, 51-52. Of EIP, 279-283.
3. ROE, p.v.
4. E.g., PP, 30, 31, 33, etc.; ROE, 10, 26, 52, etc.;
NAA, II, 117-122.
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3, Duality in Unity in Experience
This valid dualism which Ward finds in experience is for
him always purely experiential in nature. It is not, in any
sense, a substantial dualism, such as the Cartesian dualism
of matter and mind. Although he recognizes a rough corres-
pondence between the psychological subject and the individu-
ality of the organism, and, again, between the objective con-
tinum and the environment, yet he insists they are not to be
identified in either case.^ The metaphysical basis of the
experiential dualism is to be understood in the light of his
monadism.2
4. The Analysis of Experience
a. The Content of Experience
On the basis of this duality in unity of subject and ob-
ject, Ward proceeds to a detailed analysis of the nature and
process of experience. We shall abandon his analytical or-
der, for purposes of this brief and condensed exposition,
and begin by imagining an instance of extremely simple ex-
perience. An object is presented to a subject. The first,
and in some respects the most important fact to notice is
1. PP, 29-30. Cf. ROE, 10, 26.
2. See, e.g., NAA,^'Chaps. XIV, XV; ROE, 26, 117-130
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that the reception is never really passive, hut always re-
active and selective,^ This total reactive activity of the
subject of experience (much wider than mere cognitive atten-
tion, in the usual sense of the word) Ward calls attention .
^
This ’’attentive” activity is engaged, so to speak, in three
directions: (i) In conscious cognition of the presentation.
This presentation is no Isolated somewhat, but is in the
nature of a change in a totem objectlvum or objective con-
tinuum.^ (il) The ’’attentive” activity of the subject is
also concerned with a purely subjective aspect of experi-
ence: feeling. Peeling is not, for Ward, a presentation,
for it has no objective side whatever. He contends that v/e
’’know of” it, as we ’’know” ’’attention.” We know them only
through their effects, ”by certain changes, i. e., which they
bring about in the character and succession of our presenta-
tions.”"^ And (ill) the ’’attentive” activity is concerned,
also, in the third constituent of experience: conation, or
conative activity. The object presented causes a feeling of
pleasure or pain, which in turn arouses activity in the
direction of avoiding painful experience or seeking pleasur-
able . ^
1. PP, 57, 58, 60, etc.
2. Ibid. Note the whole Chapter III, ”Theory of At-
tention,” 60-73.
3. PP, 46-51; 76-80; and Chapter Eight of this paper.
For a thorough analysis of the continuum, see Marshall, CWP.
4. PP, 57-58; 41-45. Cf, SOK, 143-144.
5. PP, 51-55.
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We must not conceive the factors in this primitive cona-
tive process in fully cognitive terms, as we would in de^
scribing mature consciousness. In a sense, these terms
denote purely limiting conceptions of presentation, feeling
and conation, far below the level of conscious awareness, as
we ordinarily use that teirni. On the basis of this elementa-
ry recognition of the ’’three distinct and Irreducible
components. Attention ( all activity. Including conative ac-
tivity), Peeling and Objects or Presentations as together
constituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis,”! Ward
proceeds to build up his conception of the development of
perception, volition and intellection. Note that his funda-
mental principle of the duality of subject and object is
clear here: on the subject side, ”Attention” and ’’Feeling”;
on the object side, ’’Presentations.” Furthermore, he rec-
ognizes ’’two distinguishable • but normally inseparable -
forms* of psychoses: those where the ’’attention” is deter-
mined involuntarily, and feeling follows ’’attention”; and
those where the ”attention” is determined ”voluntarily,
”
i. e., by the subjective feeling which here precedes the
"act of attention”. The former he calls sensory or recep-
tive
, the latter motor or active. 2 On the basis of this
division of psychoses, the total objective continuum falls
1. PP, 57
2. Ibid.
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into two phenomenal divisions, the "sensory contlnu-um" and
the "motor contimmm."
b. The Subject of Experience
One of the most striking elements of V/ard's reanalysis
is his insistent recognition of the subject of experience.
Experience is always "owned." Nearly all modern psycholo-
gists (in common v/lth other scientists) persistently refuse
to have anything to do with this "I" of experience. True, it
is alv/ays assumed, even when it is denied; and V/ard is per-
sistent in clearly recognizing its reality, meaning and im-
portance .1
About this essential notion of the active subject of ex-
perience, the conative Individual, Ward builds his doctrine
of the growth of self-consciousness and the development of
personality, through social intercourse, from earlier stages
of merely sentient life. 2 There is built up in the recipro-
cal interaction or mutuum commercium which is experience, not
merely (1) an empirical "Me", composed of "the sensitive and
appetitive self" and "the Imagining and desiring self "^3
also, (il) an "I", an intellectual knowledge of "what v/e are
as experients." "Into the empty 'form of consciousness’ our
1. PP, 34-35, 361, 370, 379, etc. Cf. below, VII, C, 2.
2. PP, Chap. XV; ROE, 120-124, 262-265, 391-393.
3. PP, 365, 366.
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being fits,” he declares*^
c. Body-Mind in Experience
V/e must not close this summary of Ward’s psychological
reanalysis of experience without noting that at this level
Ward arrives at no solution of the body-mind problem. In a
section of the Encyclopedia article (omitted in PP) he dis-
cusses certain proposed solutions which he rejects as contra-
dictory to the facts of experience; but, on the positive
side, he is compelled to leave the problem ”as occasionalism
formulates it, ...pending the metaphysical discussion as to
the ultimate nature of interaction generally. ”2 Psychology
then, as such, cannot legitimately transcend an apparent
dualistic interactionism, although it can, and in Ward's
thought does, criticize the common sense interpretation of
that viev/point.
B. V/ard's Monadistic Metaphysics
1. Its Logical and Historical Derivation
Ward, being a philosopher as- well as a scientist, could
not rest content with a mere psychological reanalysis of ex-
perience. Guided always by the light and norm of that
1. PP, 381. This doctrine of the ”pure Ego or Self” is
developed in PP, 370-382.
2. EB, 11th Ed., Section 47, "Relation of Body and
Mind.” See supra
.
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experience, he must push on to a doctrine of reality, Logi-
cally, this doctrine was determined for him by the necessity
he felt of accounting for such elements In experience as the
active subject, freedom, transeunt action, interaction of
body and mind, and external perception, without, in any sense,
denying the reality of these deliverances of experience, as
critically understood and determined.
Historically, his metaphysical doctrine rests back,
chiefly, on the work of three great predecessors: Leibniz,
Kant, and Lotze.^ The thought of Hegel, also was very in-
fluential In the best sense of the term. Ward is an eclec-
tic. Unlike some great philosophers, he is not the least ad-
verse to acknowledging his indebtedness to these predecessors
and others,*^ He makes no claim to originality, yet in the
exercise of discrimination and synthesis he did add a not in-
considerable determinative factor of his own.
2. The Monad, According to Ward
Abandoning, again. Ward’s order of presentation, let us
state summarily his monadistlc doctrine of reality. He dis-
tinguishes two aspects of the world: that of nature, and that
of spirit, or ends. He regards the latter as fundamental.
1, Ward himself once said, ”lf I am anything at all, I
owe it to two men, Hermann Lotze and Henry Sidgwick." EIP,
92.
2. Note, e.g., PP. 15-16, and Chaps. VII and VIII of RCE
. 3, See e.g., PP, Chap. I, and Pages 31,33, 147, 203, etc.,
ROE, 2, 15-16, 21, 79, 106, 114, 149, etc.
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and. so interprets nature from the historical or moral, i. e.,
from a refined anthropomorphic point of view.^ Those v/ho take
this point of viev;, he tells us.
Take all their bearings from the historical stand-
point and endeavor to work backwards from the facts of
human personality and social intercourse. Their mode
of thought is frankly, though not crudely, anthropomor-
phic .
.
He holds that the world consists fundamentally and originally
of a vast plurality of simple or elementary monads, or living
agents. The conception of a ’•bare” monad is, he holds, a
limiting conception, similar to the physical '"dynamical con-
cept of a mass-point as a center of force. The corresponding
psychological concept answers to what Leibniz happily de-
scribed as mens momentanea seu carens recordatione . ”3 Such a
monad is marked by immediacy, which, he says, ’’answers to
what psychologists now call pure sensation, an ideal limit to
which our simplest experiences never descend. ”4 Again, he de-
scribes ’’the concept of the bare monad whose organism, so to
say, reduces to a point and its present to a moment; which can
only react immediately and to what is immediately given.
These bare monads, as well as all the higher types which de-
velop through their interaction. Ward tells us, are to be con-
ceived in terras of our own self-hood:
1. ROE, 1-3, 28, 52, 71, etc,
2. ROE, 71.
3. ROE, 255. (Ward italicized only
one word, as here.)
4.
5
ROE, 256
ROE, 257
.
. ,
ri-'-for: 'i-: o.tn.u' srij jrro"": evr o'i.f’ •• -.dni oe I)fii
- >5t cifv' o^c^^T 'lo wi-iJoq oliiq-iowot^dX' L^^n2': '
^3// Lllloc Of' ^.-'i.V I r ^xi’-
-qoecf'; I'j .tBlri r.'-iu r,*.nJ':f?ed r.j oy.Bl'
"To oil^j • :4'r,s< ' ?.'-co'v Oo 'i ovi’,f>Lir--f. vtX'i^ Of
oboi' :s c^co:lnl It^iooe Lric o; n? 'Xm
-''Oiriox.o'i'fjnp- q , reirt*'. x- oon diRX/cdct ,vCyr *f'* ?.i ux'r' o
*
r
' '
« • • 1 .
V r.c Jill.'*:,• M r/nc aj;^n'i;''x PueiEftco r>X‘/ow oi.ct i .u-ia r.' f.oi: oil
•'r'v.f.r "o hen Oft; v/jjactnorTto lo 'xo o Xenix:-- 'Ic vd/f.-enr" -v a lO
fi tR'i.Lorf cd bEHCfn ”e‘ii 5d' j3 lo n< . .'joM o oil a
'• Lsi: li.iy-ny.b" Zsicl^ydr o'-i forii
,
or nj • .1- ..'.X
vnJii.c'CO-M..‘-'‘-:oc. oirr .-orc'^ lo 'xoctnor a 23 liiic- sc
-
'.I. c s.' /'Tdlol rtr.d'.v o:> x'XOvverijB Icoof'OX' l30l'ro.[of{c\;aq
3 dr'c. r ' •OO '- aiie'v^c i/oa e^r».3 .-tnej 'r>:-f ensn: Ij&GlvT2
o-j cc-sv-'anc” .CY-^‘ , qo3J:oo;tan.‘ vd be:'-i>^in c.' -Gnoxn
oi v-t.tnXI I39M ’3riOe s'li/c floe .'Cn acHlioIofir /aq :f3 r>;
-^u Gfl
. ‘-nenoc- 1 lovor: Lor-noliooxo d’Eelqii.i.o -lOO liolilv
oc‘ o? , ()i2 OGod'.v ioAnof' C'xtiCi orfeJ '^o dcreonoo S£l:f” 20 Cij''-':a
nxij^ r':.)j.'-x ; -'nor on a oJ^ dTfess'io roX ^nloc a oi aooisrf'x
^
.
-s
S’*
.
-'ffjvJ n borcril ?.l J-Bfi'.v ol one ylno
"•’0
-o'rf'.v RS( qX ofld’ IIb Eti 2 "
^
in^.noiT 0''3f' ORCi'iT
-.'CO od oX s*rA , Rff 2£l9d t'lx-,' < nol^ OM'-fodr; j ‘i.‘c^r':f 'f’csr.- Cifl qclov
: booff-‘“. foe nv^o -liie 10 srn©;:^ nX bjevieo
.Od'9 , IV tld .1 till
. lV ,cwP ,
YTho Off: iox-r/.dx I.TBi: ) .coS .SCI
.o’lo/L 2.1, ^.'..-lO'.. exxo
77 .
The self of which we are convscious, then, furnishes
U8 with our first paradigm of what we are to understand
I
by the individuals of our plurality .. .Even the lowest
j
also will possess whatever be the irreducible minimum
essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all.l
I
j
This '’minimum” nature of all monads may be stated in two
I
terms: first, they are perceptive, in the Leibnizian sense
that each one is in some sense dimly cognitive of the whole
world of monads of which it is an individual, and which thus
forms for it its objective continuum or totem objectivum ;
secondly, they are appetitively conative, each one seeking
self-conservation and betterment through seeking pleasurable
and, especially, through avoiding painful situations.^
3. His Monadology
a. The World
For Ward, then, the entire world is to be conceived in
terms of these monads, or activistic psychical individuals.
Unlike Leibniz's monads, these have "windows", and, while they
mirror the universe, that mirroring and their apparent inter-
action is not to be explained on the basis of any "pre-estab-
lished harmony," but are real. In fact, in Ward’s thought
there are no pre-established laws at all, unless the nature of
1. ROE, 52.
2. ROE, 54.
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1the monads themselves be so regarded. -*• Through their inter-
action, on the analogy of habit, the so-called lav;s of nature
are built up as statistical generalizations. There is, in
nature, nothing inanimate, and *‘no rigorous and mechanical con
catenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume. **2
Again, he writes:
The so-called Interaction of atoms will not account
for the contingency displayed in the world; but what we
know as the conduct or behaviour of cognitive and cona-
tive individuals may, it is contended, explain both the
contingency and the uniformity that we find there.
^
On the basis of this monadistlc ontology Ward builds an
epigenetic theory of evolution as "creative synthesis," ex-
plainable only on the basis of the activity of experiencing
subjects. Although later we must examine this important doc-
trine in more detail, let us here state it in Ward’s own
words, as briefly as may be. Over against a literal inter-
pretation of "evolution," the epigenetic theory maintains that
Each new organism is not an ’educt’ but a 'product,*
to use Kantian phrases; its parts are in no sense pres-
ent in the embryo but are gradually organized, one
after another, in due order, as the term epigenesis im-
plies and as Harvey, who first used the term, propheti-
cally maintained.^
This epigenetic theory may be maintained and explained, ac-
cording to Ward, most easily on the basis of his panpsychic
monadlsm. (On the other hand, epigenesis may justify monadism.]
1. "And then, indeed," says Ward, "the world would start
|
with as many laws as there are individuals," for he regards eachj
individual as in some sense unique. ROE, 76, 63-64. '
2. ROE, 78, 21. 4. ROE, 98.
3. ROE, 51.
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The explanation he summarizes in the following passage:
There is progressive experience at all because
there are active individuals, severally suvgenerls ,
each from its own standpoint bent on working out a
modus Vivendi with the rest.. .The more experience ad-
vances, the more there is of adaptation of environment
as well as of adaptation environment
b. The Individual
Now, of course, in the process of this evolution the
monads did not all remain separate individuals. Soon some of
them began to acquire associates, and so individuals with com-
plex bodies were built up. Within these bodies there is a
closer or more Intimate rapport between constituent monads
than between one monad within and another without the body.
In the higher, more complex living bodies, at least, we seem
driven to positing a "director* or "dominant monad," which we
may call a "soul. "2 Such a complex organism is no mere auto-
maton. . Regarding the dominant monad. Ward says: "Its domi-
nance must be regarded as due in part at least to its innate
or essential superiority, not solely to the accident of its
position."^ In some way, which Ward does not make very clear,
that form of experience which we call, commonly, awareness or
consciousness belongs, in a special sense, to the dominant
1. ROE, 106. Note whole Lecture V, "Evolution as Epige-
nesis and Equilibration," pages 97-116. Of. Lecture XEt parti-
cularly pages 251-254. See below. Chapter Ten.
2. ROE, 207.
3. ROE, 196.
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monad of the individual’s psychical organism,^ The conscious
subject 2 is to be regarded, therefore, as the psychological
equivalent or manifestation of the dominant monad.
^
c. God
As we begin at the level of our own pluralistic self-
consciousness and explore experience in both directions, that
of simplicity and that of complexity, we find that both lead
beyond the world as we know it. So, Ward holds, theism is a
necessary postulate. ”How God created the world, how the One
is the ground of the Many,” he says, ”we admit we cannot tell.'^5
The existence of the world implies the limitation, but not the
“diminution” of God: he is not the “Absolute” or “All," even
though all are dependent upon him. He is both transcendent
and immanent
•
C. Ward’s Modified Interaction! sm
1.
Monadlsm and the Body-Mind Problem
a. Panpsychic Realism
And, now, at last, we are prepared to see hov; the body
mind problem is to be solved by James Ward, and to consider
the arguments he presents for a modified interactionisra.
1. ROE, 462.
2. PP, 34-41.
3. ROE, 443, V/e have here (442-444) Ward’s own summary
of his theistlc argument, which occupies a large part o£ the Lectuies.
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Ward never wrote any lengthy or detailed discussion of the
body-mind problem, as such. One section. No, 47, of his Brit -
tanica article dealt with it, as we noted above; ^ and a Sup-
plementary Note, No. Ill, to The Realm of Ends , ^ takes up some
of the details of a monadistic interpretation of body-mind re-
lations. In addition, there are many scattered references to
it, and brief discussions of various points, throughout his
I
writings.^ Perhaps it is not too much to say that it seems to
be nearly always in the immediate background of his thinking.
We have noted his attitudes toward substantialistic dualism
and singularism. In his own metaphysical thinking, as we have
seen, he embraced a panpsychlc pluralism, although he admitted
the possibility of an occaslonalistic solution,'^ It is now
our task to examine Ward’s monadism in relation to the body-
mind problem.
Let us begin with his statement that there could be no
solution of this problem "till dualism is laid to rest, "5 The
problem, for Ward, is deeper than the mere abolition of all
real dualism. No "cheap and easy monism"® could satisfy his
empirical realism. To reduce individual body or mind to the
status of the imaginary'^ (as, in the last analysis, all singu-
;
1. Supra . 64, f. This section of EB is not included in H*.
2. ROE, 461-467.
3. E.g., ROE, 254, 258;. NAA, I, 14, 177; II, 4, 35, 38,
285; PP, 3, 7-11, 423, 441, etc.
4. ROE, 248-265.
5. PP, 12.
6. ROE, 24. Quoted from Bradley, Principles of Logic, 533,
7. "The main antithesis to ’real’ is ’imaginary’"/** EIP, 297,
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laristic monisms do) is, for him, quite as impossible as to re
gard them as substantially different. Consequently, his solu-
tion must be that of qualitative monism and quantitative plu-
ralism.
But within the range of this general solution of the prob
lem, there are two further possibilities: those represented
by occasionallstic personalism and panpsychic realism. Ac-
cording to the former, the body, in common with the whole
"order of nature," has no real existence save in the mind of
God. The body, therefore, is to be regarded as the instru-
mental activity of the divine mind, at work upon the individu-
al minds of other persons. Ward rejects this systematic oc-
casionalism and embraces panpsychic realism on the grounds
(i) of greater simplicity in the conception of divine activity
(il) of the avoidance of the epistemological difficulties of
subjective Idealism, and (ill) of being better able to account
for functional and organic evolution.^
b. The Individual Organism
For Ward, then, the complex Individual, as we know him on
the human level, at least, is a society of selves or living
agents in mutual rapport This is the ontological reality:
a society of monads whose unity is functional; not a being
1. ROE, 247-269. See below. Chapters Nine and Ten.
2. On this and all other points in the remainder of this
section, not otherwise noted, see ROE, 254-259; 461-467.
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composed of disparate substances, matter and mind; nor a
single being of double aspect. Now within this society of
monads are distinguished, first, a dominant monad or "direc-
tor"^ and, secondly, a vast number of subordinate or minister-
ing monads. Between the dominant and subordina.te monads of tbe
living organism there exists a peculiarly intimate relation.
This intimate, or "functional" relation is different from the
"foreign" relation to monads not of the organism. It is this
difference, misapprehended by dualism, which lies at the basis
of the body-mind problem and the difficulties that cling to it
so long as the dualistic viewpoint persists.
c. Psychoneural Parallelism
This becomes clearer as we consider the psychoneural
parallelism which lies at the heart of the body-mind problem.
That there is an "intimate correspondence between psychosis
and neurosis" is beyond reasonable doubt, as Ward states:
In development and efficiency, in the intensity and
complexity of their processes, mind and brain keep invaria-
bly and exactly in line together .. .We reject materialism...
while still maintaining this psychoneural parallelism to be
a well established fact.^
It is not strange that this should be so, however, on the
monadistic assumption. For, "the living being, that the
psychologist regards ejectively as mind, the physiologist
1. ROE, 207.
2. ROE, 431. Note iVard's use of "neurosis" in historical
sense of "the specific and normal activity of the nervous
system," (Warren, DPS, 179.) vs. recent pathological usage.
3. EB, 11th Ed., XXII, 300, Of. ROE, 461. On three types
of parallelism distinguished by Ward, see suora
.
p. 64-65.

regerds objectively as mechanism."^ To the subject or dominant
monad the subordinate monads which constitute the neural
p
mechanism are "diaphanous." There is more or less complete
intimacy of rapoort . This accounts for the fact that the or-
ganism has "windows," and also for the fact that millions of
people live and die without knowing that they have a brain or
other neural mechanism. F’urther, the subject or dominant monad
is in contact with the entire world outside his organism only
through the monads which compose this neural mechanism and the
other subordinate monads. Through them he both knows, and
effects changes in, the world external to his living organism.
d. Sympathetic Rap lort
Rapport or the relation of immediacy between monads is
for Ward a basic concept. Once more, as in the case of the
monad itself, it is a concept derived from our own personal
experience. There, instances innumerable occur in which be-
havior is conditioned entirely or largely on "'sympathetic
rap .or
t
' or interest that rests upon cognition, "the sort
of mutual understanding. . .which we daily observe in the per-
so nal intercourse of our fellow-men."'^ An excellent illustra-
tion is that of the relation between private citizens and
1. ROE, 461. Gf. Drake, MPN
,
80, 81.
2. ROE, 466.
3. ROE, 218.
4. ROE, 253.
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public officials. The citizen knows little, and cares little.
about the technical details of the smoothly working post-office
or police department; "he only knows what they mean and confi-
dently relies on their services."! "These officials are per-
sons too, no doubt; but so far forth as their social functions
are concerned, their position is analogous to that of subordi-
nate monads. "2
Wow, of course, it is true that this and Ward's various
other illustrations of sympathetic rapport betv/een selves^ are
all taken from the high level of human self-consciousness.
But Ward is convinced that, nevertheless, we are dealing here
with an ultimate and all pervading element in experience. Let
him speak for himself: In a passage in one of his best essays,
"In the Beginning, .., " he is discussing the Lelbnizian princi-
ple that quod non agit non existit
.
and that all appearances
imply something active, though not themselves active. He con-
tinues.
But what experience implies is activity at both ends,
i, e., reciprocal interaction, commercium dynamicum
.
as
Kant called it. Ydien, then, 'finite centers of experi-
ence’ are mentioned, are we not entitled to understand
this phrase as meaning individual agents en rapport to-
gether? We can give no explanation of this rapport
v/hich does not covertly imply it; for we come here to
the bedrock of experience: it Involves two agents, we
know that, and that is all v/e can say in the beginning, 4
1. ROE, 464.
2. ROE, 463-464.
3. E. g., ROE, 218-219.
4. EIP, 297. Of. ROE, 219.

86
.
Thus, for Ward, all Interaction, within and without the organ-
ism (presentation, conation and transeunt action) finds its
ultimate explanation in the sympathetic rapport and concurrent >
response of monads,
1
e • Mind and Body
It remains now, before turning to the arguments in sup-
2port of modified interactlonism, to compare the conceptions of
mind and body commonly held with those of this monadistic sys- i
tern. Except for those slngularistlc systems in which any real
distinction vanishes, the common view is duallstic: body and
mind are separate substances, or essentially disparate in that
one is finite activity, the other the activity of the divine
mind. Ward^s system, however, seeks to preserve all the valid
distinction there is, and at the same time to bridge the gap
I
of disparateness. The distinction is preserved in subject-ob-
|
ject and subject-subject relation. The disparateness is over-
come, in that there is only one ontological reality: the
society of monads in a world of such psychic beings or selves.
On this viev/, body is the society composing the organism
viewed, as it were, objectively. Thus, for the physiologist,
and for the individual, in so far as he regards his own organ-
ism objectively, the body is entirely phenomenal. But, now,
the subject or dominant monad (by virtue of his position and
1. See below. Chapter Ten, Sec. A,4.
2. The term "modified interact ionism" will be adequately
.
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defined and discussed in the sequel. (Note especially Chap.
Tv/elve, Sec. A, p.208 f, below.) Yet in view of the technical
use of ” interactionism, ” a preliminary word would seem in
order here. Granted, of course, that interactionism is a
technical term with a definite connotation, it is no exagger-
ation whatever to say that the whole point of Vizard’s thought
is just to controvert the connotation of such terms. He was
e. realist; which, being interpreted, means that he consistently
refused to deny the genuine meaning and force of the
deliverances of experience. One of these is for him, unques-
tionably, a basic natural duality. As we pointed out above
(supra, 62-63), in his Britannica article he contends that,
on the level of science
.
this duality, and its implied
interaction, cannot be transcended. Yet on other grounds he
is convinced that it must be overcome, metaphysically . This
he attempts, first of all, by interpreti rg the basic duality
as not substantial, but a subject-object duality. (Of.
?/hitehead.) Secondly, by reinterpreting the meaning of "body"
and "mind" in terras of his monadism. Consequently, it seems
to me, there is no other way to name hie solution than
"modified interactionism." He did hold strenuously to
interactionism, on the level of experience and psychology,
insisting on the real efficiency both of "mind" and "body".
Yet the only ontological reality, for him, was psychical
activity; and he was a psychone^oral parallelist, in his
special sense, as adequately defined on pages 64-65, supra*
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the consequent epigenetic attainment of self-conscious cog-
nition) may be aware not only of the society of monads and
the world beyond as object, or in objective relation. He may
be av/are, also, of the sub ject-to-sub ject , or Intersubjective
relation of the monads of his own organism, and of the con-
tinuous changes wrought therein by contact with the world of
monads outside the organism. This is ’'mind" according to
Ward. It is in part - so far as it is content - phenomenal.
But it is not "merely phenomenal or eplphenomenal; since it
Implies the subject, or dominant monad, to whom such phenom-
enal experiences belong."! Note carefully the distinction
here between subject and mind. Mind is, so to speak, the in-
ternal view of the organism, belonging to the subject as
conscious. It is the living organism regarded ejectively;
the body is the same organism regarded objectively. The two
points of view are forever distinct - "incompatible" is
Ward’s term: and "it is this incompatibility that gives rise
to the psychophysical problem, so hopeless for the Cartesian
dualism with its disparate substances, and so simple for the
personal idealist. "2 sq it is that Ward could write.
And, now, instead of studying others’ brains, for
we cannot see our own, let us turn to our own minds,
which none but ourselves can see. What have we here?
Nothing but sensations and movements or complexes of
these, the physical equivalents of which we find to
1. ROE, 462
2. ROE, 463
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constitute the whole structure of brain? Nothing, I
believe, except the mind which is conscious of having
all these, together with the pleasure or pain it re-
ceives from them.l
2. The Pact of Bodily Control
This monadistic conception of body and mind is buttressed,
in the thought of Yi/'ard, by the way in which it meets the de-
mands of a critical Interpretation of experience and nature.
We may note here three points, in addition to that of the
reality of external perception (which is implied throughout
the preceding exposition, ) The first of these is the fact of
bodily control. As we might expect, an empiricist like Ward
is very positive about the reality of bodily control:
V/e are active beings and somehow control the move-
ments of the bodies we are said to animate. No facts
are more Immediately certain than these, and there is
nothing in our actual exoerience that conflicts withj.
them. From these facts v/e advance to the abstract con-
cepts on the strength of which Naturalism, by a grievous
misapprehension of its ovm standpoint, attempts to ques-
tion them,
2
According to panpsychism, the explanation of bodily con-
trol is extremely simple. It is but the natural activity of
the society of monads in sympathetic rapport
.
looked at from
the point of view of the organism as a whole, under the direc-
tion of the dominant monad. Here, ’Ward contends monadlsm has
a distinct speculative advantage of simplicity over occasion-
1. PAE, 21.
2. ROE, 12.
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alism v/ith its ciimbersome notion of the ’middle-raan • activity
of the divine mind. Prom the point of view of closeness to
empirical fact, the realism of this view seems preferable to
the phenomenalism of occasionalism. But, as Ward frankly
says, concerning this and other arguments based on body-mind
relations, "The only alternative left seems to be that adopted
by the occasionalist ; and perhaps to some this may seem prefer'
able."l
3. The Freedom of the Subject
In addition and closely related to the fact of bodily
control as an argument in favor of a modified interactionism,
we find in Ward’s thought the argument of "the reality of that
self-determination v/hich we directly experience, "2 and which,
he holds, can be clearly proved on empirical grounds.
3
Now this freedom means, for him, first of all, freedom
not merely from external constraint, but from Internal neces-
sity. "A man is internally free, then, whenever the ends he
pursues have his whole-hearted approval"^ _ be they good or
bad ends. This does not mean a liberum arbitrlum indifferen-
tlae
.
"for that would seem to differ in no respect from abso-
lute chance or caprice. "5 But it does mean that, while choice
is in large measure determined by character, that character is
1. ROE, 467.
2. ROE, 291. Ward’s position on freedom is succintly ^ven
in PP, 404-407, and at greater length in ROE, 283-291.
3. PP, 407.
4. PP, 404-405.
_
5. Ibid.

Free self-
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not merely "nature modified by circumstances,"
determination involves freedom "to like as he likes" as v/ell
as "to act as he likes." It is positive, as well as negative,
and. Ward believes, it may be shown, empirically, to involve
"not mere freedom from constraint, but freedom to initiate,
to turn circumstances to account, even - thanks to the
that reason affords - so to deal with oneself."!
Now monadistically, of course, this positive freedom of
the subject is the freedom of the dominant monad, rapport
with the subordinate monads of his organism, who respond to
his "directions." Thus, through their response he effects
changes in the organism and through it in the environing world
of monads. These changes, objectively observed, constitute
the so-called "efficiency of mind," as it appears to the in-
dividual and to 'other persons. Thus the fact of real freedom
is an argument for a modified Interactionism, and the only
real alternative to the monadistic solution would seem to be
that of occasionalism, but, as v/e shall see, in the all-per-
vading role of "attention" and "interest" monadism would seem
to offer a more nearly complete explanation of the nature of
positive freedom,
2
4. The Psychical Factor in Evolution
The final, and in some respects the most interesting and
1. PP, 407.
2. See below. Chapter Twelve, Sec. B,2,c.
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important suggestion in Ward’s thought, in support both of
interactionism and of his particular monadistic modification
of interactionism, is that worked out through a consideration
of organic evolution. As we must take this up in some detail
later, 1 we may state here the important points very briefly,
in so far as they bear on interactionism as a body-mind theory,
I
If the organic world is really nothing but a complicated
j
I
m.aterial structure, whose development is to be explained fully
by mechanical laws and the principle of natural selection
alone, how is one to account for the anabolic nature of the
process, for the ’’arrival of the fit, and its arrival in so
many forms, ”2 and for the unquestionable presence of a direct
teleological factor, at least in the case of man and the
higher animals ?3 Further, what is the meaning and explanation
of heredity?^ Ward's position is that the only simple and
satisfactory answer is in panpsychic realism, with its modi-
fied interactionism. 5 From the purposeful interaction of a
world of cognitive and conative beings and of the social-in-
dividuals which they unite to form, an epigenetic evolutionary
process results. "Subjective selection" and "self-conserva-
i
tion" must be added to natural selection in order to account
j
I
for evolution. Without this introduction of the psychical
1. See below. Chapter Ten.
2. Bowne, RfET, 280.
5. NAA, I, Chap. X, 272-302; ROE, Lect. V, 97-116.
4. ROE, 206-212; EIP, Essay VIII, 253-276.
5. See below. Chapter Ten.
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.
factor, and the consequent assumption of genuine mental ef-
ficiency in the natural world, evolution cannot be explained.
1
These, then, are the chief positive supporting arguments
for modified interactionism, to be found in the thought of
James Ward: Only by means of such a system can you account
(i) for objective presentations in experience, (ii) for the
fact of bodily control, (lii) for positive freedom of the self,
(iv) for the anabolic and teleological factors in evolution,
and for genuine heredity. It shall be our task in the sequel
to examine and criticize these suggestions.
1. NAA, I,
I
291-302. Of. ROE, 103-108
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i
PART TWO
PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF WARD»S THOUGHT
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE
A. Introductory Note
As we pass, now, to the criticism and evaluation of
Ward's thought, it will be well to state clearly the change
in method involved. Part One presents the historical
background and the essential points in Ward's thought, partic-
ularly as it bears on the body-mind problem. Every important
point has been documented with sufficient references. In
Part Two each chapter will be devoted to selected problems
arising definitely out of the material covered in Part One,
For example, in this Chapter (Seven) no attempt is made to
cover all or even many of the problems raised by Ward's
analysis of experience, outlined in the last preceding
Chapter;^ only three points, each of which is' vitally related
to the body-mind problem, are selected for discussion. This
selective method will be followed throughout Part Two. The
only apparent exception is Chapter Eight, The Theory of the
1, Supra
.
Chap, Six, Sec.A.
I
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Continuum, and this exception is more apparent than real.
For, in the last analysis, the speculative significance of
the continuum has a vital bearing upon Ward's interpretation i
of body-mind relations, just because of its significance for
his total metaphysical creed. And, also, the discussion of
the objective continuum is in reality but the consideration
of a fourth point under the general head of “The Analysis
of Experience,”
This Chapter (Seven), furthermore, will be intentionally
limited because of three considerations: (i) It is
introductory and preliminary to the problems which more
directly concern body-mind relations. It is, so to speak, a
necessary scientific prolegomenon to the \inderstanding of
Ward's metaphysical thought as it affects the solution of
the body-mind problem, (ii) It is, therefore, for the most
part concerned with psychology, purposely avoiding the
metaphysical questions to which ensuing Chapters will largely
be devoted,! (iii) In view of (i) and (ii) the aim of this
Chapter will be, not to present anything like an exhaustive
analysis and criticism, even of the three points discussed,
but rather, to make clear their meaning, particularly as it
bears on o\ir problem. Anything further would not only take
1. E. g.. Chapters Nine, Ten and Eleven
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US far afield, but would inevitably raise the same
metaphysical problems which later must be met, anyhow, and
which can be dealt with more directly and profitably in
connection with body and mind as understood by Ward,
B. The Science of Individual Experience
1. The Primacy of the Individual
It is difficult for us, today, to feel the importance
and the necessity of the reanalysis of experience, as it
must have appeared to Ward. The solution of a problem like
that of body-mind was rendered impossible for him by the
faulty conceptions of current doctrines. On the one hand
there were the commonly accepted mechanistic associationism
of the dominant psychologies; and the ingrained dualism of
matter and mind of naturalistic thought, with its rigid
mechanism. On the other hand, there was the all-absorbing
monism of Hegelian systems, with their ultimate determinism.
The reality and freedom of the concrete individual were lost
in the ’’reification of abstractions” of one sort or another.
The first necessity was to get back to experience and
recover its real deliverances and implications.
As Ward attempts this task he first of all reinstates
the individual as the real primus and locus of experienoe.
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and, therefore, of psychological study and analysis. This
is sound method, and one that has been exceedingly sinned
against both before and since Ward*s day. To start out with
less or more than concrete individual experience is to
ignore the only real beginning possible to psychology.^
3. The Pluralistic Nature of Experience
Ward is likewise on solid ground in his emphasis upon
the pluralistic standpoint of experience. In truth, we do
not start with the One, but with the Many, in speculation.
And however far from the plurality of experience our
speculation may take us, the Many are still there and must
always be accounted for. With respect to his pluralism,
however, we should keep in mind the facts, first, that Ward
was an insistent empiricist in scientific and philosophic
method; and, second, that nevertheless he recognized clearly
the limitations of pluralism and the necessity of an
ultimate transcendence of it in metaphysics. ^ Starting out
”to ascertain what we can know, or reasonably believe,
concerning the constitution of the world, interpreted
throughout and strictly in terms of mind . ”
^
1. Cf. PP, 36-28, 104; EIP, 277-302. See supra . Chap.
Six, Sec. A,l.
2. Loc. Cit. Also, ROE, Lectures II, III and XI.
Supra
.
Chap. Six, Secs. A,l; B,l.
3. ROE, p.v. Italics his.

his metaphysics is rooted and gro\inded in the psychology
whose “exclusive business” it is “to analyze and trace the
development of individual experience as it is for the
experiencing individual. “1 it was on the basis of such a
psychology that he could begin his metaphysical discussion
by writing,
At the outset, this world immediately confronts
us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one,
but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds
in mutual interaction. It is from this pluralistic
standpoint that our experience has in fact developed,
and it is here that we acquire the ideas that eventually
lead us beyond it.^
Note, then, that in his general analysis of experience
Ward finds - purely on the level of the psychology of
individual experience - the two-fold “objective whole in
which we discern many minds in mutual interaction.” The
singularistic element, the “objective whole,” he has shown
to be purely phenomenal, the “ totm objectivum ” or
“objective continuum,”^ varying with each individual's
experience, and explainable on the basis of the primacy of
the pluralistic standpoint (at least if metaphysical
pluralism, “many minds," is assumed). True, the psychical
element (the “minds”) is at this point (“at the outset”)
1. PP, 104.
2. ROE, p. V,
3. PP, Chap. IV. Supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec. A, 2. Chap.
Eight, below, deals with the metaphysical significance, if
any, of the objective continuum.
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piire assumption. But the point to be noted is that, having
analyzed experience (in Psychological Principles ) Ward
begins his metaphysical work with an ’’objective whole”
purely psychological in character, and a pluralism unshaken,
and still fit to be the basis of metaphysical speculation,
3. Activistic Panpsychism versus Substantialism
Ward*s inherent pluralism, then, is to be noted. But
its true significance can be grasped only as it is seen in
relation to the \inderlying monism of his thought. His
pluralism is not an ultimate pluralism of ’’substances,” All
real exi stents - all the Many - are for him of the nature of
mind; i. e.
,
psychical activity is the only ’’stuff” of real-
ity,^ and this ultimate activity, which ^ reality, exists
as many minds forming an interactive whole, Ward*s theory
is not to be confused with panpsychisms of the ”mind-stuff”
variety. This ultimate union of pluralism and monism is at
the very foundation of hie metaphysics, and yet it is rooted
j
and groiinded in empirical psychology and epistemology. Ward
found nothing in his psychological analysis of experience to
contradict this fundamental metaphysical hypothesis. On
the other hand, he found it possible, on this basis, to
1, Of. PP, 343-344, 381-382; EIP, 297; ROE, 391-393,
Supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec.B,
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accoimt for the particulars of experience, ^ and to solve the
riddle of epistemology,
C. Duality of Subject and Object
1, Duality versus Dualism
At the basis of the riddles to be solved lies the
apparent dualism of mind and body. Ward was right in insist-
ing that short of miraculous occasionalism there was no
solution of this problem so long as the dualism of disparate
substances was maintained. And this brings us face to face
with the essential question concerning Ward's analysis, from
the point of view of the body-mind problem. That question
is this: Is that duality which we know as ’’the bedrock of
experience"^ a duality of subject and object within the
unity of individual experience, as Ward contends, or is it a
dualism of disparate phenomena or substances of matter and
mind as has been traditionally maintained? Upon our answer
to that will depend, in large part, our judgment concerning
Ward's solution of the problem of body-mind relations. The
two points which seem to me to weigh heaviest in favor of
1, See below, Chaps. Nine and Ten, for critical
discussion of important points.
2. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 30. Cf. NAA
,
II, 110-123
on this duality in experience, Cf. supra. Chap. Six, Sec. A',
3, and references there cited.
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Ward's position, and which he brings out in his analysis,
are these: (i) the reality of the subjeot, and its
distinction from the objective factor in experience; (ii)
the activity of the subject*
2. The Oweynership of Experience
First, Ward insists, rightly, that all experience
belongs to subjects; that,
.however much assailed or disowned, the concept of a
'self* or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or
explicitly in all psychological writers whatever - not
more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume,
who treats it as a fictional
and, we might add, it is to be found even in the behaviorists
who refuse to mention itj
But, further, regarding this "owner" of experience, or
subject. Ward holds that it is not to be defined in purely
phenomenal terms. "We cannot call our consciousness of
self merely phenomenal. "2 is this latter position which
is of most importance in answering the question under
consideration as to the subject-object analysis of experience
For on the purely phenomenal level you cannot get away from
a disparate body and mind; they are simply both there as
distinct phenomena. The only possible solution in that case
1. PP, 35. Cf. 34-41; 376- 382.
2. ROE, 237.
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is to “explain away” one or both, metaphysically. But the
point of Ward*s analysis is that there are more than the
disparate phenomena in experience: that body and mind as
r
phenomena are both objective presentations, and in experience
always stand over against an experiencing subject.^
In the last analysis, I suppose, each of us must judge
Ward's analysis on the basis of our own experience. For
my part, I think he is fundamentally correct. The argioments
against his position are well summarized by Professor
Strong, 2 They may be given in three sentences from his
discussion:
(y Granting its existence [ward's non-phenomenal
subject
,
it is impossible to give a rational explanation
of the manner in which our knowledge of it was obtained..,
(2) But, even if our knowledge of it could be
accounted for, it would be impossible to assign it a
natiire.,.
(3) Finally, the theory would be inconsistent with
the fact that our whole knowledge of the Ego and its
function is in truth derived from experience. . .3
The answer to the first of these objections would seem
to be that knowledge of the existence of a subject and even
a limited knowledge of its nature might well be had
inferentially or intellectually; and, in fact, is so acquired
1. On the doctrine of the experiencing subject, see
supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec. A,4,b, and below, Chap. Eleven. Cf.
PP, 34-41,
2. WMB, 203-209,
3. Op. cit. 206-207.
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in part.^ But Strong overlooks the fact that the subject,
though not phenomenal, is for Ward, never entirely
non-empirical. All that we know about it we do know in and
through conscious experience. Ward is extremely careful to
keep his psychological doctrine of the subject of experience
free from any metaphysical implications of a non-conscious
soul. He says definitely.
This psychological concept of a self or subject,
then, is after all by no means identical with the
metaphysical concept of a soul; it may be kept as free
from metaphysical implications as the concept of the
biological individual or organism with which it is so
intimately connected,
^
However, the subject must not be confused with the
biological organism. Nor, on the other hand, is it merely
"the unity and continuity of the so-called contents of
consciousness," The analysis of experience reveals clearly
...feeling, and effort or impulse, as the result of
feeling; and it is just these purely psychological facts
of feeling and impulse that compel us to recognize a
conscious subject as well as a unity and continuity of
the so-called contents of consciousness^
As to Strong's second objection, it has validity only
on the basis of such a view of the nature of reality as
Strong's own phenomenalism. If Ward's fundamental
Leibnizian conscious activism be granted, this objection
1. Of. supra
.
Chap. Six, A, 4, b. PP, 370-382.
2. PP, 35-36. Cf. Brightman, IP, 174-178, 189-191
3. PP, 36. Cf. Brightman, op. cit.
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simply has no meaning. And the third objection^ if it has
any meaning for Ward*s thought, amouints only to a repetition
of the first, and would seem to be based on a misapprehension
of Ward*s doctrine.
3. The Activity of the Subject
The second important point for our problem in Ward*s
analysis of the subject-object duality of experience, is
that of the activity of the subject. Conceive the subject
or consciousness as real in any sense save that of psychic
activity, and sooner or later, ipso facto , either the
subjective side is divested of every mental characteristic,
or one element of a dualism of substances is posited which
demands, for its metaphysical complement, the disparate
substantiality of the object, and the world is sundered into
matter and mind, of one metaphysical sort or another. The
former is what happens, even, in the case of ”mind-stuff”
theories, which Ward so vigorously criticized.! Only on the
basis of an activistic conception of the subject in
experience, is it possible to understand the duality of
subject and object in experience, without falling into
substantial dualism, which would render the problems of
1. NAA, I, 177; II, 15-17. Of. Clifford, LAE, 274-286.
and see supra
.
Chap. Five, Sec.D,2.
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perception and of body-raind relations insoluble. Experience,
then, according to Ward*s reanalysis, does not give us a
substantial dualism of matter (including body) versus mind,
but does show a unified experience within which we may
always distinguish a duality of (i) an active conscious
subject who is experiencing (ii) an objective whole, within
which, further, many objects may be distinguished, among
which are those called “mental” and “material”. And dualism
is possible only by a “reification of abstractions” from that
duality in the unity of experience,
D. The Organic Unity of Experience
1. The Selective Activity of the Subject
And now, keeping as much on the level of the analysis
of experience as may be, let us examine the organic unity
of experience, as Ward conceives it. It must be kept in
mind that this unity is, for him, purely experiential, i.e.,
phenomenal, not substantial. In Hegelian fashion, we may
distinguish a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. The
thesis is the selective activity of the subject.
Within experience we may distinguish a certain unity
due to the selective activity of the controlling subject.
Every presentation, however dim and undifferentiated it may'
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be, arouses in the subject a corresponding feeling, on the
basis of which the conative activity is determined, looking
toward the preservation and betterment of the organism.
No two experients are, for Ward, ever alike, and so this
selective activity varies with the subject. It is one pole of
the organic \inity of individual experience,
2. The Unity of the Continu\am
The antithesis is the unity of the objective continuum.
The world confronts the selecting individual subject, not
as many disparate beings, but as an objective whole - a
continuiom - from which presentations are differentiated.
Undoubtedly, whatever may be the metaphysical explanation
of this continuum, its unity is in part to be explained, on
the psychological level, as being due to the fact that it is
a presentation to a single subject. However explained, it
is the other pole of the unity of individual experience.
3. Functional Unity and the Self
Thesis and antithesis are gathered up, in experience,
in the synthesis of the functional unity of the self. The
unity of experience is not an artificial knitting together
of disparate elements. It is not a miraculous "substantial
unity" of distinct substances, as Decartes supposed, misled
by an abstracting rationalism. Experience, as we know it.
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is best described as an organic unity. Within that total
unity the cognitive and conative subject (at the self-
conscious level of our human experience, at least) seems to
be in a two-fold relation to the objective continuum. To
a certain relatively small part of it (which we call body)
he stands in an intimate relation, involving a large
measure of direct control. With the balance of it he seems
to be in more or less indirect relation and far less
effective control through the body. Subject and body
function together, and this functional unity is distinguished
from the rest of reality as ”self”.^
Thus Ward's reanalysis of experience may be seen, I
trust, to be really fundamental and necessary to the task of
accounting for body and mind on the deeper, metaphysical
level. The last trace of Cartesian dualism, in so far as it
involved a faulty analysis of experienoe into a dualism of
substances (real or phenomenal) had to be eliminated. Three
centuries of the keenest analytical thought of mankind had
failed to make progress against the impossibility of that
1. Here we reach the very heart of the body-mind
problem, in Ward's thought. Before attacking it critically,
we must deal with a number of metaphysical questions. See
Chap. Eleven, below, for fiirther discussion of the nature
and development of the "self."
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dualism. At the same time, the valid pluralism and duality
within the unity of experience had to be preserved, and its
explanation made possible on a monistic basis. To deny
these was, indeed, to fly from Scylla and be lost in
Charybdis.
At this point we come upon the contention of Dr, John
S. Marshall, that "the (objective) continuum theory is
...a refutation of extreme pluralism," and "is the supreme
expression of the fact that Ward is not a genuine
monadologist . "1 We must turn aside from our direct
examination of Ward*s solution of body-mind relations long
enough to consider carefully this claim.
1. Marshall, OWP, 138-139
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE THEORY OF THE CONTINUUM
A. The Principle of Continuity
1. The Theory and the Principle
One of the most distinctive and important contributions
of James Ward to psychological thought was his theory of the
objective continuum. Perhaps next to the subjective-
objective duality in unity (which has been considered in the
preceding Chapter) this theory of the continuum is for our
problem of body and mind, the most important part of his
reanalysis. That is particularly evident in the light of the
interpretation of the continuum and its significance which.
Dr, J. S. Marshall gives us in his dissertation entitled,
The Continuiun in James Ward * s Psychology.
In that excellent study Marshall makes two significant
statements of a general nature which we must consider
carefully. In the first place, he says,
The problem of the continuum is largely a problem of
Ward's method. It is a problem of making explicit his
methodological presuppositions. These are rooted in his
epistemology and general philosophy.!
In so far as Marshall makes any attempt at all to “make
1. Marshall, CWP, 4.
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explicit” Ward *8 ’’methodological presuppositions,”' he
succeeds in laying bare only one such presupposition, viz.
,
the principle of continuity. ^ It is clearly Marshall *g
Implication, therefore, that there is a direct and important
relation between the principle of continuity and the contin-
u\m theory. That, I take it, must be the meaning of the
quotation ;ju8t given. In other words, Marshall is contending
that the theory of the continuum can be understood only on
the basis of the principle of continuity. This, I shall
attempt to show, involves a mistaken notion of the nature
of the continuum, resulting from a confusion of scientific
and metaphysical standpoints.
And, now, this giytake confusion leads Marshall to
a second statement of even wider and deeper significance,
both for Ward*s philosophy in general and the body-mind
problem in particular. He says.
The theory of the continuum is the supreme expression
of the fact that Ward is not a genuine monadologist . .
.
Ward does not need to transcend the empirical level to
find his pluralism transcended. The continuum theory is
itself a refutation of extreme pluralism.®
This, indeed, is important, if true. Yet how amazing that
7/ard himself seems totally unaware of the speculative
1. Op. cit., 4, 37, 155, and passim .
2. Op. cit., 138-139. Note the entire passage.
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significance of the theory of the continuum.* The truth
%
seems to be that the theory has no such significance at all,
but that Marshall *s conclusion rests back on the same
confusion mentioned above and involved in the statement
first quoted. In order to dispel that confusion and lay
bare the mistaken conception of the continuum to which it
leads, we need only to see clearly the meaning of the
principle of continuity and of the theory of the continuiJim
in Ward *8 thought, keeping in mind always the distinctions
of standpoint urged in Chapter Three, above.
1
2. Ward's Use of the Principle of Continuity
a. Early Recognition of the Principle
In his dissertation Marshall has a lengthy and
enlightening discussion of the development and use of the
principle of continuity by the mathematicians, from Greek
times down to Leibniz, and of its appropriation and appli-
cation by the philosophers, particularly Leibniz and James
Ward. Its place in the work of the latter we must note in
some detail.
That James Ward was conscious of the importance of the
principle of continuity in the development of a rational
1. Supra
.
19-27. Cf. Ward's essay, "philosophical
Orientation and Scientific Standpoints," EIP, 182-208.
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philosophy there can be no doubt. As early as 1870 he wrote
to a friend, concerning epistemological method, that ”on
the analogy of ourselves we build our knowledge of things
without," and went on to expound this in terms of the
principle of continuity:
So knowledge grows, one part acting and interacting
with another... Is it not possible so to connect knowledge
with knowledge without a break as at last to see in the
Macrocosm such a resemblance to the Microcosm that it
shall be recognized as the expression of a Mind, whose
image we bear?... A realistic idealism may yet prove the
solution of philosophy.
1
b. Ward Derived it from Leibniz
From this early recognition on down to his latest work
the principle can be traced, explicitly or implicitly
present. Ward himself acknowledges that he borrowed it from
Leibniz.^ In the Preface to his Nouveaux Essais sur
L 'Entendement Humain
.
the latter declares:.
Rien ne se fait tout d’un coup, et c'est une de mes
grandes maximes et des plus verifiies, que 3^ nature ne
fait .jamais de sauts . J’appelais cela In loi de
continuitfe .^
Perhaps the clearest statement of how completely he regards
this principle as applicable in the natural world is to be
found in the following fragment of a letter, written October
16, 1707, to an unknown person:
1. EIP, 37. Quoted by his daughter from a letter Ward
wro"^ Henry Wolstenholme
,
August 25, 1870.
Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais
.
17.
^2. ROE, 20, 53-54.
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Men are connected with the animals, these with the
plants, and these again with the fossils, which will be
united in their turn with bodies which the senses and the
imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and shape-
less. Now since the law of continuity demands that when
the essential determinations of a bein^ approach those of
another so that likewise -accordinp:!:/ all the properties
of the first must .gradually aopi roach those of the last
,
it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings
form only one chain, in which the different classes, like
so many links, connect so closely the one to the other,
that it is impossible for the senses and the imagination
to fix the precise point where any one begins or ends.
On the basis of such rigorous application, Leibniz goes on
to predict, in this letter, the discovery of .creatures
"which as regards many properties .might pass for vegetables
with as good right as for animals.^ He further suggests the
importance of the principle for philosophy, in revealing
new truths, and says, "I flatter myself that I have some
ideas concerning them, but this age is not qualified to
receive them."^ These ideas he worked out in his Nouveaux
Essais
.
to some extent, where they were published for the
first time half a century after his death.
It is clearly evident, however, as Marshall points out,^
1. Langley, LNE, 712-713. (italics Leibniz's) Of.
Nouveaux Essais
. 17, 225, 422-423. For references to
Leil.niz' 8 other writings, see Langley, LNE, 334, n.l.
2. Langley, LNE, 713-714. The discovery of bacteria
has vindicated this prediction,'
3. Ibid.
4. Nouveaux Essais
.
particularly 225, 422-423.
5. Op. cit., 25, 35.
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that Ward is not nearly so thoro\igh-going in its application
as Leibniz. This is due, undoubtedly, to the fact that
speculation, with Ward, was constantly balanced, checked
and limited by empirical observation. If, indeed, continuity
is ”the one speculative principle in Ward's general method,'*^
yet it never functions alone and with the freedom we find in
I
Leibniz, and it is always found in conjunction with the
|
test of experience. We may illustrate this by quoting the
following footnote from the Psychological Principles :
The principle of continuity then gives us no title
to infer from the distinction reached by analysis to the
separate existence of the factors analyzed. Only experi-^
ence can justify such a separation. . .So in psychology
we find a duality of subject and object but never any
warrant for dualism. On the other hand, the underlying
unity and all-embracing totality, sometimes spoken of as
the Absolute, does not belong to the empirical plane.
^
c. The Principle in Ward's Thought
On the other hand, while not nearly as rigorous as
Leibniz in his application of the principle. Ward was clear
as to its importance for metaphysics. He says definitely:
Every system of thoroughgoing pluralism accepts the
Leibnizian principle of continuity, at least to the extent
of maintaining that there is no infinite gap, no complete
diversity between, one monad and another, a principle
against which the Leibnizian theology itself offends.*^
1. Op. cit.
,
155.
2. PP, 442, n.3. (Underlining mine. Not cited, in
this connection, by Marshall.)
3. ROE, 54. Of. ROE, 20, 52-53,185-188, 433.
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.
He cites with approval, also, Leibniz *s succinct phrase,
"Nature never makes leaps." 1 in so far as his general
conception of the nature of the universe may be said to
determine every scientist’s work it must be freely admitted
that Ward's adopted principle that "Nature never makes leaps"
may be clearly traced throughout Psychological Principles .
This, undoubtedly, is what Marshall refers to when he calls
continuity "the one speculative principle in Ward's general
method."^ Someone - probably Ward himself - has taken the
trouble to trace the principle through Psychological
Principles , and to list in the Index some twenty-five
passages where it is "referred to or illustrated. "3 a
careful checking of these passages shows that in not one of
them is the principle itself directly considered. Nor is the
principle, in a single instance, made use of, so to speak,
constructively, in the determination of specific doctrine;
but always it is present, explicitly or implicitly, only in
a general and interpretative fashion, illustrative of the
general truth that "Nature never makes leaps." Certainly,
neither from these passages, nor from anything in the method
of Ward's development of the doctrine of the objective
1. ROE, 20.
2. Op. cit., 155.
3. PP, 472.
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continuum, can an argument against pluralism as a
metaphysical principle be deduced.
It is of some importance to note that, being a speculB.-
tive principle, continuity functions particularly in Ward*s
epistemology. Marshall has rightly recorded this fact.
Discussing Ward*s epistemology, he speaks of the principle
of continuity as the “cardinal methodological axiom," and
again as “a postulate of the rationality of experience; an
axiom of the possibility of explanation."^ In my judgment,
that is putting the matter rather strongly. I do not
believe the principle of continuity can be shown to function
in quite such an important manner, epistemologically, in
Ward's thought. Its primary application is ontological,
rather than epistemological. Marshall's confusion here,
once more is chiefly that of standpoint. However, that is of
little morlient at present. The important point is that the
principle of continuity is a speculative principle;, that as
such Ward recognizes it and uses it continuously; and that
as such it functions only in a general and interpretative
(and not in a determinant) manner in his science.
^
1. Op. cit., 37.
2, See below. Sec. C,l, df this Chapter.
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B. The Definition of the Theory
of the Continuum
1. The Objective Continuiim
Our next and more essential task is to try to make clear
what Ward meant by the objective continuum, and, at the same
time, to see, if we can, how he arrived at that theory, and
what place it held in his thought, i.e., what kind of a
theory it was, for him.^
In his observation and interpretation of the facts of
h\iman consciousness James Ward was impressed, first of all,
by what he called the “continuity of consciousness.
What we have to deal with as psychologists is not a structure
made up, so to speak, of separate bricks which, in some
fashion or other, have been put together, but rather with
a continuous whole which is being constantly modified in the
course of the individual's experience. He says;
...Though analysis be first in the. order of knowledge,
synthesis is first in the order of existence.
The proximate fact for the psychological observer is,
however - this much, at least, we may safely say - a \inity
that is differentiated. But though differentiated, it is
not disintegrated.^
1. It will be noted that this Section (B) is in
fundamental agreement with Marshall’s excellent exposition of
the continuum. Disagreement re^ftters with the consideration
of the significance of the theory, in Section C.
3. PP, 76.
3. PP, 409-410.
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On the basis of this view of conscious experience,
therefore, he finds a sensation, or “so-called elementary
presentation,”! to be "really a partial modification of some
pre-existing and persisting whole, which thereby becomes
more complex than it was before,”^
It is this "pre-existing and persisting whole," or con-?-
sciousness as it continuously presents itself to the
individual, which is for Ward the to turn objectivum , or
objective continuum. ^ There are far better analogies in biol-
ogy, he insists, than in physics or chemistry, to "the
progressive differentiation of experience,"^ "The process,"
he says, "resembles a partial segmentation of what is
originally continuous, rather than an aggregation of elements
|
at first independent and distinct,"^
It is important to keep well in mind, then, these two
emphases in Ward's doctrine of the presentations: (i) They
form a presentational or objective continuum, (ii) parti-
|
cular presentations are never to be regarded as discontinuous i
or distinct. Let us have them once more, briefly, in his
own words:
But even when most definite, what we call a
presentation is still part of a larger whole. It is not
separated from other presentations.
1. PP, 78. 4. PP, 76.
2. Ibid. 5. Ibid.
3. Cf. Brightman, POI, 13-19, on the "datum self."
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whether simultaneous or successive, by something which is
not of the natixre of presentation, as one island is
separated from another by the intervening sea, or one note
in a melody from the next by an interval of silence.
1
And, again, he writes, in treating of the nature of the
presentations as modifications "of some pre-existing and
persisting presentational whole,"
...this increasing complexity and differentiation
never gives rise to a plurality of discontinuous
presentations, having a distinctness and individuality
such as the atoms or elementary particles of the physical
world are supposed to have.^
2,
Psychoplasm and Anlage
In addition to the terms ‘objective continuum,* and
'presentational continuum,* Ward makes use of the word
•psychoplasm. * 3 So far as I have been able to make out,
these terms are strictly synonymous, so far as their content,
or essential reference is concerned. In connotation, how-
ever, the term psychoplasm, from its relation to terms such
as bioplasm and protoplasm, suggests innate or underlying
structure, and the broader relationships of the individual
continuum."^ This seems to be Ward's point of view. He
states plainly that for the psychological individual, psycho-
plasm is the objective continuum. However, for the concrete
1. PP, 76.
2. PP, 78.
3. PP, 412-429. Of. 76-80.
4. Ibid.
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I
individual, that is, for the individual considered in hie
historic and natural relationships, psychoplasm involves
something further which he denotes by the German term Anlage .
In order fully to understand all that the doctrine of
Anlage comprises, we shall have to take into account Ward's
theory of the monads; for, like the whole monadology, the
doctrine of Anlag;e goes back to Leibniz. In Section 57 of
his Monadologi:y
.
Leibniz writes of ”the special point of view
of each monad.” Similarly, for Ward, Anla^e is "this
intentional aspect of the body ...as it is for the concrete
experient when - so far as we can trace it - his experience
begins.”! Interpreted in lees technical language, as I
understand him. Ward means that when consciousness begins
the individual is already in possession of a presentational
plasm or continuum. From the moment of the birth of
consciousness on, this continuum undergoes modification,
but nevertheless, in some sense it persists, and itself
modifies the process of experience. This original given
factor, which, though soon modified, persists and itself
modifies, is the Anlage which is comprised in psychoplasm
when considered as of the concrete individual. ”It would be
psychoplasm,” says Ward, ”but psycho olasm as modified by
1. PP, 428.
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heredity . “1
I
i
3. Objective and Subjective Factors 1
In order to complete our survey of Ward’s definition of
the continuum, we must note the respective places which he
gives to the objective and the subjective factors in the
process of the modification of the objective continuum in
experience. Here we touch upon a matter of great importance
for the understanding of Ward’s general psychology; namely,
his insistence upon the activity of the self or subject,
2
In the first place, he insists that the two factors are
found always together. Specifically, he says,
...^ every step the subjective and the objective
aspects, function and structure, the experient and the
experienced, mutually mould and modify each other.
3
This is not to say, however, that they are of equal
importance in the determination of experience. In analysis,
which is primary for knowledge, the objective aspect and
results are obtrusive. But in the actual world of experience
in its ongoing, he holds that it is the subjective factor,
i.e.
,
interest, which is determinant. Let us have the
statement in his own words:
1. PP, 428.
2. ROE, 104-106; PP, 69; NAA, II, 255.
3. PP, 410.
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There must be material to synthesize, of course:
we cannot synthesize what is not 'given. ' But we do not
synthesize merely on the ground of presentation.
Differentiation implies some concentration of attention
but effective synthesis implies interest as well.l
And, again, he puts the matter even more strongly when
he writes, a little farther on in the same passage;
So the objective differentiation progresses on
subjectively determined lines. This is for psychology
the first and fundamental fact: to lose sight of it is
to miss the essential meaning of experience.
2
In Ward's thought, then, the objective continuum as
actually presented has a twofold determination: (i) it is
determined by the objects which are presented. According
to his monadistic metaphysics these objects are real, for
"presentation is a relation among monads not a subjective
state in a single monad. (ii) The continuiim owes its
modifications (i.e., differentiations) largely to the
selective activity of the dominant monad (the activistic
subject.) This total activity Ward calls "attention,"^
meaning thereby the total reactive activity of the subject.
pp 4i4
2. PP, 415. Italics his.
3. ROE, 260. Of. 54, 466.
4. Of. above quotations from PP, and PP, 57; ROE, 54,
260, 466. On "attention," as Ward uses that term, see
supra
.
Chapter Six, Sec. A, 4, a.
tv

C. The Significance of the Theory
of the Continuum
1, It is a Scientific Theory
And now, having summarized Ward's doctrine of the
presentational continuum, let us move on to o\ir first criti-
cism of Marshall's treatment of that doctrine. That advance
can best be made through a discussion of the significance of
the continuTjun in Ward's thought and work.
The first, and the essential point to note here is that
for James Ward the continuum was always a scientific theory.
This may seem obvious, and yet it is important, particularly
if one is to understand rightly the relation of the theory
to Ward's underlying metaphysics and to the speculative
principle of continuity. For that the continuum theory
is scientific, not metaphysical or epistemological, means,
first of all, that its basis is purely empirical, and not
speculative. It is, for Ward, primarily a sound interpreta-
tion of the plain facts of conscious experience. Psychology,
for him, was always ”an empirical science which deals with
experience as fact.”l How anyone can read the Psychological
Principles and overlook or be in confusion on this point is
hard to see. Certainly there seems to be no doubt about the
matter, so far as explicit judgment goes. Marshall himself
1. Marshall, CWP, 38; Ward, PP, 26.
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plainly recognizes the fact, as we have just noted. W. E.
Johnson states what would seem to be a consensus of opinion
when he writes: ’’Empirical psychology in the work of James
Ward was united to a more complete and thorough-going
method. ”1
This is not to deny the fact that the continuum theory
is a theory, and not simply a scientific observation. On
the basis of the observed facts. Ward has built a logical
superstructure (particularly as regards the subjective factor
in the determination of the continuum) which he believes is
entirely warranted, nay, rather, is demanded by the facts.
This, too, is completely within the range of legitimate
science, and is the common practice of all kinds of scientists^
;
'
True, his acceptance of the general principle of continuity
undoubtedly affected Ward’s concept of the continuum, but only
in the “general and interpretative fashion, illustrative
of the general truth that 'Nature never makes leaps,'”
referred to above. ^ But in no sense does it transform the
theory from a scientific hypothesis into a philosophical
speculation.
2. The Theory is Not Self-Sufficient
Whence then arises the apparent confusion between the
1. In the British Journal of Psychology
. 16 (1925) 3.
(Quoted by Marshall, CWP,1.
2. Supra
. p. n4 .
I!
1
1
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scientific and philosophical viewpoints, which, we have
intimated, seems to be manifest in the work of Dr. Marshall?
It arises, I think, in the fact that the continuum theory,
in the very nature of the case, points beyond itself. Even
though it be found to fit perfectly the concrete psychologi-
cal facts and situations (as Ward held it did), yet it was
of such a nature as to demand explanation and justification
that was bound to carry the speculator beyond science, into
metaphysics. Ward not only recognized this,^ but he
definitely attempted to meet the challenge by his monadistic
theory, and his doctrine of presentation as the result of
a relation of subjects,^ in his metaphysical theorizing,
j
He himself was always careful not to bring this metaphysics
into his scientific discussion.
3. Its Historical Significance
The continuum theory, then, is a scientific theory or
I
interpretation of conscious presentations, and ought not to
I
be confused with speculative explanations, and justifications
which grew out of it. It remains to note very bxiefly the
relation of Ward's work in this field to the c\irrent atomis-
tic psychology of the England of Ward's day, and its
1. PP, 412, n.l.
2, Ibid.; PP, 428; ROE, v, 60-64, 209-210, 257-260.
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similarity to certain later systems.
The dominant note of the psychology of the last century,
both in Great Britain and on the Continent, was that of
analysis, and the prevailing mode was analytic sensational-
ism. It was against this deeply intrenched tendency within
his chosen field that James Ward waged almost lone battle.
That he was eminently successful in the long run, there can
be little doubt. Although perhaps a bit overenthusiastic,
the statement of the writer in the British Journal of
Psychology is not wholly inaccurate:
British psychology has for over a quarter of a
century put off its mourning garb for associat ionism.
Professor Ward gave mental atomism its quietus long ago.^
It seems doubtful whether the true significance of the
continuum was very greatly appreciated at first, even by
Ward’s own disciples, but there can be no doubt that slowly
but surely its meaning penetrated and permeated psychological
theory in England. However that may be. Ward’s famous
article on “Psychology,” which appeared first in the 9th
Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica
.
in 1885, was hailed
at once as a masterful and authoritative piece of work.
1. British Journal of Psychology
. 16 (1925) 56.
Quoted by Marshall, CWP, ^
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Although I have found no evidence of direct connection,
it is of interest to note the strong similarity between
^yard's continuum doctrine and the central teachings of the
Oestalt psychologists.^ In fact, the similarity seems to be
so great that one might almost say that they are fundamen-
tally the same. The explanation, perhaps, is to be found
in the fact that they were opposed to the same type of
analytical assoc iationism.
D. The Problem of the Continuum
1. As Dr. J. S. Marshall Saw It
I
Turning once more to the aforementioned statements by
I Dr. John S. Marshall in The Continuum in James Ward * s
Psychology^, we find that the underlying contention of that
I
paper is that the psychology of Ward, the continuum theory,
' and, in particular, the conception of psychoplasm, are
' obscure and difficult because Ward failed to make clear his
I principles of method. He says, e.g.
,
The problem of the continuum is largely a problem of
Ward's method. It is a problem of making explicit his
methodological presuppositions. These are rooted in his
epistemology and general philosophy ... Even Ward's
philosophical writings are obscure because the postulates
of method are implied rather than expressed.
^
1. Of. Hartmann, GPS, 17.
2. Marshall, GWP, 4.
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The problem of the continuum, in other words, is for Dr,
Marshall a problem, not of psychological interpretation but
of philosophical presuppositions, of Ward's underlying
I
method of dealing with his material and its problems.
I
Marshall gives us the impression, surely, that he intends to
i
j
make these presuppositions of method clear and explicit.
By implication, at least, one would also suppose that he
intends to link up the presuppositions with Ward's work,
particularly with the continuum theory. As we have already
j
I
remarked,^ Marshall discloses but one supposed methodological
|
presupposition, and, so far as I can see, he fails almost
j
entirely to show us how -that principle applies to the
continuum. On the other hand (I believe because he fails
to distinguish the respective standpoints of science and
metaphysics, which play so important a part in the under-
standing of Ward) he seems to me to miss the real significance
of the presupposition he does expo\md. Let us look at his
treatment of that presupposition,
2, The Principle of Continuity
We have already noted the fact that the principle of
continuity is, indeed, as Marshall contends, of exceedingly
j
1, Supra
. Sec. A,l, of this Chapter
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great importance as a speculative principle in Ward's work,^
Whether or not it is, as Marshall holds, “the one specula-
tive principle in Ward's general method, does not parti-
cularly concern us here. Suffice it to recognize that there
can be no question but that it did underlie all of Ward's
thinking. Now Marshall thinks that Ward does not make clear
just what this principle means for him, or what its status
is in his work. He writes;
The principle of continuity seems to be the one
speculative principle in Ward's general method.
Considering that it is speculative, it is surprising
that he never made a more thorough exposition of its
significance and status for his system.
However, it may be that Ward intended that the
meaning of the principle of continuity should be; it is
sound method to proceed without break unless there is
empirical evidence to the contrary.
3
And that latter phrase expresses exactly, I think,
just what Ward did intend the principle of continuity to
mean. Dr. Marshall proceeds:
There are many passages which have this coloring.
But Ward often tends to give the principle more than a
methodological meaning. That is because a methodological
principle always has its influence upon the science in
which it is used."^
Undoubtedly it is Marshall's intention to show that the
doctrine of the continuum is one of those places where the
1. Supra
. Sec. A,2,a,c.
2. Marshall, CWP, 155.
3. Marshall, C7/P, 155.
4. Ibid.
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principle of continuity has more than a methodological
meaning. Yet it is not at all apparent, to me at least, that
i
he succeeds in doing any such thing. He gives, us, in the i
dissertation, an excellent summary of the history of the i
(
I
principle of continuity. He presents also a good exposition
of the details of the theory of the continuum. And he makes i
I
it fairly clear that he thinks the two are related in
[
1
intimate fashion; doubtless that the continuum theory is an
instance of the functioning of the principle of continuity
in the thinking of James Ward, But proof or substantiation
of this latter view seems to be entirely absent.
3. Is the Theory of the Continuum Speculative?
The reason for this failure to carry out the evident
intention of the dissertation is, by this time, I trust, not
far to seek. The principle of continuity, as Dr. Marshall
rightly recognizes, is a purely speculative principle. If
the theory of the continuimi were a speculative doctrine, let
us say, a metaphysical or epistemological explanation, it
might be in order to attempt to find its basis in the prin-
ciple of continuity. But for James Ward the theory of the
I
continuum is not a speculative or philosophical doctrine.
|
It is a clear-cut scientific hypothesis, rooted and grounded
in empirical observation, and held in the conviction that it
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is logically necessary as the reasonable interpretation of
those observed facts. After describing, in the vivid lan-
guage quoted above, ^ the ‘continuity of consciousness* that
he finds in experience. Ward himself states::
In our search for a theory of presentations, then,
it is from this 'continuity of consciousness' that we
must take our start. Working backwards from this as we
find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and
general considerations to the conception of a to turn
ob.iectivxim or objective continuum which is gradually
differentiated,
2
The theory of the continuum, then, as a scientific
theory, has little or no direct speculative connection with
the principle of continuity. As a speculative methodological
presupposition that ”it is sound method to proceed without
break unless there is empirical evidence to the contrary,”
of course there is connection. But evidence of more than
that general connection I fail to find, either in Marshall
or Ward. This is not to say that the continuum theory has
no speculative bearings or meanings. It most certainly does;
but those bearings and meanings all hinge upon and follow
after its validity, first of all, as a scientific
hypothesis. It is because Marshall fails to recognize
clearly the scientific nature of the continuum theory, and
1, Supra, Sec. B,l, second quotation; note the whole
section.
3, Ward, PP, 76. Of. the context of this quotation,
and also pages 49-50.
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constantly confuses, therefore, the two standpoints in the
work of James Ward (i.e., the scientific and the
philosophical) that he falls into the error of contending
that the problem of the continuum is a problem of the
methodological presuppositions, and that he likewise misses
the true significance of speculation with respect to the
continuum.
This true significance, I believe, is this: that the
continuum theory, while it may be a sound interpretation of
the facts, is not completely self-explanatory. Particularly
under the historical conditions of its development, it
demanded further justification: a fitting into and checking
up with the whole philosophy of nature and life of which it
must manifestly be a part. Here, indeed, speculation must
play the leading part; and here, indeed, the principle of
continuity becomes of prime importance. But that takes us
to the subject of the monadology, and, incidently points us
back to the main theme of this paper.
We may, then, sum up our criticism of Dr. Marshall's
attempt (or at least, projected attempt) to discover the
principle of continuity in the origin and development of the
continuum theory, by saying, in homely phrase, that he got
the cart before the horse.
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4. What Does Ward’s Continuum Imply?
Thus far in this Chapter we have been dealing primarily
j
I
with the first of Marshall's two statements, which we set
|
!
out to criticize,^ Over against his contention that the
|
problem of the continuum was speculative (i.e., was that of
“making explicit” Ward's “methodological presuppositions”)
we have set the plain fact that the continuum is a scientific
hypothesis, with only a comparatively minor and unimportant
relation to the only methodological presupposition Marshall
is able to uncover (i.e., to the principle of continuity).
Interesting as this statement is, in itself, however, its
chief importance for our problem of body-mind relations is
in its implications. Those implications come to a head in
the second statement we quoted^ and set out to criticize.
This was to the effect that the theory of the continuum is
proof that Ward was not a genuine pluralist
,
not a true
monadologist
;
that this theory, on the empirical level, tran-
scends extreme pluralism.
Now in the first place, we must agree with Marshall, in
|
so far as his statement implies that James Ward was not
ultimately a pluralist. That is true; he was a theist, as
part II of the Realm of Ends adequately reveals.^ But, in
1. Supra
.
Sec. A,l, of this Chapter. !
2. Ibid.
I
3. “Theism,” pages 225-453.
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entire disagreement with Dr. Marshall, (i) I contend that if
1
I
he is right and the theory of the continuum actually contra-
dicts pluralism and monadism, then Ward's whole system,
including the doctrines of the dominant monad, the functional
unity of the society of selves, and the continuum, falls with
the monadism; but (ii) I insist that this is not the case:
that the theory of the continuiim does not refute either
monadism or pluralism, but merely points beyond them.
|
The curious thing about Marshall's statements that
”the theory of the continuum is the supreme expression of
the fact that Ward is not a genuine monadologist , “ and that
’’the continuum theory is itself a refutation of extreme
pluralism”^ is that they are interlarded with sentences that
give the key to the whole problem:
The unity of presentations seems to be due to the
fact that they are presentations of one attending subject.
It is the dominant monad that makes possible the functional
organization which makes up a human body or community
of sub jects.
. .The functional unity of the society of
selves is as central for him as the selves. Ward does not
need to transcend the empirical level to find his
pluralism transcended.®
With any or all of these latter statements I have no
quarrel. They are accurate statements of Ward's teaching.
But all that they can possibly mean, it seems to me, is
1. Marshall, CWP, 138-139.
2. Loc. cit.
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(i) that Ward's monads ^ have “windows,” and that, therefore,
it is epistemologically that his pluralism is transcended;^
and (ii) that this transcendence points to a personalistic
,
panpsychic pluralism. To draw out of them the inference
which Marshall does is simply to ignore the distinctions
between epistemological, metaphysical and scientific stand-
'7
points.'^ For the continuum is a scientific hypothesis.
Partly on the basis of it, and in explanation of it. Ward
works out his doctrine of the dominant monad and the
consequent functional unity of the society of selves in the i
t
I
human individual. If from this theory of the continuum one
j
makes a direct metaphysical inference (as Marshall does) he !
is ignoring the purely scientific status of the continuum
in Ward's own thought, and elevating it into a metaphysical
reality in its own right. This is to upset Ward's whole
monadistic system, and deny the very doctrines from which
|
Marshall himself is arguing; the dominant monad, the
functional unity of the individual, and even the very nature
of the continuum as a presentational continuum. For Ward
states definitely that “presentation is a relation among monads
not a subjective state in a single monad, and the only
1. As Ward himself clearly taught. See ROE, 260, 466.
2. ROE, 260.
3. Of. supra
, 21-23, 24-25.
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ontological realities involved are the active, psychic
beings - the monads. The continuiim is only phenomenally
real, and in no sense except the epistemological does it
transcend pluralism. Ontologically
,
again, the functional
unity implies only the dominant monad and its active,
pluralistic relations with the subordinate monads which, for
Ward, are the body of the individual. How or in what sense
there is any denial or refutation of monadology or pluralism
involved, either in the doctrine of functional unity, or
in the theory of the continuum rightly understood, I am not
able to see. Of course, from the point ofjBownian, view of
occasionalistic personalism the entire problem of presenta-
tions is altered - and with it the whole body-mind problem.
In that case - granting that the facts justify a continuum
theory - the continuum may be regarded as the phenomenal
expression of the ontological unity of the direct action of
the divine mind on the subject.^ That seems to me to be the
ultimate source of Marshall’s confusions of standpoint.
He had failed to sterilize completely his verbal and
»
intellectual instruments, and so has seriously infected with
1. Of course, for Ward, as for all theists
,
the
ultimate source of all unity is the divine mind. In a
footnote in PP, 286, n,l, e,g,, he makes such an implication.
But this is far beyond the empirical facts of science. In
ROE, Part II, this is worked out metaphysically.
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his own metaphysics an otherwise objective and valuable study
of the continuum and its meaning in Ward’s more realistic
personalism.
i
i
i
I
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CHAPTER NINE
PROBLEMS OF MATTER AND THE BODY
A. The Realms of Experience
I
1. The Kantian Distinction
^
Returning now to the more direct examination of Ward*s
j
thought in relation to the body-mind problem, we naturally
|
i
take up for consideration next the aspects which have to do
j
with matter and the body. On the psychological level, as we '
I
have seen. Ward held that matter and body are presented in
j
experience as an objective continuum. In delving below the
|
surface of this psychological continu\im. Ward, as he so often
did, followed the guidance of Immanuel Kant, and began his
metaphysical thought with the distinction of two realms of
experience. These two realms, the realm of nature and the
|
realm of ends, he held to be genuine aspects of the one
universe. 1 Ward contrasts these two realms thus:
The one never reaches the individual and concrete,
the other never leaves them; for the one spontaneity and
initiative are impossible, for the other inertia and
rigorous concatenation; to the one the notions of end and
value are fruitless, nay meaningless, for the other they
are of paramount importance.
2
1. ROE, Lecture I
2. ROE, 2-3.
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Yet Ward was rightly careful to note that these two very
distinct realms were only aspects of the one world, and that
just here was the problem: "where and how are we to find the
final unification or mediation of the two?"l
2. The Primacy of the Spiritual
The first step for Ward is to decide which of the two
aspects is the more fundamental. In Naturalism and
Agnosticism he examines at length the claims of those who
i
I
hold the realm of nature to be primary, and of those who are
! driven by the contradictions of that position to posit an
unknown tertium quid
.
of which both are aspects. He finds
that both of these attempts are futile, and so in The Realm
;
o^ Ends he sets out to explore the possibilities of taking
I
the spiritual as primary. This position, he says, "will have
this advantage, that while it may be possible, setting out
from mind, to account for mechanism
,
it is impossible,
setting out from mechanism to account for mind. "2 Again, he
puts the matter clearly:
That the mechanical aspect in itself is thoroughgoing
is precisely the position frankly accepted ,. .Again, the
facts (1) that the teleological is there, and (2) that the
mechanical scheme can find no place for it, are precisely
the reasons which lead us to conclude that the mechanical
theory cannot be either ultimate or supreme.
^
1. ROE, 3,
2. ROE, 18. Of. 431
3. NAA, II, 285-286
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Thus far, as over against the naturalists and absolute
monists, Ward seems to be unquestionably correct in his gen-
eral procedure and conclusions. If metaphysics is to be
based upon all the facts of experience, then it is only by
abstracting from or ignoring the reality of teleological
facts that philosophers can maintain mechanistic determinism,
whether naturalistic, realistic or idealistic.
3. The Reality of Nature
But although Ward took the standpoint of the supremacy
of the spiritual aspect, he never made the mistake of deny-
ing altogether the metaphysical reality of the material
aspect. Nature, for him was real: it was there to be
explained, never to be in any sense explained away. Ulti-
mately it was indeed found to be of the nature of spirit or
mind, but it was not, on that account, to be regarded as
merely phenomenal. ”As actual,” he declares, ”it is - so
far as we can judge from its physical constitution - just
what it always has been, the permanent theatre of perpetual
changes.
These two factors in his thinking; the supremacy of the
spiritual, and the reality of nature, issue in two definite
principles upon which his metaphysics rests. The first of
1. NAA, I, 197-198
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these is that of the entire instrumentality of the physical
world. The second is, in a word, his personalism. Although
finding indirect expression here and there, this first
principle is stated in absolute clearness in his discussion
of the cosmology of theism, when he declares;
...In short, the physical world is simply a system
of means provided for the sake of the realm of ends:
it is only to be understood as subservient to them, and
apart from them is alike meaningless and worthless.^
With this ultimate view of the essential meaning of
physical nature, it is natural that he should be led to the
second basic position which he rather strikingly summarizes
in these sentences in the first chapter of the The Realm of
Ends:
Man only knows the world as it faces him and he
interacts with it, and he knows it only so far as he
finds it intelligible. And finding it intelligible he
can only conclude that it is not after all an alien
Other but has its ground and meaning either in another
self or in a community of selves . This much we are
taking as already clearT^
If this seems a short and easy method of arriving at
a fundamental standpoint (as indeed it isJ), we must remember
that practica-lly all of his philosophical writing is an
attempt in one way or another to expand and justify this
point of view. So far as I am aware, he never gathered up
into brief compass the arguments for these fundamental
1. ROE, 252.
2. ROE, 28. (Italics mine.)
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metaphysical first principles, as distinct from the more
general position with regard to the supremacy of the spirit-
ual, Here again, perhaps, we have a reflection of the
scholastic and religious interests and atmosphere of his day
and his environment. His battle was against the Gog and Magog
of natural realism and agnostic monism, and he was not greatly
concerned to defend his particular metaphysical creed against
those who belonged in the same ontological household of faith.
Yet we are face to face, here, with a fundamental question
and a speculative decision of first-rate importance to our
body-mind problem. What is the exact status of the physical
world (which includes, of co\irse, our own bodies)? Must we
regard it personalistically
,
as Ward assumed in the last
quotation above? If so, are we to regard it realistically,
throxighout, as he did, or phenomenalistically and
occasionalistically? What are his grounds for the positions
he holds, so far as we can work them out?
Let us consider first his grounds for the rejection of
phenomenalistio occasionalism.
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1. The Status of the Problem
The problem as Ward faced it is stated succinctly in
the last phrase of the quotation just cited: for the person-
al idealist the world “has its ground and meaning either in
another self or in a community of selves.” Which?
As we have just indicated, Ward was clearly conscious
of the metaphysical kinship of all who accepted the spiritual
as the primary, regardless of their choice of these alterna-
tives. We reiterate the fact that his chief interest was in
asserting and defending the broader standpoint, because, in
many respects, his discussion of this (to him) secondary
alternative is sketchy and inconclusive.^ However, just
because, from the point of view of the body-mind problem, the
question of the metaphysical analysis of the physical world
is so all-important, we must consider carefully such reasons
as Ward does offer or suggest for his choice of realistic
panpsychism.
3. Simplicity of Explanation
In the first place. Ward held panpsychism to be prefer-
1. ROE, 247-269.
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able to the occasionalistic hypothesis! commonly adopted by
idealistic theists, on the ground of simplicity of explana-
tory principles. Although he specifically denies the validity
of Leibniz’s charge against occasionalism, viz., that it
involves "perpetual miracle" and "irrational recourse to a
Deus ex machina ."^ yet he does contend that it introduces
a cumbersome duality of divine activity. The panpsychist,
he telle us, may indeed find it difficult to specify the
exact nature of the psychical intercourse of the monads.
But it is questionable whether - nothwithstanding
this - the occasionalist with his apparent psycho-
physical interaction is not in a worse position; for
he only dispenses with the need for any specification
by assuming what we may call a ’dualism*', in the divine
activity, and that to many minds will always appear too
cumbrous and, so to say, imscientific
,
to be intellectually
satisfactory,^
j
This "cumbrous and, so to say, unscientific" dualism,
!
is a dualism entirely within the divine activity in the sense
that God first creates the selves or persons who are ends
in themselves; and then, in order that this realm of ends
1. In these following Sections I have in mind
particularly the doctrines of idealistic occasionalists — as
I feel sure Ward had - although Ward clearly recognizes the
fact that, historically, occasionalism was most often
associated with ontological dualism.
2. ROE, 249.
3. ROE, 257.
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may function (i.e., that these purposeful beings may have
intercourse with one another) it is necessary that we posit
for him a second and a different type of activity. This is
a mediating activity, which on the phenomenal view of
nature, appears to us as the physical world. Now
I
panpsychism, Ward holds, is simpler in that there is only
one kind of activity posited: the original creative effort
which brings into existence a world of cognitive and conative
monads, whose mutual psychical interaction provides all the
necessary mediation.
This argument, it must be admitted, is hardly impressive.
In the first place. Ward ignores the fact that both panpsych-
ism and occasionalism must, in any case, posit a duality of
divine activity, viz., creativity and conservation. Granted,
for the sake of argument, that panpsychism does avoid a dis-
tinctly different form of activity (i.e., the mediative),
yet it so vastly increases the complexity of the conserving
activity that one may well question whether, in the last
analysis, the conception is any less cumbrous or unscientific
than that of occasionalism. But it is not at all clear that
panpsychism does or can reduce the number of types of divine
activity by dispensing with a distinctly different form in
mediation. What it does, and all that it does, is to
j
reduce mediation, so to speak, to its lowest terms: I
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^
The existence of an indefinite number of such monads
Libare' monads, in sympathetic rappor^ would provide all
the 'uniform medium* for the intercourse of higher monads
that these can reqiiire, without any need for such divine
intervention as occasionalism assumes,^
Thus, apparently. Ward pushes the problem of the explana-
tion of the mediation back out of sight, but he has not yet
solved it apart from recourse to a special form of divine
activity. For the direct mediation of occasionalism he has
substituted the indirect and vague mediation of the ’’sympa-
thetic rapport” of an indefinite number of 'bare* monads.
Before this can be accepted as less cumbrous and more scien-
tific, even as regards types of divine activity, it is necess-
ary to examine more closely and critically the concept of
’’sympathetic rapport .” Apart from the immediate question of
panpsychism versus phenomenalistic occasionalism, such an
examination cannot be long postponed, for Ward’s entire theory,
of the physical universe would seem to rest ultimately upon
this idea of the psychical relation of simple monads.
^
Meanwhile we may well doubt whether panpsychism has any real
advantage over occasionalism as a simple explanation of the
divine activity which either is the physical world, or which
produces and sustains that world.
1. ROE, 257.
2. To that examination a large part of the next Chapter
of this dissertation is devoted.
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3. Epistemological Difficulties
Ward is on safer ground when he rejects occasionalism
because of its epistemological difficulties. According to
the occasionalist
,
presentations are subjective modifications,
due directly to the activity of the divine mind in contact
with the experiencing mind. In this assumption, declares
Ward
,
Occasionalism becomes hampered with all the epistem-
ological difficulties of what is known as subjective
idealism, difficulties which made the existence of the
external world such & hopeless problem for modern philos-
ophers till Reid began to clear the way by his criticism
of the Cartesian 'theory of ideas.
The problem suggested by Ward, here, is, in its entirety,
one far beyond the scope of the immediate discussion, both in
extent and in substance. Suffice it to say, first of all,
that it is questionable, perhaps unfair, to say that "all"
the difficulties of subjective idealism must be imputed to
occasionalism. That would seem to be a patent over-statement.
Modern philosophical occasionalism, at least, carefully avoids
some of the difficulties in question. In particular, for
example, those difficulties inherent in Cartesian and Berkel-
ian "ideas” are no more to be imputed to occasionalism than
1. ROE, 259
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to panpsychism, Homer seems to have been nodding at this
point
i
But, on the other hand, there is a residuum of truth,
in Ward's charge. On the occasionalistic assumption, we know
nothing of the nature of an absolutely unmediated contact of
one human mind with another. Our knowledge of other minds
would seem to be mediated, exactly as is our knowledge of
things. How, therefore, can the occasionalist account for
the rise of knowledge of the realistic existence of other
minds, while imputing only phenomenal existence to things?
It would seem that such knowledge cannot be accounted for,
logically, by the occasionalist, without the pure assumption
of an additional realistic factor which not only is absent
from occasionalism per se
.
but is really foreign to that
explanation. In any case, it would seem only arbitrarily
to be limitable to other minds, and denied to things. Ward's
position (which he nowhere argues in detail) is that a
complete realism of other minds and things is both a simpler
and a prior hypothesis -
If that can be called a hypothesis which claims to
be the bare statement of the facts... and further, we
may say with some confidence that occasionalism would
never have heard of but for the Cartesian dualism of
matter and mind and the Cartesian theory of ideas as
subjective states.^
1. ROE, 260
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In other words, on what logical basis does phenomenalistic
occasionalism posit any ontological distinction between
persons and things - other than the basis of pure assumption?
Of course, the necessities of coherent general explanation
may seem to demand such an assumption, but Ward is strongly
convinced to the contrary,! I think rightly. At this point,
as he intimates, occasionalism is in the same boat with the
Leibnizian “windowless monads”; and, compared to the
epistemological simplicity of Ward's conception of really
interacting monads, it is true, as he says.
That God should have created the monads without
windows and taken on himself the function of supplying
their place - whether continuously, as the occasionalists
assumed, or once for all, as Leibniz held - seems then a
needless complication.®
4, The Problem of Evolution
Ward's third major argument for panpsychic realism is
concerned with the functional or dynamical aspect of the
world. With the details of the contribution of Ward's
monadism to a possible explanation of evolution we shall be
1. If the occasionalists are right, and things are
phenomenal then the divine mind would seem logically to be
the only realistic object strictly knowable, and one is
driven to a pure phenomenalism (Of. Renouvier, PER), and
ontological singularism - apart, again, from pure assumption.
2. ROE, 260.
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concerned later, ^ but certain general aspects must be noted
here. Ward was convinced, on excellent grounds, that
monadism more completely and simply accounts for the ongoing
and progression of nature than does phenomenalistic
occasionalism.
I
The human constituents of the realm of ends are members
of the natural order, in a real sense. Ward contends.
It was Leibniz himself, the founder of modern plural-
ism, who said that ”a disembodied soul would be a deserter
from the general order, which implies matter and movement
and their laws. ”2
Life and mind arise out of nature and are dependent on nature;.
I
and the inorganic and lower organic parte of nature evidently
precede the higher organisms. Truly all must admit that
’ Natur ist die Vorstufe des Geistes
.
on any system. Yet Ward
points out that for the monistic occasionalist
,
as Lotze said,
i
I
nature is "only a system of occasions or mea.ns for producing
j
presentations in spiritual beings."^ Now, Ward declares,
1
For the monist.,.to suppose nevertheless that this
j
system is maintained by the divine activity, when as yet
ji there are no spiritual subjects to benefit by it; nay, to
I suppose further that this system is actually itself not
jj
so much a means adapted to them but rather a means to
which they are adapted - surely this is a. Tporc^ov
not easy to match,
^
A partial answer to this argument of Ward's may be given
1. See next Chapter. 4. ROE, 264,
2. ROE, 254.
3. Lotze, MET, Par. 97.
Quoted, ROE, 264.
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on the basis of the doctrine of the “Griven”
,
advocated by ’
Dr. E. S. Brightman.l On this view, nature is not merely
j
'•a system of occasions or means for producing presentations.”
It is an order of the divine experience, and the irrationality
suggested by Ward in this passage is to be explained on the
basis of the Given^in the nature of God, with which he is in
eternal struggle.
Then, again, panpsychic realism avoids any "breach of
evolutional continuity"^ in accounting for the appearance
of life, mind and self-conscious spirit, in nature. And as
we saw, 3 Ward held, more or less consistently, to the
Leibnizian dictum: Natura non facit saltus . Further, it is
possible, on this system, to account for the waste and
I
"natural evils" of the physical world, without immediate
resort to an inexplicable "Given" in the divine nature and
activity, such as that to which occasionalistic personalism
is quite logically driven."^ As moral evil is accounted for
by human freedom, so natural evil may be explained by the real,
if limited, freedom of the monads, and by their acquisition
1. Brightman, POG, 113,123-138; 182-193. Cf. FOG,
152-153, 172-178, 184-193.
2
. Loc . ext
.
3. Chapter Eight. i
4. ROE, 87-89, 349-360. Cf. Brightman, POG, loc. cit,
and Ward's essay, "The Present Trend of Speculation,"
||
EIP, especially pages 177-181.
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.
of habitual behavior.
The acceptance or rejection of Ward's argument here would
seem to depend upon one *s presuppositions. If the principle
of continuity is to be taken seriously in building a
metaphysics; and if one is bound to commit as little as
possible to his asylum of ignorance, in explaining the details
of the world; then there would seem to be merit in Ward's
position. This does not mean the denial of the Given; for in
any case waste, evil, and irrationality are undeniable aspects
of the natural world, and must be imputed to God, ultimately,
if the monads are created. But at least some measure of
irrationality would be avoided. Clearly, also, justification,
on the basis of the production of character, for imputing
freedom to the monads, which is necessary for a solution of
the problem of natural, evil, depends upon a rigorous
application of the principle of continuity.
Thus because of its positive advantages in accounting
for the evolutionary character of nature, as well as for what
seem to me to be its epistemological advantages in accounting
for the knowledge of the real existence of both persons and
things,^ Ward would seem to have some justification for his
choice of panpsychism rather than occasionalistic personalism.
1. Cf. sujra
. 147, 148.

15^
C'. Monad ism and Nature
1. The Ultimate Question Involved
In the previous Section (B) we have examined Ward's
choice of panpsychic realism rather than occasionalistic
personalism. We must now consider certain problems arising
in the physical sciences which call into question the
panpsychic element of Ward's realism. The ultimate question
which these ensuing considerations set before us is this:
Granted Ward's insistence upon the primacy of the spiritual
and the necessity of a "refined anthropomorphic" standpoint,
is it necessary or urgently reasonable to interpret the real
physical world in purely mentalistic terms? Ward held that
it was; hence his monadism. A negative answer would point
toward the interpretation of refined common sense (e.g.,
Neo-Scholasticism) or of critical realism. Natxirally, a fair
evaluation cannot be made until we have considered in greater
detail Ward's doctrine of evolution and his interpretation
of causal interaction. 1 Nevertheless, this ultimate
question should boe borne in mind as we discuss certain other
more general problems of hie monadistic interpretation of
nature.
1. See next Chapter.
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2. Natural Law and Mechanism
,
One of the very difficult features of Ward's monadology
is that of the psychical explanation of all natural laws and
natural mechanism. 1 But thoiagh very difficult, it is not
* an impossible conception, nor even a manifestly improbable
I
one. From the point of view of Ward's interpretation, the
difficult aspect of natural law and mechanism, as ordinarily
conceived, is the absolute lack of anything remotely resem-
bling, or even indicating the presence of freedom or
contingent choice. The key word here is "necessity,” and if
that were all that were to be found in nature, then, indeed,
we would be justified in describing the world as a "rigorous
and mechanical conca,tenation of things such as naturalism is
1 wont to assume, But this is not all. There is contingency
j
in the natural world, and there is freedom in the realm of
ends (which, as we have pointed out, is for Ward inextricably
I
I
imbedded in the realm of nature,) Starting frankly from the
j
realm of ends as primary, and consistently holding to the
historical-moral or refined anthropomorphic standpoint and
norm. Ward is, of course,, obviously able to account for most
1. Vide ut supra. Chap. Six. Sec. B. 3. a. Of. ROE.
63-80. —
.
' 2. ROE, 78.
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contingency and all freedom. That much, at least, is clear
gain; for he is beyond question correct in his contention
that mechanism per se never can account for the facts of
contingency, teleology and mind.l
The difficulty with the panpsychic explanation is the
other side of the problem, viz., how to account for the rigid
and inanimate, or the strictly mechanistic aspects of nature.
Now Ward holds that these aspects can be accounted for by
monadism. In a word, his explanation is this; habit, and the
statistical constancy of large numbers. He himself states
it in a brief sentence; "The fixity, so far as it is real,
will embody the result of experience; so far as it is
apparent, it will be due... to the statistical constancy of
large numbers. ”2 Although finding its type or analogue on
the level of human experience, this explanation refers of
course to the experience and numbers of the innumerable
simple or *bare* monads which constitute the inorganic world,
and are the basis of organic nature.
Now in the nature of the case, there can be no proof or
disproof of this explanation. All that we can say about it
is that Ward, in his exposition of it, makes it seem possible.
He is able to show, I think, that the unquestionable presence
1, ROE, 14-18, and passim . NAA, I, Chaps. IX, X
2. ROE, 78,
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I
of natural laws and mechanism - of "fixity'* in nature - is
,
not an insuperable barrier to panpsychism, 1 But so far as
j
i
'
rational argument for the position goes, it is all contained
j
in the sentence quoted above.
I
3, The Extent of Psychic Animation
Granting that nature may be explained monadistically
,
we must further ask, ’;fhat are the probabilities of the real
existence of psychic life below the level where it can be
^
! clearly and reasonably demonstrated? In other words. What
are the grounds, if any, for the extent ion of psychic ani-
I
mation to apparently inanimate portions of the physical
I
j
world?
I In dealing with this problem, we note, first, that the
line of demarcation is very dim and broad. It is impossible
to say that here psychic life definitely appears to cease,
or at this point it clearly begins, in any ordered arrange-
ment of living creatures. As we go down in the scale, so
far as we can tell, the life of mind seems to fade out very
gradually into purely mechanistic activity; and even the
organic itself fades only gradually into the surely inorganic.
Now as to Ward *8 grounds for assuming the psychic anima-
tion of all nature: aside from general considerations of
1. See ROE, 65-67
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the adaptability of monadism to the facts of nature, there
seem to be two, (i) Spinoza’s principle of the ’’animation of
all individual things,” and (ii) the Leibnizian principle
(referred to above) of continuity, according to which, ’’Nature
never makes leaps, ”1 Once again, precise and definite justi-
fication of these principles, on Ward's part, does not seem
to be available. He apparently assumes them, on the basis
of his general contentions versus naturalism and in defence
of the primacy of the spiritual, and then proceeds to show
that it is possible to understand the universe, if, proceeding
with these principles, one extends mentalism throughout
nature.
Over against this position we must weigh a very strong
scientific objection. Ward himself points out that the lowest
known organisms are ’’highly complex and extremely varied,”
but claims that ’’there is nothing to suggest that we have
reached the limits of life.” He insists, further, that
All we can say is that our senses and the artificial
aids and methods of research at present available do not
enable us to discriminate between yet simpler forms of
life and their environment; not that these do not exist,
2
With what is here said as a general statement of fact
concerning our senses and the state of research, we can have
1. ROE, 20-21, Supra. Chap. Eight. Sec, A.2,
2. ROE, 21.
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no quarrel. But it is not clear that that is “all we can
say,” nor that “there is nothing to suggest that we have
reached the limits of life.” The facts are these, as
Professor C. D. Broad points out:
Everything which we have the least gro\ind for
believing to be sentient is a living organism; i.e., a
highly complicated material structure consisting of
millions of molecules. Moreover, every organism is
composed of a comparatively few chemical elements, viz.,
Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Sulphur and
Phosphorus.^
Lacking any scientific evidence for sentient life below
the level of these “highly complicated material structures,”
it would seem that nothing short of absolute logical necessity
should force us to posit such psychic animation of apparently
inanimate nature. Whether there is such necessity is, again,
the ultimate question. All that we are concerned with here,
however, is to note that the application of the principles
of animation and continuity, in the simple and easy Leibnizian
fashion that Ward adopts, completely overlooks or ignores
certain plain facts of inanimation and discontinuity clearly
revealed by scientific analysis. It is, truly, as Broad
states, “an enormous extrapolation to ascribe any kind of
sentience to inorganic matter which does not consist of these
six chemical elements.”^ General philosophical
1. Broad, MPN, 645.
2. Ibid.
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considerations and the theoretical adaptibility of raonadism
to the gross facts of nature and of life hardly justify such
”an enormous extrapolation," in the face ©f specific facts
such as those involved in the intricate structure and limited
chemical constitution of all known living sentient organisms,
4. The Monadistic Constitution of Body
Our progress then, thus far, may be summed up by saying
that we must grant that it is not impossible to explain
natural law and mechanism monadistically
,
but that there are
i
real, though negative, difficulties in the way of extending
psychical animation throughout apparently inanimate nature.
These difficulties demand strong grounds, if we are to adopt
|
that assumption. Before we leave the direct consideration
j
I
of the monadistic conception, to consider such possible
|
grounds in the problems of interaction and evolution, we must
'
ask another question: Is there anything in our direct exper- 1
ience of body which weighs for or against the theory of the
monadistic constitution of our bodies?
i
It is to be noted that in answering this question we are
not concerned with epistemological and psychological problems
of body-mind relationships, We are asking simply whether, at
the point where our knowledge of physical matter should be
most intimate, almost immediate and direct, there is any

evidence which would seem to support or to bring into
question Ward's theory that the body consists of a vast
multitude of monads in functional relations of peculiar
int imacy?
So far as direct empirical observation goes, of course,
there is and can be no evidence for or against monadism. As
Ward well said, in another connection, the monadistic
interpretation ’’goes far beyond our psychological facts: it
is a speculative ‘first chapter* in place of the psychological
one, which we have had to admit to be lacking. *2 Yet it
does seem that on the empirical level of psychology there
are certain general facts plainly evident, of which Ward
seems to have taken little or no account. These facts may
be comprehended under the statement that life and
consciousness have always an organic basis, and that nothing
in our observation of our own bodily experience warrants
us in any other conclusion. True though it be, as Ward
contends,! that the conception of organism is fundamentally
teleological, that does not alter the fact that whenever
and wherever we have any experience of our own bodies which
we have any clear right to call psychical or mental, there
we always find a certain complicated arrangement of "living”
1. E.G., Muirhead, CBP, II, 41. Of. NAA, II, 26-29;
ROE, 209-211, etc.

16U
matter which we call ’'neural.” We have no immediate or
"internal" bodily experience which is an experience of
matter, per ee . Direct bodily experience is always of matter
as organized protoplasmically
,
and, probably, as organized
neurally. In other words, there is absolutely nothing in our
experience of our own physical organism to justify the
extension of psychical animation to all matter, but only, at
most, to matter in certain specific configurations and
combinations.
As we go on to study the problem of causal interaction
and of evolution, it will be well to bear in mind these facts,
negative though they are: that the extension of psychic
activity to the conception of inanimate matter has not the
slightest empirical basis, but is a purely speculative
assumption; and furthermore, such an assumed extension must
be made in f ace of the facts, scientifically, both objective
and introspective, that psychical animation seems clearly
limited to complicated organisms, constituted of a half
dozen chemical elements.
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CHAPTER TEN
PROBLEMS OF PSYCHIC ANIMATION
A. The Problem of Physical Interaction
1. Ward's Lotzian Background
Now Ward had at hand two arguments which he might have
used far more clearly and forcefully than he did, as grounds
for an extension of psychic animation. I refer to (i) the
monadistic interpretation of causal interaction of things,
and (ii) the argument from evolution. This is not to imply
that Ward was not conscious of the importance of these
considerations; for he was, and he dealt with both at some
length. But, apparently, he did not consider that monadism
needed 'bolstering up' in this fashion; so he merely deals
with evolution as exhibiting the adaptability of monadism to
the facts of nature, and treats of interaction as a difficulty
which can be solved by pluralism quite as well as by
singularism. No doubt this attitude is explicable as due to
his complete idealism or mentalism. He could entertain no
conceptions of realism save of that natural realism which he
felt, rightly, had been rendered hors de combat in Naturalism
and Agnosticism, But we of a later day must reckon with
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« I
critical and neo-realisms, which are hardly within the scope
|
of Ward's anti-naturalistic arguments.
|
I
Considering first the problem of causal interaction in
the physical world, we note that Ward's treatment of this
j
problem was highly colored, if not rather completely I,
determined by his approach to it through the work of Lotze.
|
This philosopher, beginning as Ward did with the Many, came !
to the conclusion, speculatively, that causal interaction,
or as he called it, “transeunt action” was really unthinkable.
Ward gives us Lotze ‘s argument "in its barest outline” as
i
follows;
Since attributes cannot be separated from substances,
”no state can detach itself from the thing A, whose state
it was, so as to subsist even for an infinitesimally
|
small moment between A and B, as a state but yet nobody's
state, and then connect itself with B so as to become
its state, ”1
|
On the basis of this impossibility, Lotze posits singular- I
I
ism as a speculative necessity; but Ward, having previously
|
accepted the pluralistic standpoint, explains such interaction!
ii
on the basis of the purely psychical nature and the ji
'sympathetic rapport ' of the monads which constitute "things.”
The point to emphasize here is that Ward apparently
II
accepted without criticism Lotze 's analysis. And, on the basi^
1. ROE, 216, The quotation is from Lotze, presumably,
but Ward does not give its source.
I

1——— —
^
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of that analysis, Ward’s psychical interpretation does become '
as reasonable a ground for the positing of monadism as
i
Lotze’s argument (or lack of it) for the assumption of !
singularisra. Ward seems entirely justified (other consid-
i
erations apart) in holding that the pluralistic explanation
can account for causal interaction if it be granted that
Lotze's metaphysical analysis and exposition of causal
interaction is correct. !
j
i
i
2. Analysis, Abstraction, and the Phenomenal |
I
The weakness of Ward’s treatment of interaction lies in
his acceptance of Lotze’s rationalistic and analytic approach i
to the facts. To some, this “weakness” may seem to be its
strength. For we touch here a fundamental question of stand-
point which can no longer be avoided. Ward's thought,
j
proceeds from a mixture of the standpoints of analytic
|
I
rationalism and concrete empiricism, which now and then
I
becomes a confusion. Nowhere is that confusion more evident
than in his treatment of the problem of causal interaction,
for this problem involves the troublesome questions of the
nature and meaning of "phenomena” and the "psychical,”
|
i
That both standpoints (i.e., that of analytic rationalism!
and that of empirical realism) may be philosophically
j
jjustified, and that the same thinker may, nay, must embrace |
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both in differing situations, may be freely admitted. It is
not the mixture, but rather the confusion or inconsistency
in their use, with which we axe here concerned. Let us
examine, first, the two standpoints in Ward’s doctrine of
phenomena.
In his criticisms of naturalistic realism Ward contended
strongly that naturalism, in its assumption that the
conceptual constructions by which science interprets phenomena
were to be taken as real, is guilty of a rationalistic error
nothing short of absurd. For by this assumption, ’’reason
attains a priori to a knowledge of the real per s£, ”1 and
thus he states plainly, ”it perpetrates the absurdity we have
so often stigmatized of phenomena per se.” ^ Throughout his
criticism of naturalism. Ward holds consistently to this
standpoint that the concrete deliverances of experience are
the real. Thus, for instance, he contends that the notion
of empty space and empty time, as necessary antecedents of the
things and events that are said to fill them, is an inversion
of reality;^ and, again, he asks rhetorically.
Why should appearances not be reality? Nay what else
can they be? How can reality appear, shine forth, and yet
remain totally and forever beyond the knowledge of those
to whom it appears?^
1. NAA, II, 181. Of. 104, 149-151, 272, 275-276.
2. Ibid.; quotation, 276.
3. NAA, II, 149-151. 4. NAA, II, 276.
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On the other hand, when he comes to build his own
system, he begins well enough on the empirical level of
concrete experience; ^ but almost at once he abandons his
concrete empiricism by adopting as his hypothesis the abstract
and analytical mentalism of the Leibnizian-Lotzian monad-
ology. His interests here (The Realm o f Ends ) are primarily
the defense of spiritualistic theism, and secondarily the
justification of pluralism. If I judge correctly, these
interests lead him to commit exactly the same fallacies of
rationalistic analysis and abstraction that he so thoroughly
and justly condemned in natiiralism, and lead him, even, to
carry them one step farther, at least in the case of purely
physical phenomena.
Consider, for example, his interpretation of causal i
i
interaction. The bodies involved, and the apparent causality
are not merely phenomenal, i.e., purely subjective. They
are appearances of realities. Now when naturalism, realistic
or agnostic, attempts to probe behind the real appearances,
and posits matter in motion or an unknown somewhat, it is
being absurdly rationalistic, and is abstracting from the
total reality which includes facts of life and mind.^ But
when Ward himself embraces Lotze's raticnalistic analysis
1, E.g, ROE, 2, 225, and passim .
2, NAA
,
II, loc, cit.
,
and passim .
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of *transeimt action' into substances whose states seem to
be transferred, and then posits those substances as psychic,
and interprets their seeming interaction as mental rapport ,
that, apparently, is not being absurdly rationalistic or
abstract. I confess that I cannot make out the difference.
Both Ward and the naturalists are being abstract and ration-
alistic, but in the case of causal interaction the naturalists
have the advantage, at least, of being closer to a literal
description of the actual phenomena, and, also, of proceeding
logically, step by step, to their abstracts. Whereas the
monad 0 log i St s , on purely speculative grounds, and principally
for the sake of overcoming speculative and epistemological
difficulties, confuse the status of the concrete phenomena
involved and deny their own empirical premises. By a species
of rationalistic legerdemain the entire physical world
disappears into the maw of mind.'
3. The Level of the "Psychical"
The weakness of this position emerges more clearly,
perhaps, as we consider the meaning and use of the term
"psychical," and its equivalents, as applied to the phenomena
of nature, e.g.
,
to causal interaction. Pointing out that
there is at least an aspect of nat\ire, described by such terms
as law and order, subject and attribute, which is "so much
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metaphor borrowed from the world of persons," Ward goes on
to state that,
For the pluralist, however, it is more than metaphor.
If the Leibnizian assumption, that there are no beings
entirely devoid of perception and spontaneity - which
Lotze too accepted - is otherwise sound, then the objection!
to transeunt action between thinp:s become irrelevant.
For these objections do not apply to personal interaction
based on mutual rapport
.
which is all that the pluralist
requires.
1
Now there is an inherent confusion of standpoints in
this apparently plausible position of Ward's, which really
invalidates the whole argument. "Transeunt action between
things" is an empirical perception or conception, on the
level of comparatively massive concrete objects, which, even
on Ward's own system, consist of millions - probably
countless millions - of "bare monads," These elemental
perceptive and spontaneous "beings" of the "Leibnizian
assumption" are infinitely below any level where empirical
transeunt action has any meaning. How an event on the one
level is to be explained by assumed events on the other would
seem to demand considerable elucidation. Not only do we
have no indication as to how minute psychical relations of
constituent monads is to account for empirical transeunt
action, but it seems inconceivable that there could be such
an explanation. Here, again, we have "an enormous
1. ROE, 219
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extrapolation" which would seem to demand ironclad logical i
necessity to force one to adopt it. i
I
4. Mediation in "Sympathetic Rapport "
Coming to still closer grips with the significance of .i
j
the "psychical," let us note the confusion between the
structioral and the activistic or functional connotations of
i the term "sympathetic rapport ." The fundamental psychical
i relationship, upon which Ward bases all phenomenal physical i
:
relations (e.g,
,
transeunt action) is that of "sympathetic
i
'
I
I
rapport . " This concept he takes from our human social
I
i experience, and he defines it as "interest that rests upon
I
cognition. "1 He analyzes it, further, into (i) "the
1
I
apprehension or the knowledge on the part of one person of the ^
I
‘attitude,* the feelings and intentions displayed or announced
by other persons;" (ii) active response, "in their cooper-
^
I
ation or opposition, actual or prospective;" and (iii) "the
j
new feelings and intentions of the person interested, to
|
which this knowledge leads.
|
Note that in tlK concise definition of sympathetic
rapport as "interest that rests upon cognition," and in items
(i) and (iii) of his analysis, Ward has only the element a£
1. ROE, 2l8. Of. supra
,
Chap. Six, Sec. 0,1, d.
2. Ibid.

169
structural consciousness and its changes. Theoretically,
j
Ward clearly intends that there shall be nothing else. "The ]|
il
doings and sufferings of persons are both alike immediate,” |j
he declares, ”,..A11 that is strictly personal in social
|
intercourse is of this nature.”^ Evidently the second item
j
I
in his analysis, which introduces the activistic or function-
;
I
al element, is intended to be so interpreted. In a footnote *
I
II
to Supplement III of ROE he recognizes Lotze’s objection that
|
’’there may be many intermediating processes producing the !
conditions on which this rapport depends.” His answer is,
’’but if we look closer we find no mediation so far as the
rapport itself is concerned.”^ If so, then Ward is introduc-
ing a purely speculative, not to say imaginary, assumption.
For as a matter of fact we know absolutely nothing of the
"cooperation or opposition, actual or prospective" of persons i
ii
save through the mediation of the physical world, of our own
bodies, at least. It simply is not true that in "social
intercourse" "the doings and sufferings of persons are both
alike immediate" (whatever may be true of rapport
.
per se )
on the human level
.
unless the whole realm of experience
i
which makes up this physical mediation is purely illusory, I
J
and Ward certainly does not intend to say that. He simply
|
t
I
1. ROE, 218.
2. ROE, 463, n.2
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ignores these implications of functional mediation, and
surreptitiously (and apparently unconsciously) reintroduces
j
them with the functional-activistic element of item (ii),
|
i
Of course it may be perfectly true that one mind can
|
immediately affect another. Recent investigations would
seem to support this thesis,^ but that is not the point in
question here. Ward definitely assumes such immediacy for 1
I
his monads on the basis of our experience in social |
intercourse; and it is the empirical basis of that assumption
|
we are questioning. He, himself, admits frankly that,
“The precise details of this psychical interco-urse the
I
pampsychist is unable to specify”, ^ To make such an
|
j
ass\imption, then, on the basis that we know such immediacy j
in social intercourse, and that “all that is strictly personal
|
!
in social intercourse is of this nature,”^ is to confuse the ,
I
structural and functional elements in experience, and to
|
I
ignore the functional mediation almost always (if not always)
implied in empirical intercourse.
It seems apparent, therefore, that Ward*s monad ism has
;
1, See, e,g,, reports in popular news journals of inves-
tigations being conducted at Duke University, which seem to
confirm the possibility of telepathic communication,
2, ROE, 257, (Note ’"ard ’ s peculiar spelling.)
3, ROE, 218,
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not really solved the problem of transeunt interaction, save
by pure assumption, based on a mistaken reading of human
!
I
intercourse. His argument begins with a rationalistic and |
false analysis of the situation, ignores the vast difference
||
in level of monads and interacting bodies, and ’’solves" the
j
problem by reading back into extremely simple experience a i
I
questionable type of personal relation, which, in any case, ^
is known only to exist on the relatively high and genetically
late level of human experience.! Had Ward been able to
|
1
I
accomplish what he set out to, and what he thought he had
accomplished, it would, indeed have been a strong arguiaent in
favor of pluralism and of panpsychism; an argument which,
incidentally, might have been used to establish his general
j
position with even more telling effect than he employed it.
!|
ii
For any ultimate metaphysics must attempt an explanation of
j,
transeunt action, and one which could offer such a simple
solution of this difficult problem would have a decided
achievement to its credit!
1. Ward assumes that sympathetic rapport exists on
much lower levels, but this, again, is open to serious
question, and would certainly be denied by many, if not by
most biologists. Of. ROE, 253-254.
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B. The Problem of Evolution
1. Ward versus the Naturalists
As we turn to the consideration of the problem of
evolution and Ward's attempt to solve it monadistically
,
we
find the historical setting to be once again, that of
controversy. At this point, as at so many, Ward’s thought
is to be grasped best by first seeing clearly the doctrine
which he was controverting. Again, as so often, it was the
mechanistic naturalism of his day that called forth his
opposition and led to his attempted reinterpretation of the
theory of evolution.
The point of the doctrine of evolution as expounded by
the naturalists (in particular by their high priest of that
day, Herbert Spencer), to which Ward was most insistently
opposed, was that of the mechanical explanation of progress
or development. He says:
One thing at any rate is certain, a strictly
mechanical theory of the world, since it necessarily
implies complete reversibility, can never explain what we
understand by progress and development.
1
This objection he elaborates, pointing out ’’the vital
1. ROE, 103.
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difference of value between organization and disorganization,
^
sense and nonsense '• whereas in the mechanical realm '
“composition and resolution are altogether on a par,” so that
j|
"mechanism can always, life and experience can never, be made '
i
to move backwards.”^
|
!
I
In the first volume of Naturalism and Agnosticism, the
j
I
mechanical theory of evolution is subjected to an exhaustive
and devastating examination,^ In particular. Ward shows
that Spencer confused evolution without guidance and evolution
j
with guidance;^ and that out of space, time and mass,
however manipulated by the naturalists, progress, history and
j
meaning can never ^ deduced,^ Then, in the last Chapter,
5
I
''
j
Ward himself examines the work of Darwin and points out that
^
I
I he made no pretence at explaining the origin of life mechan-
I
ically, but, on the other hand, regarded certain teleological
,
I
factors as indispensable to the theory of evolution. Self-
|
conservation and the subjective selection implied in
1
knowledge, e.g., are inevitably related to the theory of
|
1
natural selectioni® Such factors as these. Ward contends, are
j
1. IiOc • cit.
2. NAA, I, part II, Lectures VII to IX, p. 185-271.
3. Op. cit., 203-211.
4. Op. cit., 243-246.
5. Op. cit.
,
Lecture X, p. 272-302.
6. Op. cit., 291-302.

certainly not compatible with mere mechanism, and do imply
the presence of mind.^ An examination on this point of the i
work of the naturalists (in particular Spencer), Ward declares,;
will reveal that
1
I
1
on the one hand we have statements purporting to be
|
strictly mechanical; on the other, conceptions not
!
mechanically intelligible slipping in unawares and
j
gradually changing the venue,
j
I
'!
2. “The Arrival of the Fit“ i
I
I!
Before turning to the positive side of his discussion
|
of evolution, we may pause long enough to note that, in
j
dealing with this general problem. Ward was at his very beet.
In the first place, he was a competent biologist in his own
right, with a thorough mastery of theory as well as having
practical experience in that field, ^ Secondly, he was as
completely at home, also, in physics and mathematical theory
as in biology. In the third place, being perhaps the beet
theoretical psychologist of his day, in England, he was
thoroughly prepared on that score, to deal with the irapli-
cations of mind in nature. Added to this equipment was his
j
natural keenness in detecting the weaknesses in an opponent's !
1. Loc. cit. Of. Vol. II, 91-92.
2. NAA, I, 263. Note illustrations of this, cited from
[
Spencer's Principles of Biology : NAA, I, 263-265,
3. Of. the statement of his daughter, Mrs. Olwen Ward
Campbell, EIP, especially 81-82, on this and related points.
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i
argument and a passionate thoroughness in dealing with them.
|
Naturalism and Agnosticism may be regarded as perhaps the
|
i
final word on the negative criticism of mechanistic '
naturalism and agnostic monism, at least on the other side i
of the Atlantic.
1
Ward's negative criticism of the naturalistic doctrine
of evolution makes clear two necessary tasks on the positive
side: (i) the presence of those factors which cannot be
^
I i
accounted for by mechanistic naturalism must be considered;
(ii) the modus operand
i
of the evolutionary process must be
I
investigated, and a working explanation suggested,
i In the last previous Section we noted Ward's statement
! that "a strictly mechanical theory of the world... can never i
* o
j
explain what we understand by progress and development.'*'^ ‘
Concerning the attempt to account for natural development by
such mechanical principles as the conservation of mass and
energy he remarks:
It is notorious that these concepts are the result
of ignoring those differences of quality which alone converti
units into individuals. Without these we may have
Erhaltung but not Entfaltung
.
as a German would say: we
1. Note the statement regarding Ward and Spencer,
EIP, 82. Of. the work of Bowne, in American thought.
2. ROE, 103. Of. Bowne, MET, 280: "The arrival of the
fit, and its arrival in so many forms, are left quite
unaccounted for by the great principle of natural selection.
Yet these arrivals contain the knot of the problem."
1
I
j.
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may have conservation and indefinite composition but not
development and definite organization.^
The explanation, then, of progress or development - what
Bowne called “the arrival of the fit"^ - is to be found in
“those differences of quality which alone convert units into
individuals." For, he tells us, “in other and plainer words,"
...there is progressive experience at all because
there are active individuals, severally sui R’eneris
.
each
from its own standpoint bent on working out a modus
Vivendi with the reet.^
And again he puts this view in a phrase: “So all nature is
regarded as plastic and evolving like mind,"^ and quotes
with approval the statement of C. S. Peirce, “The one
intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws".^
3.
General Laws of Development
As to the general laws or principles which may be found
to obtain in this plastic and evolving experience of active
1, ROE, 103-104. Of. McDougall, MEE, passim .
Loc. cit.
3. ROE, 103.
4. EIP, 243. Of. ROE, 73-74.
5. Quoted frow C- S- Peirce, “The Architectonic of
Theories," Monist
. 1(1890)170. EIP, 244; ROE, 74. Of. Royce,
WAI, II, 226, from which Ward quotes at length.
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ii
I
individuals, which is nature, Ward notes particularly these .
i
three:
j
I
(i) Evolution is always the result of a reciprocal process
|
I
of adaptation, never of a one-sided adaptation of the
individual to, or by, the environment, as commonly held.
For pluralism the adaptation is not rigidly one-sided '
but more or less reciprocal, a mutuum commercium , to use
Kant's phrase. The more experience advances, the more
j
there is of adaptation of_ environment as well as of
|
adaptation ^ environment.! j
i!
This doubtless, may be regarded as the natural implication i
of a realistic pluralism.
ii
(ii) Evolution always manifests the Spinozistic principle
|j
that "every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endes.vors '
to persist in its own being. "2
!
(iii) But (i) and (ii) are not sufficient to account for
;j
the world as it is. !|
i'
Self-conversation alone however, strictly taken
jand regarded as everywhere realized, would result in
nothing better than a static world, in which there would '
be no new events and no history. Such a state as final
!j
would correspond to the complete rest and quiescence with
which, according to Spencer's law of equilibration, the
jdrama of evolution must close, ^ i
1. ROE, 106. Cf.89, and PP, 30-31, EIP, 275. Of., also,
Henderson, OOn, FOE; and Northrop, SFP, Ohap, IV.
2. ROE, 21, 52; NAA, I, 290-294, 298 II, 92, 131,
134. Of. Spinoza, Ethics
. Ill, 6.
3. ROE, 52-53.
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Consequently, we must recognize a principle which Ward
variously calls self-realization or self-betterment, a
’’striving not merely to live, but to live well,”^ Again, he
speaks of
...the persistent endeavours of each to conserve
or improve its position. Each, so far as in it lies, is
to be conceived as ‘proving all things and holding fast
|
that which is good.^
On the biological level, he says, it is this principle
’’which first gives natural selection its ‘ point d ‘appui ‘
Looking at the matter from the point of view of the category
of value, which is characteristic of life and irrelevant
elsewhere, he declares that it is the presence of the value
experience, ’’which such terms as well-being and ill-being
imply... that gives to what we have called guidance or
direction its motive and its meaning.”^
4. Preformation versus Epigenesis
With respect to the nature of the evolutionary process.
Ward's position was that the older theory of preformation
(the history of which he summarizes) is compatible only with
the singularistic conception of the universe. ^ According t© '
this theory, the term evolution is to be taken literally,
1. NAA, II, 93.
2. ROE, 54.
3. NAA, ibid.
4. ’’Heredity and Memory”, EIP, 255. Of. NAA, I, 280-287.
5. ROE, 97-101.
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and the process regarded as ”the successive unfolding of...
a
system of emboitement or involution. As such it is” the
direct negative of evolution as we understand it today. ”2
Modern evolution, then, has no logical right to the
term "evolution,” so far as conception of process is concerned
Its conception is that of "epigenesis or the continuous
creation of what is essentially new. ”3 it is this concep-
tion, certainly, which rules in modern science, although
the naturalists were busy seeking to explain the apparently
new on the mechanical basis of the redistribution of matter
and energy. It is Ward’s contention - and here we reach the
heart of his philosophy of evolution - that the "continuous
creation of what is essentially new" is not apparent but real.
That evolution is really epigenesis or creative synthesis,
and that, therefore, it is compatible only with panpsychic
4pluralism.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts - that is
the cardinal characteristic of evolution as understood by
the pluralist .. .All real synthesis entails new properties
which its component factors in their previous isolation
did not possess.^
I
It is this undeniable characteristic of organic - and, for
1. ROE, 98.
2. Ibid.
3. ROE, 351.
4. ROE, 101-116.
5. ROE, 101-102.
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Ward, of so-called inorganic - evolution which mechanism
is powerless to explain. We must now turn to the second task
noted above, 1 and examine Ward’s "working explanation" of
"the modus operandi of the evolutionary process," This entailti
the consideration (i) of the nature of "creative synthesis,"
(ii) of the relation of structure and function, and (iii) of
the "mnemic" theory of heredity.
0, The Panpsychic Explanation of Epigenesis
1. Creative Synthesis
Thus far in our discussion of evolution we have been
moving largely on the level of scientific theory. On this
level, Ward was convinced that no explanation of evolutionary
process was to be had. Nor, as we have seen, is it to be
had by trying to extend the mechanistic concepts of science
into metaphysics, as the naturalist did. The teleological
factors are inescapable, and these factors can only be
I
accounted for by the presence of mind in Nature. This, in
essence, is the argument of Naturalism and Agnosticsm . In
The Realm of Ends Ward set, as one of his major tasks, the
metaphysical elucidation from a realistic point of view of
1. Sec. B,2.
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this presence of mind in Nature, p>articularly as evident in
organic evolution.^
And here we find a definite and more than methodological
use of the principle of continuity. In the first place,
there was its application in extending the concepts of life
and particularly of consciousness to the inorganic and
lower organic realms. The validity of this extension I have
held to be open to serious question.^ Again, now, we find
Ward applying the principle of continuity, in the explanation
of the facts of epigenesis. He takes the concepts which
he derives from a study of human experience and with them
builds a working explanation of the evolutionary process.
He begins by interpreting ’’epigenesis or the continuous
creation of what is essentially new,”^ in terms of the
concrete integrations of conscious experience. He writes.
The concrete integration of experience is the
diametrical opposite to the mechanical resultant of a
composition of abstract units; it is a creative resultant
or synthesis, to use Wundt’s happy and striking phrase.^
Evolution, then, for the pluralist is always synthesis,
and all real synthesis is creative synthesis.^
1. ROE, Chaps. V and VI.
2. Supra
.
Chap. Nine, Secs. C, 3 and 4,
3. ROE, 351.
4. Ward credits Lotze (MET, Par. 268, 271) with ’’first
signalising the fact to which Wundt has given the name."
ROE, 104, n. 1.
5. ROE, 104,
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He finds illustrations of such creative synthesis in the
timbre of a musical note, a melody, the recognition of a
picture as a significant whole, etc. However, he warns us
that we must not overstress the cognitive element in the
mutuum commercium of active individuals which is Nature.
The synthesis by which experience is extended and
enriched is then, we have to remember, not merely nor
primarily knowledge. We begin by trying and end by
knowing. Practice is the parent of theory and realisation
the surest verification.
. .The reality, whatever it be
besides, is this interaction of cognitive and conative
agents: reality is experience.!
2. Struct\ire Determined by Function
Furthermore, Ward contends that the true meaning of
this creative synthesis may be understood only in the light
of the true relationship of structure and function. The
naturalist always makes structure primary and function to
depend upon structure. This, Ward insists, is to invert the
truth:
...The pluralist holds structure to be mainly thoiigh
not entirely determined by function. . .The multiplicity
of parts of which a structure is composed is only a whole
or organized when regarded in the light of the specific
function which it subserves. This function is the new
fact that is more than the sum of their properties, the
creative synthesis that makes the parts an individual
unity.
2
The whole problem of the nature of organism, and of the
1. ROE, 106
2. ROE, 107
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relation of function to the organism, and in particular to
the structural elements of the organism, is most difficult,
not to say obscure, and far too complicated to be dealt with
here.^ The important point to note is that Ward took the
position, unequivocally, that structure is dependent, for the
most part, on function. He insists that
The determination of structure by function is beyond
question in the human affairs from which in the first
instance all these teleological concepts of structure,
function, organ, end and the like are derived; and it is,
of course, on this analogy that the pluralist 's interpre-
tation exclusively rests.
^
Furthermore, it should be noted that this position is
absolutely essential to his panpsychic interpretation, the
whole notion of epigenesis as creative synthesis depending
upon it. That, perhaps, is clear enough already from the
quotations just given, and from the notion itself. But
here is Ward's own succinct statement
:
The acquisition of new experience by commerce with
the environment, the process that is to say of development
through experience - in which clearer and distincter
percepts, wider and exacter adjustments are attained - is
to be conceived as a process in which subordinate monads
are drilled and maneuvred: here it is that, as we say,
function perfects structure. We may call it biotic as
distinct from genetic organization.^
1. See, e.g,
,
Driesch's Oifford Lectures,
loc. cit., and C. J. Herrick's excellent study,
physiologists point of view, NFB.
2. ROE, 107.
3. ROE, 210.
SPO; Northrop,
from the
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He proceeds to illustrate this, and to justify its application
and extension in biology and psychology.
3. The Mnemic Theory of Heredity
a. Transmission of Acquired Characters
This lengthy discussion of Ward’s general and specific
theories of evolution brings us at last to that part of his
interpretation which has to do more directly with body and
mind relations: his mnemic theory of heredity. This theory
begins by maintaining the validity of the Lamarckian doctrine
of the transmission of acquired characters, and, concomi-
tantly, of course, denying the possibility of explaining
heredity on the basis of the principle of natural selection
alone.
Here again, as in the preceding Section, we come upon
one of the most complex and difficult problems of biology,
adequate discussion of which is, of course, far beyond the
scope of this dissertation. J. Arthur Thomson, in his master-
ly work. Heredity
, devotes a long chapter to it(i.e., to the
problem of the transmission of acquired characters).^ He
lists some eighty-five books and articles dealing with this
1. Thomson, HER, Chap. VII, 164-249. Cf. Nordenskiold
,
HBI, Chap. XVIII, 603-616, “Modern Theoretical Speculations."
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ii
i r i vi- hn-' , .-ti-i ol- ct ai;n:cc':c oK
;
:.r ' ^n.; y ;oI, io rri :• ir.totr.s i-f:4
H jo on'T or-.
Q'lotoi- uvr> ZL 'oA '' 0 nr zoubrtu ' _ r .-'•
otJ.to^.r ' bno rh'T9r:-*j ‘zo ncii.o:.'oeib yii’o'rnei 3i;iT
c»
n.t,; ic j'liiq r o tprl .t - .?. n- itJJlovd ‘ic a9XT:or.id
bn. y;:0Q rluiTT yX*09'_J.. oo ot r
\;xc/ nil ri;::T 30 y'xrf'rit oxr.arrni airi : -iz-z briiTi
9ni:r:^'ocb ont 'icy* ib’i:.'! '/ orit .i':! -’C rnij'-
-incoriv O .nc - . I'T^io.c'i.cno yr^’iJiu' of^ '^q n; isc i; : o;li io
•:;C!i::x io:;s io vix^x x nc 'riz yxynsi ,m.;o'o Ic .yTincJit
nciJ'oalc-c 'ic =1: io*-X'r. v.:it io ex'-^no' s.i.t nc v>x:oto:i
. anr 1
5
nc’x; 9;..oo ew . -.,£:1’JOOS'Tc. srii .:x m : -jisH
, ’:''Olt'icf io OuJ'-Ioo'i " + rjjoii'ixo ;>:s 'qcrioo asc:i. erlt io eno
Z)i:cVf)Q T^2i ,*^0'C-C0 iC ,:i nOXfiiV ic ;'IOir 3-. C'3xb > j .' x;'''0c 3
-.c"", nx r »>x ^nrrxionT 'I'Jiiii/. .t . j'looeic aiic' ic oqoo-'
9fto oi ei 'o-i-o^do ;.;rcr c , :;xc^ yl
c.-: *. i.o ij- -.^o 3 io ooi '.xr. 'rn'it jr'i '^o .'neloo'iq
ci'Ii :fixc
,
.:i r 5-.. Lnn 3:ivCi f -yic: .io ccoo n^f'sxl
. 9 . ^T**\C'b-
;
ill Vi . T 7.7
o;Ji
V '>
>
question alone. ^ His conclusion is that the transmission of
acquired characters is very questionable. Thomson's arguments
are based upon the work of August Weismann^ < 1834-1914 )
.
Ward examines the chief contentions of Weismann, and subjects
them to a searching criticism, 3 in his lecture on "Heredity
and Memory." Hie conclusion, which seems to be quite
adequately supported, is that Weismann has failed to show the
impossibility of the Lamarckian theory, being unable to prove
the absolute stability and isolation of the germ-plasm; and
that, further, the essential modification of that original
position which he made in his theory of intra-gerainal
struggle and selection, amoiints to a complete surrender of
that position, and therefore has undermined his whole
argument, "as Delage and many others have urged. And so:
In short
,
while the ground on which was based his
direct and positive proof of the impossibility of the
inheritance of acquired characters is abandoned, his full
and definite admission of the need for some equivalent of
that Lamarckian factor remains.®
1. Op. cit,
,
587-588. Note entire Bibliography with
subject-index to it, 539-596.
2. See excellent Weismann bibliography, Thomson, HER,
581-583.
3. EIP, 260-270.
4. EIP, 270.
5. Ibid. Of. Thomson, loc. cit., and 458-475, on
"Weismann' s Theory of Germinal Selection." On Weismann'
s
"full and definite admission," see EIP, 268-269.
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Thus in the field of scientific theory Ward has laid the
foundation for an explanation of the progress of evolution.
In his metaphysical discussion he takes up and builds upon
an insuperable difficulty which he has pointed out in his
scientific discussion, and which, alone, would appear to
overthrow the neo-Darwinian contention of Weismann and his
followers. 1 This difficulty is that of conceiving any
explanation for “the enormous advance from jelly-fish to
mammal, which is what we find,” when, considering the supposed
isolation of the germ-plasm, incident to the advance from
Protozoa to Metazoa , we should expect, rather, ”a practically
stationary state. Not that Ward denies the validity of
natural selection or of the mixing process which produces
congenital variations. But, if the ancestral plasms have been
inaccessible and unchangeable since the first appearance of
Metazoa, then how account for the marvelous development of
species? in the words of Delage, which he quotes;
Without the inheritance of acquired characters there
can be no new ancestral plasms, and without ancestral
plasms more complicated than those of the Protozoa there
can be none of the superior animals.^
Therefore, as Ward himself concluded:
1. EIP, 265-267. Of. ROE, 101-116, 206-212.
2. Ibid.
3. Yves Delage, L‘H6ridit4 et les grands Problimes
de la Biologie gftndrale, 1903, p.560. Quoted, EIP, 268.
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.
To say that no acquired characters are transmitted
would be tantamount to saying that nothing is transmitted;
* and to say that the automatisms accomplished in a single
lifetime are not in any degree transmissible is to say
that transmission can never begin.
Holding, then, that there is, in some sense, transmission of
acquired chara.cters, the ranemic theory of heredity is Ward's
answer to this difficulty; a difficulty which would, indeed,
seem insuperable to the neo-Darwinians.
b. Heredity as Memory and Habit
;
In this theory Ward made use of the various facts, laws
i
I and principles we have been examining, and, guided by the
i
principle of continuity, on the analogy of our own experience,
i
' he posited not only the organic world of the biologists, but
all of so-called physical nature, as consisting of psychically
I
active individuals. In our human experience we find two
I
aspects: "What is done, natura naturata - the decisions made,
the habits formed, the customs fixed." It is only on the
}
basis of this (so to speak) 'solid' side of life that we are
I
enabled to move forward, as the other aspect presents itself.
i
This other aspect Ward describes as follows:
What is still to do, natura naturans
.
implies further
spontaneity and grov/th; new decisions to be taken, fresh
experiments to be made, with their usual sequel of trial
and error and possible eventual success; happy thoughts or
1. ROE, 210. Of. Hordenskifild ' s conclusion that the
discussion of "the whole of this problem of evolution ...must,
as far as our own times are concerned, terminate in a number
of unanswered questions." HBI, 618.
2. ROE, 101-108.
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inspirations occurring to the individual; and the rise of
great men inaugurating new epochs for their race or for
the world.^
This two-fold nature of experience Ward extends outwardly
to the whole so-called physical world, as well as inwardly
to the experience of the cognitive and conative individuals
who make up that world, in reality. Thus, on the one hand,
he explains the contingency we find in the world, ^ and on the
i
other the fixity and continuity there present, so far as it
|
*7
I
is real and not merely apparent.*^ i
I
Now the aspect of natura naturata ^ or “what is done”, '
consists in our conscious experience of those elements made
possible by memory and habit. Extending this concept to the
problem of evolution, we have, in a word, the mnemic theory
of heredity: “In short, what habit is for individual life
that is heredity for racial life."^ The long wrestling with
the problems of evolution, out of which Ward developed his
©•f
concept of the nature and principles^natural development,
with its emphasis on “the arrival of the fit,” epigenesis as
creative synthesis, the importance of function in the
|
determination of structure, and his determined battle for the
|
j
theory of the transmissibility of acquired characters - all
{
ROE, 72-73.
ROE, Lect. IV, 70-96.
Ibid.
EIP, 275.
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this but clears the way for the simple but profound conception
of heredity as memory and habit. A theory which he held
applicable not only in the realm of biological evolution, but
in the realm of metaphysical development as well. In the
Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture, "Heredity and Memory,"^
so often referred to already, 7'cird applied his theory to
organic evolution. It is my judgment that in this theory
he has, in principle, the only rationally adequate explanation
p
of organic development in the natural world, without direct
resort to the deus ex machina of divine experience, as in i
Bownian personalism. But Ward himself was thoroughly
j
convinced that it must be applied rigorously or not at all:
that, in the words of the last sentence of the Essay:
The mnemic theory will work for those who can accept a
monadistic or pampsychist interpretation of the beings that
make up the world, who believe with Spinoza and Leibniz
I
that "all individual things are animated albeit in divers
j
degrees." But quite apart from difficulties of detail, I
|do not see how in principle it will work otherwise. 3 |
Thus we are led back, after the consideration of the I
j
nature of the physical world (including bodies) in these two
|
Chapters, to the consideration of Ward’s monadism, in |
particular to the problems of subject and self, and the
j
question of how, on the basis of Ward’s "monadistic or |
pampsychist interpretation" body and mind are related.
|
!
j
1. EIP, Essay VIII, 251-276. Separately published.
!
2. Sources of doctrine acknowledged, EIP, 263.
|
3. EIP, 276.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE SUBJECT, THE SELF, AND THE BODY
A. The Subject and the Monad
1. The Psychological Subject
a. Subject and ’’Soul”
One of the difficulties to be faced in attempting a
criticism of any element of Ward’s thought is the fact
that his whole system is so very well-balanced and
coherent. It is hard to deal with one factor without
dealing with all. It is this difficulty which has been
largely determinant in putting off until last the exam-
ination of what would seem to be the elementary and
primary components of his ' metaphysics . Now that we have
considered important problems raised by the application
of hie monadism, we are, perhaps, better prepared to
examine the basis of his system, itself.
Pointing out, as we have seen, that ’’the truth... is
becoming ever clearer to us” that Nature is not primary,
he takes his stand on the dictum: ’’Mind is not the
impotent shadow of Nature as thus shaped forth, but this
shaping is itself the work of mind.”^ This general
1. NAA, II, 247.
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I
position he interprets to mean, not that all souls are
substances, but, rather, that we must proceed "on the spirit- i
ualistic interpretation of all substances as souls. In
other words, the ultimate constituents of reality are to be
conceived on the analogy of ourselves.
In Chapter Seven we examined the elements important to
oiiT investigation in Ward's reanalysis of experience. It is
not too much to say that the crux of that reanalysis, and
the primary logical source of the concept of the monad, is
Ward's doctrine of the subject of experience. ^ Our first
task in this final Chapter, then, is to examine that doctrine.
First let us seek to make clear once more just what
Ward means and does not mean by the subject of experience.
He does not mean substantial soul, in anything like the
historic metaphysical meaning of that term. The subject is
not "a simple substance, an entity, indivisible and inextend-
ed, therefore indestructible and capable of continuing its
I
activities indefinitely after the death of the body."^
Nor, on the other hand, is it a soul in McDougall's own
modern sense of merely "a being that possesses, or is, the i
1. ROE, 392. Cf. supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec.B.
8. See supra
.
ibid, and Chap. Seven, Secs. c,D.
3. McDougall, MEE, 14. Cf. Ward, PP, 35-36, 381.
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I I
sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and
|
•
I
|l psychophysical interaction.'*^ The subject is, for Ward, I
I
certainly that. But he is not satisfied to leave it merely
that; in fact he believes that it reveals itself as more than
i
Ijust that which acts and interacts. Needless to say, also, I
Ward would not agree further with McDougall's analysis of the
j
soul's capacities and activities.^ Yet with UoDougall's
j
j
essential aim, and with his insistence upon the importance
I
and reality of the soul or subject and its real efficiency,
he would doubtless be in entire sympathy. Perhaps the most
important and most oft-repeated emphasis of his own psychology
was on this functional and hormic aspect. Truly, their
"emphatic foot-steps fall in the same places.
b. Subject as "Self"
But Ward's functionalism is balanced by a structural
aspect that places him - where he is usually listed, I think -
among the self - or personalistic psychologists. For him,
the subject is "an individual self," "an experiencing subject
j
or experient," a "conscious subject," "Ego," or, more
I
1. McDougall, BAM, 365. Cf. Pratt, MAS, 180-181.
2. Ibid., and passim
. Cf. Woodworth, CSP, 182-204.
3. Cf. Marshall, CWP, 25-26, on mind, in Ward, as
"primarily volitional," and PP, 359-360.
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definitely, "pure Ego."^ He himself has stated his position
summarily, yet in the strongest manner;
Psychology without a soul - as the 'rational
psychologists* described soul - is quite possible but
not psychology without a self, a being that in its
acquaintance and intercourse with objects - that is,
directly or indirectly, with other selves - feels and acts.
Let the substantiality of this being be interpreted how
it may, the actuality of it is past question and therefore
never questioned.^
There are many fascinating and important questions and
problems raised by Ward's doctrine, but time and space permit
the notice of only one, here; How is this self or subject
known? It is not consciousness, per se . It is a conscious
being, known only reflectively or intellectually, strictly
speaking. It is wider than consciousness: better described
as experiential rather than conscious.^ It is reactive or
conative - primarily so - rather than merely cognitive; and so
must, in part at least, be inferred rather than known directly
Let us have Ward's own statement on this important, and, I
think, sound position;
The I is known reflectively in the Me because the Me
has been synthetically constructed by it, much as an
artist paints his own portrait by means of a mirror. The
mirror for self-consciousness is the social medium, and as
this is perfected the portraiture improves...
1. All on one page: PP, 35, but used more or less
synonymously throughout PP.
2. PP, 381. Note the whole passage, 380-382,
3. Cf. PP, 21-22, 47-48, etc.
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We conclude then that we know intellectually what we
are as experients; into the empty 'form of consciousness'
our being fits.^
One of the important aspects of this matter of self-
knowledge is the epistemological corollary, that a subject
never knows itself save in relation to an object or objects,
or, as Ward would say, in relation to the objective
continuum. We come, here, upon that universal duality of
p
subject and object noted previously, in our examination of
the analysis of experience, from the opposite side.
2.
The Nature of the Monad
If, perchance, one should point out - as well he might -
that Ward's subject as purely psychological may be interpre-
ted entirely in terras of McDougall's active soul, in spite of
Ward's denial of soul doctrine,^ it might possibly have to
be admitted forgetting, of course, to point out the
wide differences in detailed analysis, on the other hand).
But, on the metaphysical side, the ontological distinction
which underlies them, and which i£ reflected in the psycho-
logical doctrines, becomes apparent. Ward's ontology is
neither positivistic nor purely activistio,^ but is
1. PP, 381,
2. Supra
. .
Chap. Seven, Sec. c.
3, PP, 35, 381, etc. Of. Broad, MPN, 570^ see supra .191-
4, Whatever that may mean.' 193.
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definitely panpsychic. The world consists of monads, or
selves, of various grades of simplicity and complexity,
patterned on the paradigm of our human conscious selves:
definitely conative and cognitive. 1 In Ward's thought neither
the conative nor the cognitive aspect may be omitted. To
stress the co native aspect, in the psychological doctrine of
the subject, to the exclusion of the cognitive element, is
unfair to Ward's ontology. And also, I think, to his own
psychology. On the other hand. Ward parts company at this
point, just as definitely, with those psychologists and
philosophers who limit self to cognitive consciousness, or who ^
make awareness primary as, e.g.
,
in defining consciousness as
"awareness; what ceases when we become unconscious; all the
;
states and processes of thought, feeling, will, self-experiencq
etc."^
j
I
One difficulty here is with the terra "consciousness". As
|
I
Ward says, "its manifold ambiguities are something of a i
scandal. "3 He considers the confusions in its meaning ani use,
I
and prefers to try to avoid them by using the wider terra
"experience" and its variants,"^ as his basic term. Thus the
conative factors may be clearly and surely included in his
I
1. Of. supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec. B; HOE, p.v, 60-64; 254-260. i
2. Brightraan, IP, 383. Of. Chap. VI, 166-211; "What is I
Consciousness?"
3. PP, 21.
I
4. PP, 21-24, 35-41, etc.
i
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concept. And, so, strictly speaking, his subject is an
experiencing being, rather than a conscious being. In his
psychology this works well, but it does not save him from
metaphysical difficulties.
Metaphysically, the subject, or "monad”, is to be
conceived as a psychical being, conative and cognitive. In
order (so to speak) to reduce this concept to the point where
it may be applicable to the whole range of existents - those,
e.g., who compose so-called inanimate physical nature - he
imagines conation and cognition as of minimal proportions.
This concept of "bare" monads, he tells us, is a purely
abstract and limiting concept. 1 That is all very well: as
he points out, the physicist usee the same method.^ But in
any case, there are two objections that will not down. The
first of these we have already considered in connection with
physical interaction, viz., the abstractness, not to say the
impossibility, of the concept of sympathatetic rapport
.
which,
for Ward, is the only real form of mutual interaction between
monads.^ In normal experience there is no such thing as unmed-
iated psychic rapport
.
The other objection I would raise is this; by what
I
1. ROE, 52-54, 195, 254-255. Of. supra ^ Chap. Six, Sec.
B
,
2
,
2. ROE, 195, 255.
3. Supra
.
Chapter Ten, Sec. A.
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.
logical right may we call activity ’’psychical”, and the monad
a "self”
,
when conation and cognition have been reduced to
a point where they no longer resemble, even remotely, anything
in our conscious experience which goes by those names? This
j
is, perhaps, but another form of, or at least closely related
j
to, the argument advanced in Chapter Nine against the exten-
sion of the concepts of consciousness and psychical animation
to the world.
1
Of course, Ward's answer to this objection is seemingly
clear and simple - and unsatisfying to many. His answer is:
by right of the principle of continuity. Oranting freely that
this principle has a legitimate and even indispensable place
in metaphysical reasoning, we must, nevertheless, not forget
that it is always subject to the check of experience. This
Ward himself is careful enoiigh to point out in another
2
connection. And in the light of experience, both uncritical
and scientific, the whole notion of the complete psychic
animation of nature is abstract and unreal - a 'closet
philosophy' - in my judgment,
3. The Subject as the Dominant Monad
In the light of our chief problem of body-mind relations,
1. Supra, Chapter Nine, Secs. C,3,4. Cf. Chap. Thirteen,
Sec. B, below,
2. pp, 442, n.3. Cf. supra , Chap. Eight, Sec. A,2,c.
3. Cf. Chap, Thirteen, Sec. B, below.
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we must note the identification, in Ward’s thought, of the
psychological subject with the dominant monad, in complex
|
organisms. He writes;
|
The higher the form of life we take note of, the
more we seem driven to assume that the organism has a
director, and is not a mere automaton. It is here that we
are led to talk of an heir and to regard the body as his
heritage. This heir is the soul or dominant monad.
^
In his note appended to The Realm of Ends on the “Relation
of Body and Mind,"^ he specifically makes the identification
I
of subject and dominant monad, although he nowhere discusses
|
i
the grounds of the identification, except in the most general |
way. It is of importance to note the context of this
identification, however, since probably he felt - perhaps
rightly - that no further justification was necessary. On
this important point it will be well to have his own
statement. He says, “we may fairly call an established truth"
the point that,
whereas the mechanism that is the one object of the
physiologist's study is altogether phenomenal, the mind
that the psychologist studies is not - as the naturalist
vainly strives to maintain - merely phenomenal or
epiphenomenal; since it implies the subject, or dominant
monad, to whom such phenomenal experiences belong.^
With this identification, per se
.
there can be no
disagreement, if the general structure of Ward's Monadism be
1. ROE, 307. "Soul," here, not a metaphysical term. Kotej
3. ROE, 461-467. I rejection of metaphysical |
3. ROE, 463. I "soul," supra , 191-194.
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accepted. Of course, if one deny either the reality of the
subject or the conception of the structure of the individual
as held by Ward, then this identification might be contested.
Doubtless it was the patency of this situation which kept
Ward from attempted justification. The context of it, in any
case, brings us to the next point we must consider: the
nature of the individual organism, of which the subject or
dominant monad is the director.
B. The Self in Ward’s Thought
1. Ward’s "Philosophy of Clothes"
Ward’s concept of the individual is well stated in a
phrase he used in discussing the problem of heredity; the
organic individual is to be conceived metaphysically as "a
commonwealth where the whole is for the parts and the parts
for the whole; where all are more or less ^ rapport .
And, as we might expect, he is careful to add that "the key
to all this is to be found... in social intercourse. The
basis for the monadistic interpretation of this conception
he lays in his doctrine of the psychological subject, which
we have been examining. As Marshall points out, it is the
1. EIP, 875. Cf. Marshall, CWP, 132-133.
2. Ibid.
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subject as dominant monad which makes possible the functional
I
organization or community of subjects which is a human
I
I
individual.^ The commonwealth, as Ward elsewhere insists, is
i
I
therefore really a monarchy. ^ This dominant monad or soul,
through the selective distribution of its activity,^ in large
measure controls, directs and determines the process of his
own embodiment. This doctrine Ward speaks of as "a new
'philosophy of clothes.*”^
Psychologically, this activity of the dominant monad is
reflected in the principle of subjective selection. In this
principle, he says, "the primarily practical character of
experience. .. is clearly manifested."^
By this name, then, let us denote the fact that - out
of all the manifold changes of sensory presentation which
a given individual experiences - only a few are the
occasion of such decided feeling as to become objects of
possible appetite or aversion. It is thus by means of
movements that we are more than the creatures of
circumstances and that we can with propriety talk of
subjective selection. For ...we can, by what is strange-
ly like a concentration of attention, convert the idea of
a movement into the fact.®
Such possibility of the distribution of attentive activity,
then, lies at the basis of Ward's entire analysis of
1. Op. cit., 138-139.
2. ROE, 211. Of. below, Chap. Twelve, Sec. B, 2,c.
3. Of. Ward's psychological "attention," supra
.
Chap.
Six, Sec. A, 4, a.
4. PP, 442. Gf., EIP, 193-194. The doctrine he
acknowledges as from Leibniz, with indebtedness to Spinoza.
5. PP, 50.
6. PP, 50-51. Cf. 34-41, 51-59, 376-382, 423-426, 441-
442, and passim ; Ency . Brit . , 11th ed.
,
XXII, 552,554,558,598.
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experience, psychologically. And the controlling and deter-
1
minative character of the dominant monad, metaphysically, is j
i
rooted and grounded in this character of experience thus |
1
analyzed by Ward. The dominant monad is primary. "Whereas...
for the one [naturalisi^ the question seems to be how the
i
body comes by its soul; for the other [panpsychic pluralist^
,
,
it is rather how. the soul comes by its body."^
2, Body and the Self
In the commonwealth of monads, then, which make up the
individual, the position and meaning of the dominant monad is
clear. Psychologically, he is the subject, the owner and
1
controller, and to some extent, at least, the determiner of
|
1
experience. Monadistically. in the mutuum commercium of
experience this real, unpresented, 'pure' self is in inter-
i
action with the other members of his commonwealth which, phe-
j
nomenally, are known as "ray body," and (by means of them)
|
with the rest of the universe of monads, "'a vast and complex !
web of life,' whose myriad fibres are all intertwined, though
i
every one is unique,"^ and which is "the common organism or
matrix of all monads."^
1. ROE, 106.
2. ROE, 58.
3. ROE, 258.
1
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In the course of this interaction there is psychologically
developed what we may call the common notion of self, the
•empirical' ego, the 'Me' (as contrasted with the
Of course, metaphysically speaking, this self is hut the
phenomenal reflection of the subject or pure self as it
interacts with other selves. Perhaps the essential point of
Ward's whole argument for a subject is just this, that with-
out a real'l' there would never be any 'Me'. For our
problem, the empirical self is of importance, for it is this
self, not the 'I', in relation to the presentations, which
is primarily implied in the common notion of mind, when the
body-mind problem is under discussion.
I
I
Now Ward very carefully and fully traces the origin and
! o
!
growth of the experience of self.'^ He shows how it origi-
I
nates in what is "variously styled the vital sense,
i
coenaesthesis or somatic consciousness." Thus, with the
i development of definite perception, "The body becomes, in
fact, the earliest form of self, the first datum for our
1
later conceptions of permanence and individuality."^ The
continuous presentation of one's own body is "transferred" to
1. PP, 35, 361-371, etc.
2. PP, Chap. XV, 361-382, "Presentation of Self, Self-
Consciousness, Subjective Being."
3. PP, 364. Cf. Broad, MPN, 566.
4. PP, 165.

203
other bodies which resemble it. Without such transference,
he says, ”it is hard to see how we should ever be prompted
to convert the temporally discontinuous presentations of
external things into a continuity of existence."^
With the details of Ward’s analysis of the development
of the experience of self, we are not here concerned further,
interesting and important as they might be. He traces it
through ’’ the image ininp: and desirinR- self ”
,
"which the natural
man locates in his midriff;”^ through the stage
of intellection made possible by social life and the
acquisition of language^ to the ” thinking and willing self .
which distinguishes the thinker from the thoiaghts
,
until,
finally, the "subject of experience that we call the pure
Ego or Self . "5 emerges in our experience and thought.
3,
Ward’s Synthesis of Mind
Ward’s empirical bent is seen once more in the last two
chapters of Psychologcical Principles . After taking experience
apart, he is not content to leave the abstract pieces lying
about. He must put them all together, and see what the
1. Loc,cit. Of. 32-34.
' 2. PP, 366.
3. Cf. PP, Chap. XII, 286-312, "Intellection".
4. PP, 370. Cf. ROE, 120-124.
5. Ibid. On all this.cf. Eucy. Brit., 11th ed.
.
XXII,
598-599.
f
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resulting concrete individual looks like. Especially, he
must see if the individual ‘works,’ for he knows that the
model he took apart (our individual experience) was the
experience of a living, active being.
The result of this attempt at ’’a general synthesis of mind,"^
is his doctrine of the concrete individual. Once more, we
must avoid anything like an attempt at an adequate criticism,
or even a complete summary, and be content with noting
several points of importance for our body-mind problem.
Mind, as thus synthesized, is seen once more to be a
unity of experience, just as it is, indeed, for the most
primitive conscious being. But on the level of our human
intellection we are able to recognize a subjective factor and
an objective factor, a duality within the unity of experience,
each side of which in turn we have been able to analyze
further. True, of course, this duality in unity is present
in all experience. But through the abstractness introduced
into scientific and philosophic thinking by Descartes's
analysis of these factors of experience into metaphysical
substances, European thought in this field was shunted oni?^ a
three century detour. It can only be brought back by such a
reanalysis of experience as Ward has undertaken, making clear
1.
.
PP, 408.
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I
the unity of experience.
This psychological unity must not be confused with
metaphysical unity. Unquestionably Ward has been often and
badly criticized by those who have fallen into this error.
The confusion which results from such a misunderstanding is
I
apt to lead to curious statements.^ The unity of experience
I
(including the unity of the objective factor within
I
experience) is purely psychological. One source of diffi-
culty, here, is the failure adequately to differentiate
2
metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological objectivity,
j
That which is psychologically objective, is not necessarily
an epistemological object, nor a metaphysical being. One who
stresses the unity of the psychological totum ob .iectivum, and
|
includes the empirical self within that unity, may at the
same time be an epistemological dualist and a metaphysical
pluralist - all of which Ward did and wasJ Again, it is a
question of sterilizing one’s verbal instruments, and
I
I
keeping them sterilized.
jj
To get back to Ward’s concrete individual: what we call
I
the ’’mind” of a man is then a psychological unity, within
I
which may be distinguished (i) a subjective factor and (ii)
1. See supra
.
Chap, Eight. Cf. N. K. Smith’s criticism
of Ward’s continuum, ITK, 95-99.
2. Cf. PP, 18.
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an objective factor. Within the subjective factor there
may be further discriminated (a) the conative aspect (which
seems to Ward to be primary) and (b) the cognitive aspect.
Note that these are aspects not to be so clearly and
separately distinguished, as may the elements of the
objective factor. The objective factor, while originally and
fundamentally a psychological presentational continuum
becomes differentiated in the developing experience into (c)
the empirical self, within which may be distinguished various
aspects of feeling and action, and (d) a group of simple and
complex presentational experiences ranging from the simplest
conceivable sensation through perception, imagination,
ideation, etc. In all these latter, at least, the presenta-
tional element is so mixed with the subjective as to perhaps
defy complete abstract analysis. For the secret of activity
and development, including differentiation, is the principle
of subjective selection.
Upon the details of Ward’s analysis of experience,
doubtless much corrective work will have to be done as the
years go by. Some has been done already.^ But his essential
view of ex perience as the unity of objective and subjective
factors, and as being thus the datum from which we must start
1. See, e.g., the work of 0. F. Stout, MAM, etc.
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all our investigations of reality, is sound. Metaphysical
idealism on the one hand, and mechanistic materialism and
naturalism on the other, have each sinned against reality
by setting up one factor or the other as ontologically
ultimate.^
1. Cf. Chap, Thirteen, B, below; there the claim is
made that Ward himself fell into this ontological piti
XjGoia'^jdQBt dM si lo enoxisjiiuesvni ‘isjc
tain oieiLsi’iBiBm oitsinsxfooiis , bnBxf 9co ano^ no xasiX^abl
bofinXs rfono avoxl ,’x??r£5o 9iii no ,iaxX*iuj.jn
'iIXaoiyoIod'jco odt no 'lo^o^.l 9no qn 3ixxt:J-9a ycf
^x ttinXo artJ' sbxsxfi jTfcXad ,5 ,aaad‘TxrfT ‘Xw -X
Itxq XxiOX^oXo'^’no siil^ 'o^ni Xlal iXoninxxl oijs’V aodv obiia
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CHAPTER TWELVE
MIND AND BODY
I
A. Ward’s Modified Interact ionism
1. Mind and the Dominant Monad
We have just seen what ”mind” meant to Ward, and !
incidentally, what "body” meant, psychologically. From that
point of view, both are objective presentations, and both
imply a duality of subject and object, as does all experience.
We must now consider their metaphysical meaning and its
implications for the problem of their relationships.
^
Experience, according to Ward, is always the experience
of a subject. In the case of a complex being, such as man,
the subject of an individual's experience is the dominant
monad of the group or society of monads that are the individ-
ual, as we have seen.^ Metaphysically, then, all presentation,
feeling and conation, as experienced by the concrete individ-
I
ual, is really the experience of the dominant monad; and it is
|
1. On this whole problem, as here considered, see
supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec. C, where the elements of Ward’s solutdon
are summarized, and his own discussions; ROE, 254-258,
461-467; Ency . Brit
.
11th ed
. ,
XXII, "Psychology," Sec. 47;
PP, 423-429.
2. Supra . Chap. Eleven, Sec. A, 3.
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the dominant monad which controls and directs the activity
of the individual. We have noted also the fact that the
•bare 'monads which constitute the apparently inanimate
I
backgroiind of all organisms are in immediate rapoort
.
and that
all physical interaction is conceived as ultimately nothing
! but psychical relationship.^
Within the total society of monads the dominant monad
bears a two-fold relationship to other monads. To the
comparatively small group (still, an enormously large
number*.) which compose the rest of his own organism, he has a
peculiarly intimate relationship. This, Ward says, ”we may
call an internal, functional, or vital, . .relation. To the
rest of the universe of monads, the dominant monad has only
an “external, foreign, or physical, relation.”^ As we shall
see, this latter relation is always indirect: it is, so to
say, administered through the monads who are in the former
relation.
Now granting that we must not conceive these relation-
ships in pxirely spatial terms, for they are not really so,
yet there can be no doubt that our spatial perceptions have
I
their exact prototype in the realm of metaphysical being.
1. Supra
.
Chap. Ten A.
2. ROE, 257-258, See supra. Chap. Six.
3. ROE, 258.
.V ’is.
!1
T
ii
I
I
Perhaps it would be more nearly proximate to say that they are^
the exact adumbrations of monadistic reality, in so far as
they are veridical perceptions. That being so, what is the
;
spatial point in the body representing the position of the
I dominant monad? Or does it move about? Hardly, unless
j
within very limited range, for it must, undoubtedly, keep in
very intimate proximity to the cortical centers of the
brain. But we know that individuals have lived for long
I
periods minus one or more portions of every section of the
j
brain area, apparently suffering thereby only the loss of
I certain functions, depending upon the portion destroyed. In
i a word, the point is that the whole conception of the
i
j
location of mind and dominance in a single monad is exceeding-
I
ly questionable.
2. The Metaphysics of Interaction
Calling the dominant monad "A,” Ward makes this most
significant statement:
The totality of these internal relations at a given
time answers to A's objective experience at that moment.
Certain changes in this whole are, so far as A is concerned,
initiated by certain of the subordinate monads: these
changes answer to A's sensations, and to these it is
receptive or passive. Certain other changes, on the other
hand, are due to A's active initiative: these entail
sensations in certain subordinate monads, and their
response is what we call A's movement.^
1. ROE, 258.
I
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We have here in the compass of three sentences Ward's
whole solution of the body-mind problem, on the metaphysical
side.l Body and mind are a unity in A's objective experience,
which, metaphysically, is a relationship between -A and the
society of psychical beings or monads which make up the
organism of which A is the controlling or dominant monad.
What is commonly called "conscious mind" is the cognition by
A of A's own psychologically objective experience, plus A's
own subjective experience. ^\Tiat is usually meant by "body"
is an epistemological and a metaphysical projection or
objectification of a part of A's psychologically objective
experience. According to Ward, the epistemological
objectification may be completely justified. But any
metaphysical objectification which creates an "ugly broad
ditch" of disparate substances is doomed to failure. His
monadism, he believes, successfully provides for the real
I
epistemological duality, with interaction, which experience
makes necessary, but avoids the pitfall of the dualism of
I
disparate substances. For the real duality is that of domi-
j
nant monad over against the world of monads. The real
interaction is that between the dominant monad and the rest
1. His lengthy note on "Relation of Body and Mind,"
ROE, 461 to 467, is a justification and expansion of the
solution here succinctly stated.
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of the commonwealth which is the monadistic society called
an organism. Through the subordinate or functionally related
monads, the dominant interacts with the rest of the common
matrix, which is the universe.
i
B. Perception, Determination, and Freedom
1. The Problem of Perception
a. The Metaphysics of Perception
The passage from which the gist of Ward’s solution has
been quoted^ continues with the discussion of the pluralistic
I
I
solution of the problem of external perception, particularly
I
in contrast to that of occasionalistic personal theism. The
I
essential problems involved here we have already discussed
at some length, ^ agreeing with Ward, in large measure, in
hie arguments for pluralism, but questioning the panpsychic
!
I
aspect. Let us here note specifically the application of
I
his monadism to the interpretation of perception, particularly
I
as it involves the so-called relation of body and mind.
This brings us back to the other type of relationship
sustained by the dominant monad to its world of monads,
' 1. Supra
.
p. 12-2. ROE, 254-260.
2. Supra, Chap. Nine, Sec. B, 3; Chap. Ten, Secs.
k
,
3 and 4
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mentioned above, 1 To all monads external to the dominant
monad's own organism, it sustains what Ward calls "an
p
external, foreign, or physical, relationi' That is, it is
in relation to them only through the mediation of the
subordinate monads of its own organism. (And usually, also,
unless the particular "foreign" monad be contiguous to the
orgr.nism through still other monads which intervene; but at
present they may be disregarded.)
Here, as in transeunt action, the relationship is to be
conceived, ultimately, purely in terms of psychical rapport.
The subordinate monads, so to speak, minister to the
dominant monad, by conveying to him the information gathered
regarding the world of monads external to the individual
organism. In this process, they themselves because of the
"intimacy" of the '"functional" relationship, are "diaphanous!/^
This is the panpsychic way of combining the physiological
and physical facts with the psychological facts, and over-
coming the apparent "ditch" between them.
Once more, this is an explanation of accepted facts
which must stand or fall with the extension of the psychical
conception beyond the limits warranted by scientifically
1. Cf. supra
,
p. 12-1-2 : "Within the total society
of monads, the dominant monad bears a two-fold relationship
to other monads."
2. ROE, 257-258.
3. ROE, 466.
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verified experience. Details of the panpsychic doctrine of
perception are wanting, so that we may leave the matter with
this general observation, except to note that Ward, himself,
1|
seems puzzled by the state of intimacy within the organism, |
l!just referred to, such ’’that the organism has ‘windows,' - |i
is, so to say, diaphanous for its own subject and yet
j
j
opaque to all subjects besides.”^ It leads him to say of the '
relationship, that it is "what we seem driven to call a
j
p
'
subjective or intersub jective relation." This is of a i
piece with his doctrine of sympathetic rap jort
.
which we have
||
previously questioned.
3
b. The Nature of Presentation
One further word might be added, also, concerning the
nature of presentation. For Ward, it is an absolutely basic
fact of experience. We are fortunate, again in having his
own succinct summary on this point. Discussing the duality
in unity of experience, he remarks:
But as regards the bare fact of presentation there
^
is nothing to be said; it is that relation of subject
to object and of object to subject, in virtue of which
they are severally subject and object. As the absolutely
ultimate relation within experience we can either say that
1. ROE, 466.
2. Ibid. Note whole discussion, 466-467.
3. Supra
.
Chap. Ten, Sec. A, 4.
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it is inexplicable, or that it needs no explanation, or
we may entertain the notion of an Absolute, in which the
unity of experience outlasts the duality.^
Kis monadistic interpretation of perception is his method
of reducing the complex experiences of presentation to their
simplest terms, where "there is nothing to be said," for one
-j
has reached "the absolutely ultimate relation " of a subject i
I
I
and an object, as pluralistically conceived. That monadism
could so explain perception, he regarded as being another
argument in its favor. Here, again, we reach the underlying
Question of the acceptance or rejection of the panpsychistic
conception, per se.^ If it be accepted then little
exception can be taken to Ward's metaphysical explanation
of perception, for he has but sketched it in the large.
2. The Problem of Freedom
a. Mechanism, Cause, and Determination
Early in the dissertation it was pointed out that the
solution of the body-mind problem went hand in hand with
those of mechanism and teleology, and freedom and determinism;;
With the former of these correlative problems we have been
concerned all along, of course, and particularly in dealing
1. NAA, II, 117.
2. See below. Sec. B, 4.
3. Chap. Two, Sec. A, 4.
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with Ward’s panpsychism. The monad is fundamentally a
teleological concept. For Ward, all so called mechanism is
to be accounted for on the basis of habit, habit which is
the result of the activity of purposive beings, bent on
self-conservation and self-betterment. 1 By implication,
therefore, unless the monads are purely subsistent (which is
not Ward's doctrine), freedom and not determinism is the
fundamental characteristic of the Many, and so primary in
the world.
But Ward, of course, did not deny the fact of determinism
in our human experience, nor fail to recognize its
metaphysical importance.^ He discriminates two meanings of
cause and two meanings of determination. "Cause" means,
in the case of a conative subject, immanent efficiency and
purposiveness. As used by science, it means neither of these,
but merely uniform precedence. I.e., of two events, the one
(the cause) always precedes, and may be expected uniformly
to precede the other (the effect).^ Concomitantly, regarding
determination,
...we experience determination in both the forms
which make up the two sides of causation: the effect as
1. Cf. supra. Chap. Ten. Secs. B.1.2 and 3. See ROE.
50-54 72-76.
2. Cf. ROE, Chap. XIII, "Freedom", 270-291, on freedom
and determinism.
3. ROE, 75, 273-277.
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determined, the cause as determining; and we experience
both, not objectively as presentations of what is not
self, but subjectively as immediate states of self. We
have moreover no ground for regarding the one as a whit
more real than the other... and essentially distinct thoxigh
they are, both arise together in certain situations.^
And in the world of our experience we find both of these
forms of determination manifest:
The one form, that of self-determination - implying
such teleological categories as personality, utility and
worth - dominates all our interpretations of the world as
a realm of ends. The other form, that of determination
according to fixed law, implying in the last resort only
the categories of mechanism, underlies our scientific
description of the so-called realm of nature or world of
things. The one has been called the ethical postulate of
freedom, the other the epistemological postulate of
necessity
To sum up, then, Ward recognizes clearly both mechanism
I
!
1
and teleology, determination and freedom, as genuine aspects
of both subjective and objective experience. But as a
monadoligist
,
he regarded the postulate of freedom as the
fundamental and primary principle; for, after his examination
of mechanistic philosophies in Naturalism and Agnosticism.
he came to the conclusion “that while it may be possible,
setting out from mind, to account for mechanism, it is
impossible, setting out from mechanism, to account for mind.”^
1. ROE, 288. Cf. 277-279.
2. ROE, 279.
3. ROE, 18.
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b. Monadism and Freedom
Among the inescapable facts of experience which Ward
faced were such as (i) bodily control, involving apparent
interaction of body and mind, (ii) the positive freedom of
the subject or self "to initiate, to turn circumstances to
account, even - thanks to the otQ that reason affords -
so to deal with oneself";^ and (iii) the teleological factors
undeniable present in organic evolution. Ward would seem
to be quite correct in his assumption that these data must
be faced and a solution offered by^ny respectable
p
metaphysics.® Each of these involves cause and determination
in both senses recognized above. Ward's contention was,
therefore, that each of these facts involved, not merely
negative freedom, but real and positive freedom. They could
be solved only if, in each situation, an immanent ly efficient,
active self or subject or person could be posited. Let us see
more particularly what that meant, in Ward's thought.
It meant that wherever you found any fact of freedom,
there was (i) a psychological subject dealing effectively
with the content of hie objective continuum; and (ii) this
1. PP, 407.
2. Of, supra
.
Chap. Six, Secs. c,2,3 and 4.
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meant metaphysically, a dominant monad in controlling inter-
action with his subordinate monads, and through them, in
lesser control of environing monads. These, for Ward, are
the proximate facts of freedom. Furthermore, (i) and (ii)
express, from two different points of view, exactly and
literally the same facts. It is this, the panpsychic nature
of freedom and control, that is so easily missed, and so
essential to Ward's thought.
And, further the heart of that psychic interpretation
not cognition, but conation.
Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-
conservation, self-realisation, and taking conation not
cognition as its central feature, we must conclude that
it is not that 'content* of objects, which the subject
cannot alter, that gives them their place in its experi-
ence, but their worth positive or negative, their
|
goodness or badness as ends or means to life.^
j
!
again, e.g., in brief "We begin by trying and end by
j
knowing. Practice is the parent of theory and realization thej
2 i
surest verification." We must not make the mistake,
|
however, of supposing that this priority of the conative
|
i
implies that the cognitive and conative aspects can be !
1. NAA, II, 134. Of, PP, 360.
2. ROE, 106. But, as Marshall points out, "That does
not mean for Ward that theory is true because it is
useful; rather it is useful because it is true." GWP, 26.
Of. Ward's remarks. Mind
, o.s., 15(1890)232.
IS
Or
I
!
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separated. Ward's monads - even the 'barest' of them -
were always both active and percipient "in the Leibnizian
sense, that is to say."^ The importance of conation is
reemphasized here, however, because it involves so essential-
ly, in Ward's thought, the principle of real freedom.
Without this element of active, positive freedom Ward did
not see how the organic world could ever be what it was, save
by an occasionalistic assumption.
C. Interest and Freedom
We must analyze this conative element in the doctrine
of freedom one step further. Describing free determination
by personal agency, ^Vard writes:
Psychologically the situation must be interesting; but
this is not a quality pertaining to the situation as such,
it is a character that the subject as such gives to it.
And gives why? Because the subject is not, like an inan-
imate thing, indifferent to circumstances, but has ends
and aims to realise, and therefore assumes a different
attitude towards its environment according as this helps
or hinders it in the pursuit of its purposes - purposes
which conform to no general law save that of self-conser-
vation and betterment. Its own character determines the
character that it gives to objects, and its behaviour
towards them is so far essentially self-determination.
To deny all this is tacitly to deny the reality of the self
or subject of experience altogether.'^
The first question which this fundamental analysis of
1. ROE, 54, n.l.
2. ROE, 288-289.
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the basic active relationship of Ward's Monadism suggests
is once more that of its reasonable application. How can
we apply a term like "interest" to any possible "experience"
truly imaginable as possessed by beings on the level, even,
of the lower living organisms, to say nothing of the mass of
monads who make up the inanimate environment? Will the
principle of continuity justify such a psychologically
' "enormous extrapolation"? ^ In my judgment, it certainly
will not. True, this description of free determination is
purely on the human level. But Ward certainly intends that
we shall conceive free activity on the lower levels on this
pattern. Not only is this plain from his rigorous application
of the principle of continuity, but he tells us definitely
that the concept of the monad is fashioned on the paradigm
of our human experience, and "even the lowest also will
possess whatever be the irreducible minimum essential to being
in any sense a subject or self at all."^ Even that minimum
includes cognition and*' conation. And the latter, for Ward
means free effective determination of and by subject^ which
is what Ward is definitively describing in this passage.
Another and final question we must raise concerns the
nature of the control of the subordinate or ministering monads
1. Gf. Chap. Nine, Secs, c, 3 and 4, supra .
2. ROE, 52,
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by the dominant monad
,
and the force - if we may borrow the
word - which holds the society of monads together in any
organ or organism. Unquestionably, Ward would reply in terms
of sympathetic rapport
.
based on cognition and interest.^
He says, e.g.
,
speaking of the dualism of common thought:
More fundamental than any seeming dualism of body
and soul is the duality of subject and object in experi-
ence, and this - for spiritualistic monism - means the
interaction of subjects with other subjects, transcends
the opposition of person and thing. It means too, that
the organism is the result of such subjective interaction,
not that this interaction is the result of it; more
generally still, that subjects are the prime agents in
maintaining the so-called physical world, not this the
prime agent by which they are passively sustained.'^
Yet one finds it quite impossible imaginatively or conceptu-
ally to carry this general conception, in the slightest of
detail, into the realm of any such society as even a
comparatively simple living being would be. The doctrine
of freedom interpreted as determination by interest simply
will not bear the weight put upon it by supposing even
a simple monadistic society making up the very lowliest of
active organisms to be dominated and to be effective in that
way. I wonder if, in speaking of the subject as "dominant,’*
in objecting to the idea of a society of monads as a real
1 .
2
.
Of. ROE, 462-467.
ROE, 400-401.
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commonwealth and insisting that it is a monarchy, Ward is not
bringing in unconsciously ideas which really contradict his
concepts of freedom and of determination by interest?
And he tells us plainly, that on "the notion of dominance...
the entire doctrine of monadism is built.
1. ROE, 211. Of. 196, 463-464, 466-467, and Marshall,
CWP, 138-139.
,
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
TOWARD AN EVALUATION OF WARD’S THOUGHT
A. Philosophical Orientation
1. Ward’s Recognition of Its Importance
Those who achieve a point of view in life without
a
struggle may have certain kind of self-assurance, but they
lack the capability, often, of sustained and patient
criticism. Also, their own philosophy is very apt to rest
on uncriticized foundations. These two charges can never
be laid at the door of James Ward. The combination of
pietistic and Calvinistic religion in his home, plus a
’’divine discontent" (inherited or transplanted from his
father, doubtless) produced a ferment and a hunger in his
mind, which kept him peculiarly sensitive toward any tempta-
tion to intellectual smugness or "cheap and easy" solutions
of ultimate problems. This aspect of his mind and thought
worked itself out, finally, in Naturalism and A^’nosticism
.
and in one of the best of his lectures (delivered, inciden-
tally, as the Annual Public Address before the Philosophical
Union of the University of California August 26, 1904)
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•'Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints.”^
In attempting an evaluation of Ward's thought, there-
of
fore, it is perhaps^more than usual importance to see clearly
out of what philosophical windows he was looking (so to
speak) as he viewed the world. For his general viewpoint
was strongly and intentionally determinative in his
metaphysics. His own standpoint was worked out with the
greatest of care, before he attempted constructive work,
in his criticism of naturalism and agnostic monism. He
was, indeed, extremely anxious to avoid that
...source of error, too often overlooked in the
past - I mean confusion of standpoints. Precise
orientation of these various aspects of the world is one
of the first duties of philosophy, and the ascertainment
of the supreme and ultimate standpoint is perhaps its
chief concern.^
2. His Own Philosophical 'Windows'
The two elements of his early environment just referred
to are reflected in his mature point of view; spiritualistic
empiricism. On the one hand, his profo’jnd consideration of
the sciences established his fundamental conviction of the
primacy of the spiritual. Mind must be ultimate, knd we
may note, also, that his own "ultimate standpoint" brought
him back finally to his childhood belief in the supreme
1. EIP, 182-208. Published separately, also.
2. ROE, 2.
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Spirit. Probably the quest for certainty in this regard was
the motive spring of all hie intellectual seeking, at any
rate we know that he regarded theism as tenable only on the
basis of metaphysical idealism. "I take it for granted,”
•^he said in the preface to his earlier Gifford Lectures,
"that till an idealistic (i.e. spiritualistic) view of the
world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but
wasted labour."^ Here then was one of the windows through
which he regarded the world. He spoke of the standpoint
which this entailed as the "historical", the "refined
anthropomorphic," the- "moral," as well as the " spiritualis-
gtic" point of view.
On the other hand, this idealistic standpoint was
checked and balanced by one which we may call pragmatic
empiricism. It is seen, for instance, in his insistence
that the only possible "beginning" for philosophy is that of
our conscious experience. "...We begin where alone, as I
say, we can truly begin
, here and now with ourselves and
our actual experience as historical fact..."^
1. KAA
,
I. Of. Sorley, "Ward’s Philosophy of Religion,"
Monist
.
36(1926)56-69,
2. ROE, 1-3, 11, 20, 28, 50, 52, 71, etc.
3. EIP, 193. Of. "’In the Beginning’," 277-302. Of.,
also, Stout’s criticisms of Ward's empiricism, MAM, 299,
and passim
. See, supra
.
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Doubtless it was this conviction which drove him to psychol-
ogy, which, for him, was always the science of "experience."^
But in the long run, his idealism, through the instruinen
tality of the principle of continuity, triumphed in large
*
degree over empiricism, and produced his rnonadism. ^hus it
was that he could insist:
In the historical world we place determinate agents
first, and the order and development which we observe we
trace to their action and interaction. It has never been
shown that we need, nor made clear that we can interpret
Nature otherwise.
2
3. The Determining Issues
It seems clear, although Ward nowhere says so, in so
many words, that the dominance of the idealistic note, rather
than the pragmatic-empirical, in his metaphysics, was chiefly
determined by the necessity of solving certain problems which
he regarded as essential issues. These problems came to a
head in two questions, one psychological and epistemological,
and one metaphysical: How can we explain our knowledge of
the "reality" of the "external" world? And how are body and
mind related? Concerning these, as we noted, he remarked
that they "have continued to vex philosophic thinkers from
Descartes’ day to our own, nor will they cease to trouble us
Supra
.
Chap. Six, Sec. A,l.
2. ROE, 20.
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till dualism is laid to rest."^ In that remark is the key
to Ward's own philosophical orientation, and the pass-word
to any pertinent general criticism. Any alternative to Ward's
monadism must satisfactorily meet the test of the problems
of perception and of body-mind relations.
B. Monadism and Its Alternatives
1. Principal Difficulties of Monadism
Our discussion of Ward's pluralistic spiritualism and
the application of it to some of the problems of the physical
world and of living beings has revealed certain inherent
difficulties. These may be siimmarized as follows:
(i) First of all, there is the essential abstractness of
panpsychism, per se . This is not to deny the validity of
Ward's monumental defense of the spiritualistic standpoint,
in Naturalism and Aginosticism. That defense, in ray judgment,
is sound and perhaps final. But there remains, nevertheless,
the Question as to the meaning and development of that
standpoint in metaphysics. Presumably, metaphysics is to be
guided by that "'philosophic spirit'" which Ward defined
1. PP, 12
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specifically as
...the habit of reflecting upon one’s stock of
knowledges ^ in the hope of unifying them all... into such
form and order as to render them an intelligible and organ-
ic whole.
2
If so, then any system which takes one essential character-
istic of our experience, one of the two chief aspects of
reality,^ and declares it to be, in fact, the other aspect,
is guilty of an abstractness on a par with that of naturalism.
Naturalism has simply chosen the more plausible, but less
defensible, aspect to advance as primary.
(ii) This abstract quality, in my judgment, roots back in
an exaggerated application of the principle of continuity in
Ward's metaphysics. At this point he is following Leibniz,
and, to some extent, Lotze. They lead him into the very
path of abstractness that he has eschewed in naturalism. If
indeed "the principle of continuity then gives us no title
to infer from the distinction reached by analysis to the
separate existence of the factors analyzed,"^ as he rightly
observed, neither does it warrant our flying in the face of
empirical evidence. His own theory of epigenesis should have
1. With Hamilton, Spencer and others. Ward would revive
this Baconian term.
2. EIP, 210. No italics in the text.
3. See ROE, 1-3.
4. pp, 442 n.3. Note this whole passage.
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been raised by him to a metaphysical general principle. It
might have saved him from panpsychism.*
(iii) Further, in the application of monadism to the
natural world we saw the very grave practical question that -
arose as to the extension of the concept of psychical anima-
tion to the lower organisms and to "inanimate" nature. This
is the empirical result of his intellectual abstractness.
We have discussed it at some length.^ It remains "an enormous
2
extrapolation "
.
(iv) And, in addition, we found, certain particular
3problems only very questionably solved by Ward. Of such, there
may be mentioned, e.g., the explanation of all fixity in
nature as due to habit, the problem of physical interaction,
the location of mind and dominance in a single monad, the
explanation of free determination on the basis of cognition
and interest.
2.
Important Affirmations in Ward’s Thought
On the other hand, and in spite of these difficulties,
there are some affirmations of indubitable value, in Ward's
thought. Among these, it seems to me, are the following.'^
1. See supra
.
Chaps. Nine, Secs, c, 3 and 4; Ten, Sec. A.
2. Broad, UPN, 645.
3. For references, see"Table of Contents,"
4. For references, see "Table of Contents.
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(i) He was undoubtedly correct in his assumption that any
valid metaphysics must account for the teleological facts
of the universe, and his conclusion that neither mechanistic
naturalism nor agnostic monism can do that.
(ii) In my judgment he was correct in rejecting the
solutions of the body-mind problem based on substantial
dualism and singular is tic monism,
(iii) k reanalysis of experience was indeed necessary in
his day, and the functional viewpoint he introduced into
English psychology is, in the main, valid and indispensable.
(iv) In particular, his assertion of the duality of
subject and object as the fundamental duality of experience,
per se
.
and his strong argument for the reality and effective
activity of the subject are sound and invaluable for a valid
philosophy.
(v) His arguments for a realistic solution of the problem
of interaction, while "spotty", seem to me to indicate its
superiority to occasionalism.
(vi) Ward makes an excellent case for his application of
monadism to the problem of evolution. At least with respect
to or--;anic evolution, his arguments for the necessity of
accounting for teleology, for the probability of the
inheritance of acquired characters, and for the validity of
the mnemic theory of heredity (in some form) seem valid.
t
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(vii) His analysis of the general problem of freedom and
determinism is, in the main, sound, even though his psychical
theory of determination be rejected,
3. Alternatives to Monadism
a. Other Theistic Idealisms
Ward assumed a quite philosophical attitude toward the
solutions of the crucial issues involved which came within the
limits of possibility, as he viewed possibility. Toward
mechanistic naturalism and agnostic monism - for him the alpha
and omega of exploded systems of metaphysics - he was un-
yielding, offering no quarter at any point. But toward the
1
"milder", theistic, spiritual singularisms and toward
occasionalistic idealisms, he was sympathetic, recognizing
allies in a common cause. This is illustrated well in his
treatment of the difficulties raised by the problem of
transeunt action, where, on the one hand, he freely acknowl-
edged his indebtedness to Botze^ and on the other hand,
frankly admitted that with respect to his own "natural
realism" versus the occasionalistic solution, "we have no
1. Such as those of Royce and Lotze.
S. ROE, 215-219.
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means of deciding empirically between the two alternatives'll
And at the end of his lengthy note on "Relation of Body and
Mind, "we find this revealing sentence: "The only alternative
left seems to be that adopted by the occasionalist
;
and
perhaps to some this may seem preferable" i
.
Again, in a note appended to the later editions of Naturalism
and Agnosticism
, we find this frank statement, in reply to
a criticism by Prof. D. G. Ritchie;^
Professor Ritchie's own conclusion, that 'the
ultimate reality of all things animate and inanimate is
their meaning for the one mind which is_ the universe in
its inner aspect* is, as he surmises, 'not very different
from' my own.^
b. Common Sense or Critical Realism
This reference to Professor Ritchie's position indicates
a third alternative, in addition to absolute idealism and
personalistic occasionalism, which Ward seemanever seriously
to have considered in detail. This appendictory note of one
paragraph seems to be the only place he has discussed it.
Perhaps because of its ultimate theism (or idealism) he
lumped it, in his thinking, with absolute idealism. Yet today,
at least, in view of the excellent work of men like Stout,
1. ROE, 260. Note whole Chapter XII, "The Cosmology of
Theism, 249-269,
2. "Nature and Mind," notes on Ward's NAA, in Phil .
Rev., 9(1900)241-267. Note especially 264.
3. NAA, II, 286.
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Pratt and Drake, this point of view is both independent and
vocal. Let us see the all too brief and inadequate question
and the substance of Ward’s ansv;er, as he recorded them:
professor Ritchie asks:
"May not the universe be both at once, through and
through mechanical when regarded in its material and
spatial aspect, teleological when regarded in its spiritual
aspect...? Unquestionably, provided the teleological be
regarded as ultimate and supreme, provided too we are not
asked to accept an irresolvable dualism of material and
spiritual.^
So far as it goes, this question and answer are plain
enough. The decision between the two positions must be made
on the basis of detailed study. It is perhaps of interest
to conclude this dissertation (since it is no part of its
task to build a positive alternative to Ward's raonadism) with
an observation, particularly pertinent in view of the summary
of the difficulties of monadism suggested above: that
critical realism in epistemology, and refined common sense
in metaphysics (plus the development of the doctrine of emer-
gent evolution since Ward's day) open possibilities of a new
detailed study of the "crucial problems", such as was not
possible in Ward's time. Keeping to the general viewpoint
"not very different from" Ward's own, it may be possible to
work out a solution which shall avoid or overcome the
difficulties both of monadism and of occasionalistic
1. NAA, II, 285.
2, Supra
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.
personalism, while conserving the valid affirmations of both.
However that may be, it is just as well for a disciple of
Ward to remember that he himself begins the first page of
The Realm of Ends with Bradley's remark that "in the end
Reality is inscrutable," and with the observation that
"Nobody now-a-days - save here and there a man of science
off his beat, like Haeckel for example - has the hardihood
%
to rush into print with a final explanation of the Universe."
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SUMMARY
A. Orientation and Basic Standpoint
1. In the investigation of the relations of body and
%
mind as viewed, e.g.
,
in the light of the monadology of James
Ward, the first task must be that of orientation.
2. Metaphysical speculation, essential as it is for this
problem, must start from, and constantly be checked by, the
scientifically determined facts, and must further be controlled
and guided by the logic of the situation. In a word, there
is no "cheap and easy" solution of the problem worth the
having; and yet, in view of the difficulty of ascertaining
the facts, and in view of the determinative value of metaphys-
ical factors, any solution must remain probably tentative.
3. Rejecting, on apparently sound grounds, Cartesian
substantial dualism, naturalistic realism, and agnostic and
singularistic monisms. Ward's ontology is pluralistic
spiritualism or personalism. He holds that reality consists
of cognitive and conative beings, of various grades, whose
interaction (singly or organized into societies) is purely
psychical.
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B. The Meaning of "Experience”
4. In seeking a solution of the body-raind and related
problems, Ward's first task was the reanalysis of experience,
in order to lay bare the fundamental duality in unity, in
experience, of subject and object, and to establish the
independent reality and effective activity of the subject of
experience. Both of these "facts" of experience had been
lost sight of for several centuries as a result of the
Cartesian substantial dualism and its descendants.
5. Dr. John 3. Marshall makes the claim - exceedingly
important if true - that the problem of the presentational
continuum in Ward's psychology is a problem of making clear
his methodological presuppositions (which means, apparently.
Ward's application of the principle of continuity); and that
one need not pass beyond the level of the continuum to find
Ward's pluralism transcended.
6. These claims are evidently the result of failure
on Marshall's part to orient himself and carefully to
distinguish 'the respective standpoints of science and
metaphysics in Ward's thought; for the doctrine of the
continuum is a scientific theory, involving only a most
general use of the speculative principle of continuity, and
having little or no metaphysical significance, -per se .
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C, Problems Raised by Panpsychism
7. Turning now to the consideration of particular
problems of matter and the body, we find that Ward's rejection
of occasionalistic idealism seems probably justified (although
not all of his arguments are valid); for occasionalism seems
to have little warrant in epistemology for positing any more
realistic existence for persons than for things. And in
meeting the problems of evolution, realism would seem to have
the advantage.
8. But in the panpsychic aspect of his pluralism, we
run into grave difficulties which indicate that he is not
justified in his exaggerated application of the principle of
continuity, whereby (following Leibniz and Lotze, and
abandoning the empirical aspect of his general method) he
extends the concept of psychical animation beyond limits
psychologically or otherwise scientifically verifiable.
9. For example, his psychical explanation of physical
interaction begins with a questionably abstract Lotzian
analysis of transeunt action, and utterly ignores the wide
difference in empirical and metaphysical level of the
interacting bodies and the monads.
10. And his explanation of all fixity, mechanism and law
in nature, on the basis of the conations and habits of the
psychical beings he calls ’’bare monads,” while not
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an impossible conception, is certainly not very convincing.
D. The Philosophy of Evolution
11. Then, again, his attempt to extend the psychic
explanation of evolution as creative synthesis, below the
level of living organisms, at least, is open to criticism.
12. Yet his clear recognition of the teleological
factors in evolution, his general position that inheritance
of acquired characters (in some form, at least) is necessary
and valid, and his concept of evolution as epigenetic in
character, are sound, and he makes a good case for them.
E. “Mind” and "Body”
13. Concerning "mind” and "body,” we find that Ward
identifies the subject of experience with the dominant monad
and develops a conception of the individual organism as a
society of monads in intimate "functional” relationship with
their own dominant monad. To all the rest of the monads of
the universe outside his own organism, the dominant monad
maintains a far less intimate "foreign” relation, through
the instrumentality of his subordinate monads.
14. Thus "mind,” as commonly used (e.g., in speaking of
the body-mind problem), is the experience of the subject or
dominant monad: both his own subjective experience and his
psychologically objective experience due to his psychical
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interaction with his subordinates.
15. And “body" is an epistemological and metaphysical
“projection" by the subject, based on that part of his
psychologically objective experience due to direct relations
with his subordinates.
16. Careful distinction of the various meanings of the
term “objective" is absolutely necessary here; for in Ward's
thought all of both “mind" and “body" (in the usual sense)
is psychologically objective, except for the subjective
feeling and attentive activity of the dominant monad or
subject; yet only a part of "mind" and all of “body" are
epistemologically objective; while the very purpose of his
monad ism is to guard carefully the meaning of metaphysical
objectification, in order to avoid the pitfalls of those
substantial fallacies which render body-mind, perception
and related problems insoluble.
F. Ward's Modified Interactionism
17. In Ward's thought, then, the basic duality in exper-
ience is that of subject and object, which is the adumbration
or expression, on the empirical level, of the relation of the
dominant monad to his subordinates (and through them to the
rest of the universe), on the metaphysical level.
18. This modified interactionism, be it noted, holds
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that all interaction - including so-called body mind inter-
action, transeunt action, and that which is called free
determination, in the organic realm - all is purely psychical
relationship of monads of varying rank and position,
19. Ward’s solution of the body-mind problem, therefore,
will stand or fall with his concept of the extension of
psychical animation to the whole range of nature; and that
involves his entire metaphysics.
20. Ward himself recognized that the ultimate question
was that of the meaning of all things for the supreme mind,
and that there were certain reasonable alternatives to his
panpsychism and his pluralism, which ”to some... may seem
preferable." Such are theistic absolute idealism of the
"mild" type of Lotze or Royce, occasionalistic personalism,
and refined common sense and critical realism.
21. Developments in philosophy, particularly in
epistemology and Maturphilosoohie
.
since Ward’s day, would
seem to call for a type of reexamination of the "crucial
problems" of metaphysics from the realistic point of view,
which Ward, naturally was not in position to undertake.
This dissertation, however, pretends to be nothing more than
a part of the prolegomena to such a reconsideration.

242
.
G. Conclusions
(1) Ward's philosophy was fundamentally an attempt at a
metaphysical solution of two crucial problems: body-mind
relations, and perception.
(2) This attempt was made necessary by the dualist ic
view of the disparateness of substances, and the singularistic
contradiction of scientifically ascertained facts.
(3) He demonstrated that the basic duality found in
experience by an adequate psychology is that of subject and
object within experience, not one of matter and mind, as
commonly held.
(4) Ward's psychological analysis and theoretical
synthesis establish the importance and free activity of the
subject, in the development of individual experience.
(5) The objective continuum is, for Ward, a purely
psychological totwn of presentations, analogous to the “datum
self in Brightman's thought, and the Gestalt “configniration.
“
(6) The doctrine of the continuum is, therefore,
primarily a scientific theory, and does not have the funda-
mental metaphysical significance inferred by Dr. Marshall.
(7) The only ground for Ward's extension of the concept
of psychical animation beyond empirical limits is the
methodological principle of continuity.
(8) Ward's psychical explanation of all fixity, law.
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mechanism and “transeunt action" in nature is purely
hypothetical, without empirical justification.
(9) Likewise, his well-reasoned insistence upon the
place and importance of the psychical element in evolution
departs from any factual basis when extended to the
inorganic realm.
(10) Ward’s modification of the interactionist theory
of body-mind relations consists in substituting the
psychical interaction of monads for an interaction of mental
and physical substances.
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JOSEPH SCOTT PENNEPACKER
Joseph Scott Pennepacker was born March 25, 1896, in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the only son and eldest child of
four born to Frank Scott Pennepacker and his wife, Annie
Keen. His parents were of Pennsylvania Dutch and Scotch-
Irish ancestry, descended from some of the earliest represent
atives of- those racial strains to come to America.
His early education was in the public schools of
Philadelphia, but was interrupted in the third year of high
school by the acceptance of the position of laboratory
assistant at the Randall Morgan Laboratory of Physics, of the
University of Pennsylvania. After several years, having
taken advantage of public and serai-public night schools, he
entered the University of Pennsylvania, College Department,
in Arts and Sciences, by passing the Entrance Examinations.
Again the path of his education was interrupted, in
1917-1918, for the better part of a year spent in teaching
physics and other subjects in the Media, Penna.
,
High School.
Also, in conjunction with the last two years of college work,
he served as Methodist Secretary, and Employment Secretary,
of the University Christian Association. The degree of
Bachelor of Science in Arts and Sciences was received in 1919.
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The school year of 1919-1920 was spent with the Student
Volunteer Movement, as Registrar of the Seventh International
Convention of that organization.
In June of 1920 he matriculated at Garrett Biblical
Institute, Evanston, Illinois. During his seminary years he
served two student charges, and also took several courses
in the Graduate School of Northwestern University. In
iiugust, 1923, he received the degree of Bachelor of Divinity
from Garrett Biblical Institute, and immediately accepted
appointment as pastor of the Methodist Church at Libby,
Montana. In the Autumn of 1926, he entered Boston Univer-
sity Graduate School, and began work for the present degree.
Having been ordained into the ministry of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, in 1924 and 1926, he has continued to
serve churches in the New England Southern Conference of
his Church. In 1929-1930, in addition to serving a church,
he taught physics in the Collegiate Institute at New Haven,
Connecticut, and completed a year of graduate study at Yale
University,. During the past few years, while serving the
church at Warren, Rhode Island, he ha.s pursued several
courses of study at Brown University.
He is married, with five children.
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